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Abstract 
This thesis studies ways to improve Non-Cooperative Game theory (NCGT) as a policy making 
methodology. NCGT allows to categorize a wide range of situations and to provide solutions. 
However, the effectiveness of such solutions depends on whether cooperative behavior can arise. 
The common presence of  cooperative behavior in real life systems often threaten NCGT  solutions 
reliability.  Furthermore, most studies in NCGT literature fail to account for important dynamics of 
real life problems. Understanding such dynamics is of critical importance for policy analysis. We 
analyze three well-known non-cooperative games: the Cournot oligopoly, the public goods game, 
and the dictator game. To link this thesis with the existing literature, we analyze these games in 
contexts they have been applied before such as commodity markets and climate change conferences 
(COPs). We use simulations and experiments as means to test the solutions provided by NCGT in 
each specific case.  
 
We start by using the Cournot oligopoly to study the case of deregulated electricity markets. In a 
first study, we use simulations to test the effectiveness of two capacity mechanisms (i.e. 
mechanisms intended to stabilize capacity investments in the market) under different uncertainty 
levels in the market. Contrary to theoretical predictions, capacity mechanisms present substantial 
differences in market stability, market welfare and sensitivity to uncertainty. We found the most 
market oriented mechanism to be the best option overall. 
 
In a second study, we conduct an experiment to tests the findings of the first study. We found 
unexpected market reactions to one of the mechanisms leading to much worse results than what the 
literature suggests. We found the most market oriented mechanism to be the best one once more.  
 
In a third study, we use an experiment to test Meadows’ dynamic hypothesis for the hog market 
cycle (Meadows ,1970). Contrary to economic theory and previous laboratory experiments, we 
found strong evidence of lasting price cycles. 
 
In a fourth study, we carry out a public goods laboratory experiment to compare two procedures 
used in climate negotiations (COPs), one of which has been deemed as ineffective by the NCGT 
literature. We found no significant difference between the two procedures in terms of promoting 
cooperation. We also found significantly higher contributions than theory predicted. 
 
In the fifth article, we study whether the Dark triad framework can be a good predictor of people’s 
decisions in the dictator game, and whether those decisions are consistent with theoretical 
predictions. Using a laboratory experiment, we do not find evidence to consider the Dark triad a 
good predictor in this case. 
   iii                     
 
This thesis contributes to a better understanding of the existing limitations in NCGT as 
methodology for policy analysis. This should call for further efforts to understand these limitations 
in particular contexts and propose solutions to them. Also, the combined methodology proposed in 
this thesis should serve as a motivation to improve NCGT theoretical predictions in light of dynamic 
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1.  Overview 
Non-cooperative game theory (NCGT) provides a platform to study different situations 
with no enforceable cooperation (Nash 1950, 1951; Smith, 1982; Owen, 1995; Gibbons, 
1992; Rasmusen, 2007; Bolton and Dewatripoint, 2005). Such situations often lead to 
problematic interactions between players with various decisions affecting and 
influencing each other (Aumann and Schelling, 2005). Examples of this can be found in 
several social disciplines such as management, political science, international relations, 
social psychology, law, among others (e.g. Nutter, 1964; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; 
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Rosenthal, 1981; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Ledyard, 
1997; Aumann, 2003). In spite of their applicability to a wide variety of problems, NCGT 
present an intriguing predicament when used to propose real life problem solutions in 
non-cooperative situations. If a real-life problem solution is not consistent with NCGT 
predictions, such a solution is likely to fail. If a solution is consistent with NGCT 
predictions, such a solution is also likely to fail, given that its success is contingent on 
the absence of cooperative behavior1. Therefore, both theoretically inconsistent and 
consistent solutions are likely to fail in real life. This issue challenges NGCT models’ 
capacity to design public policies, as McCain (2009, p4) states:  
 
“Non-cooperative behavior is common enough so that a social arrangement that is 
unstable in the face of non-cooperative behavior will probably fail. However, solutions 
based on non-cooperative game theory may be unstable in the face of cooperative or 
collusive behavior, and cooperative behavior is common enough that such solutions will 
themselves often fail. Thus, non-cooperative game theory is far less effective as a 
prescriptive tool for public policy”.  
 
                                                 
1 Consider a market as an example. If there is no cooperation, NCGT anticipates could anticipate a Nash 
equilibrium solution. If there is cooperation, monopoly-like behavior is likely to arise, which in turn 
steers the market away from the Nash equilibrium i.e. the NCGT proposed solution. 
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One possible solution for this issue, is to improve the non-cooperative models by 
including the most important elements of cooperative models, since it seems that 
separating cooperation and non-cooperation is not possible in real life (Maskin, 2004). A 
formal definition of the non-cooperative and cooperative branches of Game theory is 
offered by Chatain (2014, p1): “Cooperative game theory focuses on how much players 
can appropriate given the value each coalition of players can create, while non-
cooperative game theory focuses on which moves players should rationally make”. In 
principle, the fundamental definitions of the two do not suggest any intrinsic challenge 
to create models based on both branches of Game theory. However, there are several 
limitations and challenges to do so in practice. First, it is not clear how competitive 
behavior can explain the mechanisms that lead to coalition formation, organization and 
competition between coalitions (Aumann and Dreze, 1974; Carraro, 2003; McCain, 
2009). Moreover, much of the literature on both non-cooperative and cooperative models 
is based on highly simplified assumptions, which on the one hand allow researchers to 
gain insights about different solutions, but on the other hand, limits these games 
applicability to real life problems, as well as the possibilities to integrate both branches 
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Rasmusen, 2007; Schelling, 2010). 
 
Another possible solution is to improve the decision-making theories that support non-
cooperative games. Several studies have been conducted to accomplish this (e.g. 
Rapoport and Chammah ,1965; Poundstone, 1992; Cooper et al.,1990; Van Huyck et. al., 
1990;). Improving decision-making theories is especially important when one 
acknowledges that many real-life problems are embedded in complex dynamic 
environments. Complex dynamic environments can compromise the accuracy of 
theoretical predictions, since such environments are known to facilitate unexpected (and 
undesired) outcomes, such as instabilities in markets (Arango and Moxnes, 2012), 
disturbances in supply chains (Sterman, 1989), and suboptimal resource management 
policies (Moxnes, 2004). Therefore, having a clear understanding of the dynamics 
players face in real life and how such dynamics influence players’ decisions is essential 
to design effective policies (McCain, 2009). In addition, an improved knowledge of these 
issues is of course interesting to producers, investors and financial agents. 
 
Despite the importance of dynamic components in real non-cooperative situations, most 
modern textbooks in game theory scarcely address how such components can impact 
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expected outcomes (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; McCain, 2009; Dinar et al., 
2008; Ott, 2006; Carmichael, 2004; Aumann and Hart, 2002). Journal articles concerning 
these types of games explore feedback driven dynamic behavior such as strategy 
evolution (Nax and Pradelski, 2015) and directional learning adjustments (Nax, 2015). 
Besides few exceptions (e.g. Van Long, 2010; Ding et al., 2014a; Ding et al., 2014b), 
non-cooperative studies generally do not take important aspects of complexity into 
account, such as accumulation and time delays, which are important in many real-life 
systems (Arango and Moxnes, 2012; Pierson and Sterman, 2013; Moxnes, 2012). 
Moreover, in absence of dynamic elements, many non-cooperative models may prescribe 
policies that can lead to unexpected outcomes in reality, given that these elements may 
alter the assumptions such games are based on (Aumann, 1973; Stuart, 2001). This thesis 
aims to contribute in correcting this issue. By using simulations and experiments, this 
thesis studies different situations that are conceived as one of three well-known games; 
namely, the Cornout oligopoly, the public goods game, and the dictator game. By doing 
so, this thesis aims to first, point out ways to improve theory in these three games, and 
second, propose policies that are not only supported by the principles of Non-cooperative 
game theory but also by simulations and experiments in which human decision-making 
biases and realistic dynamics are accounted for.  
2. Background  
Each of the studies in this thesis is based on one of three well-known games in the 
scientific literature, namely Cournot Oligopoly, public goods, and dictator game. This 
section makes a brief literature review of these games and discusses difficulties of using 
such games as a basis for policy formulation. 
 
2.1. Cournot oligopoly 
 
Ever since Cournot (1838) proposed his first oligopoly model in his work “Recherches 
sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses”, Cournot’s oligopoly 
model has been widely used to study market competition (See e.g. Von Mouche and 
Quartieri, 2016 for a comprehensive review). With almost two centuries of history, one 
could expect that its relevance today would be diminished. However, the literature 
concerning market competition seems to suggest otherwise (Von Mouche and Quartieri, 
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2016). This, of course, does not mean that problems in the original formulation by 
Cournot have not been found, in fact, the model’s solution has been challenged on more 
than one occasion (e.g. Palander, 1939; Theocharis, 1960; Puu, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
model’s main contributions about market convergence towards an equilibrium still 
remain (Cánovas et al., 2008). 
 
Simulation studies based on the Cournot oligopoly have been widely used to study 
different issues. Recent journal articles using simulations, use Cournot’s formulation to 
study contingent workforce effects (Matsumoto et al., 2015), strategic minerals markets 
(Hecking and Panke, 2015), isoelastic demand markets (Fanti et al, 2013), multi-product 
oligopolies (Wu and Ma, 2014), among many other issues. Experimental studies on 
oligopoly competition have been the subject of many publications for many decades 
(Smith, 1962; Fouraker et al., 1961; Hoggatt, 1959). Modern articles about these studies 
focus on a wide variety of issues, such as quantity and price competition, exogenous 
timing, price dispersion, tacit collusions among others (See Potters and Suetens, 2013 for 
a review of modern oligopoly experimental studies). 
 
Regarding its main predictions, the Cournot Oligopoly suggests that players will 
converge towards the Nash equilibrium, even with large number of players (Cournot, 
1838). While the convergence towards the Nash equilibrium is generally accepted as a 
benchmark of rational behavior, the stability of such equilibrium has been shown to be 
weak, even if one assumes firms to be identical (Agiza, 1998; Ahmed and Agiza, 1998; 
Puu, 2006). However, a number of experimental studies have shown that such 
equilibrium can be reached as players gain more experience in the game (e.g. Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1991). In fact, the typical strategy chosen by players can either lead to the 
game’s convergence (see e.g. the market-inertia based reply process in Kandori et al., 
1993) or divergence (see e.g the best reply process in Theocharis, 1960). This overall 
strategy has been shown to be highly information-sensitive (Huck et al., 1999). 
Therefore, one must be careful when using the Cournot Oligopoly to study a specific 
market. Failing to give an important piece of information or giving the wrong information 
will directly affect the competition level which in turn will affect the game’s applicability 
to a given market (Huck et al., 2004). This thesis uses simulation and experiments based 
on the Cournot Oligopoly to assess whether players’ decisions can generate specific 
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market behaviors based on a given set of conditions and a given set of available 
information that resemble what is found in specific real markets. 
 
2.2. Public goods game 
 
Common resources, public goods  and public bad have, for a very long time been 
regarded as a great challenge for scientists and policy makers alike. Problems associated 
with these goods seem to be especially difficult to solve, even when the cause of the 
problem is well known to the actors involved (Ostrom, 1990). The management and 
adequate procurement of common resources have been study extensively, ever since 
Hardin (1968) published his article “The tragedy of the commons”. Along with Hardin’s 
influential article, many authors consider Samuelson’s paper “The pure theory of public 
expenditure” (Samuelson, 1954) to be the foundation of modern theory of public goods 
(Pickhard, 2006). In this context, the public good game offers the possibility to study to 
what extent agents contribute to a public good given a set of conditions. The game’s main 
theoretical prediction is the convergence towards free riding i.e. the Nash equilibrium 
(Andreoni, 1995). 
 
Modern articles using simulation on the public goods game are mostly focused on 
punishment/reward mechanisms to sustain cooperation. Some of the issues in this regard 
include threshold-driven cooperation (Mikkelsen and Bach, 2016), the effect of adaptive 
reputation (Chen et al, 2016), and collective punishment (Gao et al, 2015). Similarly, 
modern experimental studies deal with institutional frameworks, participation 
mechanisms and group structure effects on sustained cooperation. Topics currently 
discussed include: institutional deterrence (Kingsley and Brown, 2016), voluntary 
participations in public goods (Hong and Lim, 2016), institutional reciprocity (Ozono et 
al, 2016), group size inefficacies (Diederich et al, 2016) among others.  
 
Predictions based on the public goods can present a number of weaknesses. Both 
theoretical and experimental studies suggest that players may voluntarily contribute to 
public goods to a greater extent than the Nash equilibrium predicts (Bergstrom et al. 
1986; Bernheim, 1986; Ledyard, 1995). While such contributions do not typically reach 
a socially efficient level, they do pose important questions about what the triggering 
factors for such contributions are. Previous research has shown that player contributions 
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decrease as the uncertainty about the public good payoff increases (Burger and Kolstad, 
2008). This finding poses great challenges for real life situations that are commonly 
characterized as public good games such as the climate change agreements. In this sense, 
having certainty about the consequences/benefits of contributing to climate emission 
abatement is a crucial point to ensure a high level of collaboration among nations. This 
becomes even more challenging when one considers that countries have asymmetric 
consequences/benefits derived from climate emissions abatement. The fourth paper of 
this thesis uses simulations and experiments to study how climate change agreements 
could be improved, in light of asymmetry and certainty about different nations’ payoff 
structures.  
 
2.3. The dictator game 
 
The distribution of income has been one of the most popular concerns in the experimental 
games literature (Engel, 2010). In fact, this issue has been of interest for many 
researchers, especially since Daniel Kahneman proposed the Ultimatum game in 1986 
(Kahneman et al. 1986). One of the main questions since then is, what makes people 
behave differently than what theory predicts when there are no apparent rational reasons 
to do so? The dictator game was first developed to answer this specific question, by 
taking out any “fear of punishment” effect from the ultimatum game. The dictator game 
has been a popular game among experimentalist, thus providing a vast body of findings 
to different research questions.  For this reason, the dictator game has been highly praised 
in the literature, both for its usefulness and its simplicity (Forsythe et al.,1994). In fact, 
this game has allowed researchers to challenge the traditional profit-maximizing decision 
making that has been traditionally believed to be the norm in economics (Kahneman et 
al., 1986).  
 
Modern simulation studies that focus on the dictator game are primarily concerned with 
two issues. The first issue is how well can individual beliefs and neural-cognitive models 
explain dictators’ behavior (e.g. Beullens et al., 2012). The second issue is the role of 
institutional punishment in societies, see for instance Gyorgy, (2008) who uses 
prescriptive agents (agents played by the computer) along with human subjects to explore 
this issue. Recent articles shows an interest in the effects of social values and 
psychological traits on the dictators’ behavior. See for instance studies of generosity as a 
result of self-worth (Przepiorka and Liebe, 2016), social value orientation (Wei et al., 
2016), reputation and cooperation (Wu et al., 2016) and social contingency (Rutledge et 
al., 2016). 
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The standard prediction of the dictator game is the convergence to the Nash equilibrium, 
that is, the dictator will give zero percent of his endowment to his counterpart. However, 
many studies that use the dictator game have shown that subjects give significantly more 
to their counterparts than theory predicts, in fact, subjects give around 28% on average 
according to Engel (2010). These findings have created additional questions such as: do 
people give away part of their endowment out of altruism? if not, is it because of strategic 
reasons derived from a fear of being in the other’s position later on? There is no definite 
answer to these questions yet, but different studies point out that it is not only altruism 
that explains players giving away part of their endowment (Bolton and Ockenfels 1998; 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Charness and Rabin 2002; Bradsley, 2008). Furthermore, 
players’ generosity has been linked to several context-dependent factors such as age of 
the dictator, perceived deservedness of the recipient, anonymity in the game, among 
others (See Engel (2010) for a meta study of such factors). 
3. Papers 
This section presents the central problems and explains the hypotheses to be tested in 
each of the papers presented in this thesis. All the null hypotheses are based on rational 
expectations (Muth, 1961). Thus, these hypotheses state convergence to the Nash 
equilibrium. Random and statistically insignificant deviations from the Nash equilibrium 
do not constitute a reason to reject this hypothesis; only systematic and significant 
deviations do. Most of the alternative hypotheses are based on Bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1979), which implies the use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1987). 
Heuristics arise when task complexity outweighs the subjects’ cognitive capabilities 
(Kleinmuntz, 1993). While such heuristics can lead to satisfying results in simple 
problems, their effectiveness tend to diminish as the complexity of the problem increases 
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3.1 Paper 1: Uncertainty and the long-term adequacy of supply: 
Simulations of capacity mechanisms in electricity markets 
 
By David Lara-Arango, Santiago Arango-Aramburo, and Erik R. Larsen 
 
This paper studies two effects of capacity policies on a the welfare generation of 
deregulated electricity markets and on price stability. The method is simulations with 
different levels of uncertainty. The two policy mechanisms are Procurement for long-
term strategic reserves contracting and Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts 
(Finon and Pignon, 2008). If rational expectations were assumed, neither of the two 
mechanisms would have a significant effect, since the market would be capable of 
converging to the Nash equilibrium by itself. However, it is clear that real deregulated 
electricity markets do not show such convergence (Olsina et al., 2006; Arango and 
Larsen, 2011; Olaya et al., 2015). Hence, this paper assumes bounded rationality for 
investment decisions. Specifically, the model assumes adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 
1958) that can lead to price cycles (Meadows, 1970), as has been observed in real 
electricity markets (Arango and Larsen, 2011). In addition, the paper hypothesizes that 
uncertainty plays a significant role when determining the effectiveness of a given 
capacity mechanism, i.e. uncertainty can make a given mechanism fail even if such a 
mechanism is the theoretically most sound.   
 
3.2 Paper 2: Towards a long-term economic welfare in deregulated 
electricity markets: Testing capacity mechanisms in an 
experimental setting. 
 
By David Lara-Arango, Santiago Arango-Aramburo, and Erik R. Larsen 
 
This paper is closely related to the previous one as it uses experiments to study the same 
two policy mechanisms; Procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting and 
Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts (Finon and Pignon, 2008). The null 
hypothesis is based on rational expectations and thus, the experiments are expected to 
converge towards the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The alternative hypothesis is based on 
simulations using adaptive expectations heuristics (Nerlove, 1958). Hypothesized 
heuristics are built using data from previous experimental studies  (Arango and Moxnes, 
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2012; Lara-Arango, 2014; Alcaraz, 2010). In correspondence with such simulations, 
Procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting is hypothesized to present the 
best results for the market both in terms of economic expected value and economic 
stability. 
 
3.3 Paper 3: Testing meadows' hog cycle theory by laboratory 
experiment 
 
By David Lara-Arango and Erling Moxnes 
 
As the title indicates, this paper tests Meadows (1970) theory about cycles in the hog 
market in the US through a Cournot experiment. The hog or pork cycle is a well-known 
example of price fluctuation in commodity markets. Meadows’ model presents features 
that differ from other commodities, for instance, the possibility to hold inventory and the 
fact that capacity expansions (livestock) lead to an immediate reduction in production 
(slaughtering). The null hypothesis states that players behave with Perfect rationality and 
thus, the market price will be stable and converge towards the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
The alternative hypothesis is based on bounded rationality and states that players will 
behave according to Meadows’ heuristics formulation. Meadows’ heuristics is based on 
adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 1958).  
 
3.4 Paper 4: Making climate conferences more effective? 
 
By Erling Moxnes and David Lara-Arango. 
 
The academic community showed marked skepticism towards pledges in the COP 21 
(Inman, 2009, Cooper, 2010; Cramton et al., 2015; Gollier and Tirole, 2015) while 
pledges received considerable support from the public at large (Solutions, 2015). This 
study aims to contribute to the COPs literature by directly comparing a pledges-based 
procedure such as the one used in the COP 21 with a negotiation procedure such as the 
one use in the Kyoto protocol. The method is laboratory experiments. If players behave 
with perfect rationality, both procedures will converge to the Nash equilibrium and there 
will be no difference between them. If players behave with Bounded rationality, neither 
the social optimum nor the Nash equilibrium will be achieved and differences between 
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procedures can be expected. Specifically, the negotiations procedure (resembling the 
Kyoto protocol) is expected to yield higher contributions given the absence of 
punishment mechanisms in the pledges-based procedure (Stiglitz, 2015). 
 
3.5 Paper 5: Socially aversive personalities and income distribution: 
Can the dark triad predict behavior in the dictator and gangster 
games? 
 
By David Lara-Arango. 
 
This paper studies how well the Dark triad of human personality (Paulhus and Williams, 
2002) can predict income distribution decisions in controlled environments. The Dark 
triad of human personality has been a widely-researched topic in behavioral psychology 
(Furnham et al, 2013). It comprises three elements; Narcissism, Machiavellianism and 
Psychopathic traits. The combination of these three elements (at subclinical levels) is 
believed to be a powerful predictor of aversive behavior towards others (Jones and 
Paulhus, 2011b). In fact, previous studies suggest that people with the highest scores tend 
to be more aggressive when seeking their goals and are more likely to disregard others’ 
well-being in the process (Jonason and Krause, 2013). This tendency is also consistent 
with higher selfishness and entitlement (Campbell et al, 2004). Hence, a positive 
relationship between the scores in the questionnaire and selfish behavior on both frames 
of the dictator game could be expected. The null hypothesis is that the Dark triad scores 
and the dictator games outcomes will be completely unrelated. Conversely, the 
alternative hypothesis for in this paper states that players with the highest scores in the 
test will also be the ones who give less or take more in their respective games. 
4. Methodology and main findings 
This section introduces the methodology that was employed in each of the papers, and 
presents their main findings. The methodology employed throughout the thesis consists 
of four phases  
 
• Game theory phase: A theoretical model is proposed to address a particular 
problem. 
• Hypotheses phase: Hypotheses are proposed and formalized. 
• Experimental phase: Hypotheses are tested by economic experiments or computer 
simulations. 
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• Comparative phase: Results from the Experimental phase are contrasted with the 
Hypothesized outcomes. 
 
4.1 Paper 1: Uncertainty and the Long-Term Adequacy of Supply: 
Simulations of Capacity Mechanisms in Electricity Markets 
 
By David Lara-Arango, Santiago Arango-Aramburo and Erik R. Larsen 
 
This paper proposes a series of stylized electricity market models to explore the 
effectiveness of two capacity mechanisms in terms of market welfare and security of 
supply. The two mechanisms are Procurement for long-term strategic reserves 
contracting and Centralized auctioning for capacity licenses (Fignon and Pignon, 2008). 
The first mechanism allows the regulator to influence market capacity either by making 
contracts with generators or investing trough a state-owned firm (Meunier and Finon, 
2006). This regulator will make capacity investments when there is a perceived need for 
new capacity. The second mechanism allows the regulator to have control over the total 
market capacity in the form of capacity licenses, which it is ultimately auctioned to the 
generators (Finon and Pignon, 2008). The generators bid for licenses to build capacity, 
that is, they compete to expand their capacity at the best possible license price (Vasquez 
et al., 2003).  
 
The proposed economic model is based on Arango and Moxnes (2012). By assuming 
generators to be price-takers, these models represent a closed-loop formulation, in which 
players decide on a new capacity based on their price expectations. In turn, the price 
results from the generators’ decisions (Wogrin et al, 2013). The paper proposes three 
economic models, a base case using the Arango and Moxnes (2012) formulation, a 
second case in which the first mechanism is implemented and a third case in which the 
second mechanism is implemented. Thereafter, four different simulation scenarios are 
proposed: no stochasticity, low stochasticity, medium stochasticity, and high 
stochasticity.  
 
Simulation results show that, in absence of uncertainty, Centralized auctions for capacity 
licenses lead to a higher market stability. These results are consistent with previous works 
about this mechanism (de Vries and Hakvoort, 2004). On the other hand, Procurement 
for long-term strategic reserves leads to a higher welfare. However, this mechanism 
seems to be less sustainable than the previous one, since it may lead to sustained reduced 
margins for generators. As uncertainty is introduced into the model, both the performance 
of both mechanisms decrease, to the point that it is no longer clear that neither mechanism 
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is recommendable. Centralized auctions for capacity licenses presents the poorer result 
in the high uncertainty treatment after being arguably the best option under no 
uncertainty. 
 
This paper points out the impact of uncertainty when assessing different capacity 
mechanisms. Failing to recognize its importance, may lead to wrong conclusions about 
the adequacy of policy mechanisms. In fact, theoretical assessments made in absence of 
uncertainty may not hold when uncertainty in the market increases. Thus, policies should 
carefully consider the benefits of a given intervention in light of its robustness to different 
levels of market uncertainty.  
 
High levels of uncertainty seem to favor generator interests by inducing semi-permanent 
shortages with high prices. This semi-permanent shortage works in a somewhat similar 
way as when generators are allowed to mothball capacity (Arango et al., 2013), which 
could give them excessive market power. This points out the importance of considering 
welfare generation when assessing capacity mechanisms. 
 
4.2 Paper 2: Towards a long-term economic welfare in deregulated 
electricity markets: Testing capacity mechanisms in an 
experimental setting. 
 
By Santiago Arango-Aramburo, David Lara-Arango, and Erik R. Larsen 
 
This paper proposes an experimental design to test the same two capacity mechanisms 
studied in the previous paper, namely Procurement for long-term strategic reserves and 
Centralized auctioning for capacity licenses. Experiments have been used to study 
various problems in electricity markets such as energy efficiency (Ramos et al., 2015), 
green technologies (Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015), regulatory designs (Rassenti et al., 2003) 
and security of supply (Brandts et al., 2008; Arango et al., 2013; Islyaev and Date, 2015). 
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on security of supply, by using 
economic experiments to assess the potential of the aforementioned capacity mechanisms 
in terms of both market stability and welfare. 
 
Three treatments are considered. The first treatment is Arango and Moxnes’ (2012) last 
treatment, and represents a deregulated electricity market without interventions. The 
second treatment introduces a regulatory firm that invests in the market when a capacity 
shortage is perceived. The third treatment introduces a centralized auctioning system 
through which players can bid for licenses to build new capacity.  The data for the first 
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treatment was taken from Arango and Moxnes (2012). This treatment was not conducted 
again because its main purpose is to serve as a benchmark for the other two, and the same 
subject pool was used. In addition, the same format was followed in the subsequent 
treatments, which makes the three treatments directly comparable. All treatments were 
carried out under the standard protocol for economic experiments (Friedman and Cassar, 
2004). 
 
Experimental results suggest that Procurement for long-term strategic reserves does not 
represent an improvement for the market in neither welfare nor stability terms. Moreover, 
players seem to bear substantial and sustained losses when this mechanism is 
implemented, which compromises its sustainability. In addition to this,  a higher price 
volatility was found in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. Therefore, this mechanism may 
lead to a worse outcome than if the market is left alone with no intervention. In fact, our 
analyses suggest that this mechanism may lead to excessive competition, which as theory 
suggest, can compromise the market’s ability to reach an equilibrium (Huck et al., 1997). 
In contrast, Centralized auctioning for capacity licenses presents an improvement in 
experimental market performances as market welfare is modestly improved while market 
stability is substantially improved. Furthermore, players’ profits are close to the normal 
profit, which implies a sustainable market setting for generators.  
 
This paper shows that some capacity mechanisms can be detrimental for both security of 
supply and welfare in a deregulated electricity market. Unexpected reactions from the 
market actors to an interventionist mechanism can lead to unforeseen and undesirable 
results. This paper’s findings are consistent with previous studies that argue in favor of 
market oriented mechanisms (Meunier and Finon, 2006). Although market oriented 
mechanisms may not be able to counteract high uncertainty, as Paper 1 suggests, they 
can still be plausible to implement, given the intrinsic risk aversion of both consumers 
and producers. Moreover, the cost of blackouts and shortages are typically considered 
more severe than the cost of the mechanism.  
 
4.3 Paper 3: Testing Meadows' hog cycle theory by laboratory 
experiments 
 
By David Lara-Arango and Erling Moxnes 
 
This paper uses a Cournot oligopoly experiment to test Meadows (1970) dynamic 
hypothesis. Meadows model aims to explain the causes of cycles in the US hog industry 
during the 50’s and 60’s. At the time, instabilities in this industry had been commonly 
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associated with instabilities in the corn supply (a critical food source for hogs). After the 
US government implemented the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, through which 
corn supply was stabilized, the hog market cycles did not dismiss. In fact, oscillations 
two decades after the Act was implemented were even larger than before (Dean and 
Heady, 1958). Meadows’ model starts by postulating that it is not the corn price that 
determines profitability for pig farmers, it is rather the ratio of hog price and corn price. 
When this ratio increases, it is more profitable to sell hogs, when this ratio decreases, it 
is less profitable to sell hogs (Meadows, 1970). 
 
Meadows model argues for an endogenously generated cyclical behavior. He argues that 
by stabilizing corn availability and price, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
actually enabled farmers to freely expand or contract their hog stock faster than before, 
which ultimately led to even greater oscillations than in previous years (Breimyer, 1959). 
In order to test his hypothesis, he proposes a dynamic model expanding the Cobweb 
theorem. Meadows model differs from the original Cobweb formulation in two important 
aspects. First, the price perceived by farmers is distinct and different from the commodity 
retail price and second, any change in capacity (breeding stock) will immediately have 
an effect on the slaughtering rate. Hog farming is modeled using an estimated heuristic, 
according to which there is a positive relationship between hog-corn price ratio and the 
desired breeding stock.  
 
This paper uses Meadows’ model as a base to develop a Cournot oligopoly experiment. 
The findings of this experiment suggest that players do not behave with perfect 
rationality, as none of the markets shows convergence towards the Nash equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the study finds strong indications of cyclical behavior in most of the 
experimental markets with some of them exhibiting a period length that resembles the 
one proposed by Meadows. Regressions over players’ decisions indicate that the hog 
price strongly influences players’ decisions as Meadows predicted.  
 
This paper findings indicate that market policies should aim to stabilize prices 
endogenously. This means considering the likelihood of an increase or a decrease in 
investment given the current price. In this sense, market policies should create 






         
                        
15
4.4 Paper 4: Making climate conferences more effective? 
By Erling Moxnes and David Lara-Arango. 
 
This paper compares two Climate conference (COP) procedures, one that resembles the 
Kyoto protocol and one that resembles the Paris agreements in 2015. In order to compare 
these two procedures, the paper proposes a novel game design based on previous public 
good games (Andreoni, 1995). Unlike the traditional game, player payoffs are determined 
by the agreement reached in the last round only rather than by all rounds. In addition, 
asymmetries among player payoff functions are introduced to capture the effect of 
asymmetries among countries. In the same way as previous threshold public good games 
(Brick and Visser, 2015; Tavoni et al., 2011), players are also informed about what the 
social optimum is and what their expected average contribution is. This social optimum 
is an interior solution in the proposed game, which means that the social optimum is less 
than the sum of players’ endowments. This feature accounts for the fact that the climate 
social optimum does not require that all of a countries’ budget has to go to emission 
abatement. 
 
The two procedures are tested in two experimental treatments, namely Negotiations (NG) 
and Individual quantity pledges (IP). In the NG treatment, players are expected to reach 
an agreement by stating their individual investments. If at least one player disagrees with 
the contribution scheme, the there will be no agreement. If so, the negotiations will carry 
on until a last round is reached. If no agreement is achieved in the last round, all players 
will gain the Nash equilibrium payoff (i.e. zero contributions by all of them). In the IP 
treatment, players are free to state their own investment in the public good without the 
need to reach an agreement. All pledges become common knowledge after each round. 
Instead of being asked to agree or disagree as in NG, players in IP are asked to revise 
their own pledges until the game stops at a point in time that is unknown to them. A 
within-subject design was used. 
 
This paper presents two main findings. First, the proposed game leads to significantly 
larger contributions than what is typical in public good (bad) games. Moreover, 
contributions relative to social optimum do not differ much from what was achieved in 
the Paris COP 21 conference, were pledges were around half of what is needed to reach 
a stated goal of 2°C warming. In spite of the climate change problem often being framed 
as a public bad game, this paper results suggest that this issue becomes more of a public 
good situation when players are asked to contribute towards an agreement, which 
generates higher cooperation, given that public good frames are known to generate higher 
cooperation than public bad frames (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998). In 
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addition, giving players a focal point by publicly announcing the social optimum also 
elicits higher cooperation than if the social optimum is not known for certain (Barrett and 
Dannenberg, 2012). Second, the study finds no significant difference between the two 
studied procedures, negotiations (NG) and individual quantity pledges (IP). However, 
NG was found to be unable to reach an agreement in two occasions, which implies that 
the risk of zero contribution in NG is higher than in IP. This finding is consistent with 
the failed COPs after Kyoto (Depledge, 2000).  These two findings imply that pledges 
may not necessarily perform as poorly as theory would suggest (Cramton et al., 2015; 
Gollier and Tirole, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015). The experimental results coincide with the Paris 
COP 21 in the sense that players were unable to reach the stated goal. 
 
This paper suggests that improved designs are needed for future COPs, in order to 
increase the chances of reaching a desired goal. One option to improve COPs could be to 
enhance face to face communication, as it has shown significant benefits when it comes 
to increase cooperation (Ostrom, 1990; Hackett et al., 1994; Rege and Telle, 2004). While 
face to face communication is present among negotiators, politicians and country leaders 
are far away from the venues of the COPs and thus, this communication benefit is 
reduced. Taking advantage of communication benefits across different stakeholders in 
different countries seems important to foster higher cooperation.  
 
4.5 Paper 5: Socially aversive personalities and income distribution: 
Can the Dark Triad predict behavior in the dictator and gangster 
games? 
By David Lara-Arango. 
 
This paper studies to what extend the Dark triad (Paulhus and Williams, 2002) can predict 
players’ decisions in the dictator and gangster games. The triad is composed of three 
aspects that can be measured separately, namely Narcissism (Morey et al., 2012), 
Machiavellianism (Jones and Paulhus, 2009) and Psychopathy (Hare and Neumann, 
2008). However, previous studies have shown that these three traits have a higher 
predictive power when they are considered jointly, as a constellation of traits rather than 
isolated parts (Paulhus and Williams, 2002). Hence, this study uses the Dirty dozen 
questionnaire (Maples et al, 2014) to assess players aggregated Dark triad scores. 
 
This study uses the dictator and gangster game (inverted dictator game). Master students 
in Economics and System Dynamics were recruited. Since a within-subject design was 
used for this experiment, players were given a dirty dozen questionnaire to fill in once 
they were finished with both games. The questionnaires were answered in separate work 
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stations to ensure privacy. They were also received and processed anonymously. By 
using the same code for questionnaires and games, it was possible to test for a relationship 
between the two. 
 
This paper’s findings suggest no significant relationship between players’ Dark triad 
scores and their decisions in the experiment. Only marginally significant relationships 
between Dark triad components and Economics students’ behavior in the dictator game 
were found. Since both games used in this paper are anonymous one-shot games, it was 
not possible for the players to build reputation. Not allowing players to build reputation 
obscures the distinction between Psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Kessler et al., 
2010; Jones and Paulhus, 2011a). The paper findings suggest that personal attributes such 
as having a callous personality has little to no relation to income distribution decisions. 
Further research is needed to account for situational circumstances, such that personal 
attributes can be better put in context and thus, maybe have a higher predictive power for 
player’s decisions.  
5. Conclusions and future research 
Non-cooperative game theory (NCGT) is a powerful method that allows decision makers 
and researchers to understand, conceptualize, and solve problems. Its theoretical nature 
allows researchers to find principles that can explain a wide range of situations and their 
respective expectable outcomes. This theoretical nature however, also entails challenges 
when one intends to use NCGT to formulate policies for real life problems. Hence, there 
is a clear need for a bridge between a powerful theoretical tool such as Game theory and 
real-life policy making. This thesis proposes simulations and experiments as suitable 
methodologies that can help to build such a bridge by improving our understanding of 
how people make decisions. 
 
Non-cooperative situations are often regarded as difficult to solve and in need of better 
understanding of the problem they entail. The present thesis shows that dynamic non-
cooperative games can present unexpected behaviors that are endogenously generated 
and are often not predicted by theory. These endogenous dynamics are often the result of 
relationships between decision makers’ actions and system features such as delays, non-
linearities and feedback loops. Hence, successful policies need to be built on a solid 
understanding of these relationships. Both simulations and experiments can be useful in 
this respect. By providing a structure-based causal framework, simulation methodologies 
such as System dynamics can offer a context in which Game theory solutions can be 
tested, and refined to suit a more complex reality. On the other hand, experiments allow 
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for a deeper understanding of players’ decision rules that can be later used to improve 
theory. A combined use of Game theory, simulations, and experiments allows to have 
more reliable theories as basis for policy making. 
 
Regarding this works’ limitations, the papers comprised in this thesis leave a number of 
questions open that call for future research. 
 
5.1. Cournot oligopoly applications to study commodity markets 
 
Regarding electricity markets, this thesis suggests that market oriented mechanisms have 
a higher chance of improving market performance than interventionist mechanisms, 
which is consistent with previous studies (de Vries and Hakvoort, 2004; Meunier and 
Finon, 2006; Finon and Pignon, 2008). Since only two capacity mechanisms (one 
interventionist and one market oriented) were considered, future research is needed to 
further validate (or refute) these findings with other mechanisms and other market 
conditions.  Future research is also needed to test the implementation of these and other 
capacity mechanisms in different energy generation matrixes, particularly in the context 
of the current energy transition many countries are undergoing. In this respect, market  
stochasticity also needs to be addressed with different approaches that are not only 
limited to production uncertainty e.g. uncertainty in capacity construction projects, 
institutional uncertainty, changing demand patterns, etc. 
 
Regarding endogenously generated instabilities, the fourth paper of this thesis supports 
Meadows (1970) theory of endogenously generated cycles. Rather than being the result 
of exogenous phenomena, these cycles result from players’ decision making, which can 
be explained in terms of adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 1958). These findings point out 
a need to formulate policies that can endogenously mitigate the effects of such strategies 
e.g.  implementing financial mechanisms that discourage investments during price booms 
and promotes investments during price busts. Further research is needed to test this 
postulate and to test the effectiveness of specific stabilization policies in Meadows 
model, as well as in other types of commodity markets. Producer education is another 
possibility that should be studied. 
 
5.2. Public good game applications to study COPs 
 
When comparing pledges against commonly agreed-upon quotas, it is important to note 
that the former eliminates the problem of assigning individual quotas. Assigning quotas 
has been identified as one of the main impediments in COPs before Paris, to successfully 
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address the climate problem (Depledge, 2000; Gollier and Tirole, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015). 
Experimental evidence in this thesis suggests that players tend to behave accordingly to 
their payoff function. Thus, if countries behave as players in such experiments, pledges 
will be better in representing countries payoff functions than assigned quotas. Further 
research is needed to test this hypothesis by exploring to what extent pledges in the COP 
21 reflected countries’ payoff functions. 
 
Regarding positive influences on players’ contributions, this thesis suggests that leading 
nations should set an example to other nations by showing willingness to contribute. 
Leading nations could encourage other nations to contribute by acting as active leaders 
promoting cooperation (Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2003). In this respect, further 
research is needed to propose ways in which the benefits of face-to-face communication 
(Ostrom, 1990; Hackett et al., 1994; Rege and Telle, 2004) can be transmitted across 
different stakeholders in the negotiation, such that cooperation is increased and this 
leadership effect is effectively used. For negative influences, the presented experimental 
evidence shows that high standard deviations in contributions reduces future 
contributions. Thus, policies aiming to enforce and sustain cooperation should consider 
reasonable and graduated punishments (Ostrom, 1990) for free riders in order discourage 
this behavior, while preventing future retaliations by punished free riders (Grechenig, 
2010). Future research is needed to investigate different punishment mechanisms and 
their corresponding effectiveness on preventing free riding and fostering cooperation. 
 
5.3. Dictator game applications to study income distribution 
 
When it comes to variables that can predict behavior on income distribution problems, 
this thesis suggests that the Dark triad of human personality (Paulhus and Williams; 
2002) does not effectively predict how people decide on these issues. This suggests that, 
in a similar way as other predictors such as IQ, the Dark triad prediction power can be 
highly context-dependent (Murray, 1998; Kamphaus, 2005; Neisser, et al., 1996). As 
such, the Dark triad can constitute a form of the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 
1977). However, two components of this triad seem to present a low, yet interesting 
chance of being relevant when a situation requires giving money to a counterpart. 
Machiavellianism and Psychopathy are two personality traits that are strongly linked to 
how likely a person is to disregard others well-being (Kessler et al., 2010; Hare and 
Neumann, 2008). Therefore, these two traits are correlated with selfish behavior, which 
in principle could give an indication of how likely a person is to “give something away”. 
Future research is needed to propose experimental designs that would allow to further 
test the Dark triad as a behavioral indicator for income distribution decisons.  
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The difference between Machiavellianism and Psychopathy is mainly based on the 
strategic use of self-reputation by the former and the risk-taking, non-empathic behavior 
of the latter. The experimental design proposed in this thesis fails to capture the effect of 
players’ reputation, which implies that the border between the two traits becomes unclear 
and it is not possible to clearly separate the effects of these two traits on decision making 
(Jones and Paulhus, 2011a). While this does not affect the results presented in this thesis, 
future research is needed to explore specific relationships between the individual 
elements of the Dark triad and human behavior on specific situations. 
 
Regarding differences across players’ backgrounds, the studies in this thesis show that 
System dynamics master students and Economics master students were equally 
insensitive to changes in framing. However, only Economics students presented 
significant relationships between their Dark triad scores and their income distribution 
decisions. Future research is needed to explore relationships between specific 
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Deregulation in electricity markets has changed the conditions for maintaining long-term 
adequacy of supply. Particularly in the last decade, security of supply has become a major 
issue for policymakers due to a number of changes in technology, especially the 
introduction of renewables, where regulators have introduced capacity mechanisms. In 
this paper, we focus on the use of two different capacity mechanisms: procurement for 
long-term strategic reserves contracting, and centralized auctioning for capacity 
contracts. We investigate the effect of uncertainty on the effectiveness of these two 
mechanisms in maintaining a stable and sufficient supply of capacity. We use simulation 
to establish the behavior as the level of uncertainty is increased. Our results suggest that 
a market’s level of uncertainty plays an important role in the effectiveness of these two 
interventions. The results raise questions about when it is appropriate to introduce either 
of them. 
 
Keywords: Security of supply, Adequacy of supply, Capacity mechanisms, Strategic 
reserves, Centralized auctions, Uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, electricity markets in many countries have gone through 
several major restructurings, from an initial deregulation to changes in the structure, 
pricing mechanisms, and regulations when problems or policies required alignment of 
the markets [1]. The initial focus was on making sure that the deregulation was efficient 
and effective, which means delivering the promises in terms of new investments, 
reliability and, in many cases, lower prices. This led regulators and policy makers to focus 
on the short to medium-term promotion of competition [2, 3] and the prevention of market 
power [4]. More recently, the discussion has moved on to the long-term security of 
supply, i.e. the market’s ability to deliver enough new investments (and power) at a 
required time, in order to avoid shortages [5]. This concern has resulted from a number 
of issues in the last decade, such as the desire to withdraw nuclear capacity in Europe [6], 
and financial problems for companies in the electricity sector [7], among others.  
 While there are many elements in security of supply, we shall focus on capacity 
adequacy, i.e. making sure that there is enough available capacity to deliver electricity at 
a reasonable market-based price [8].  We start from what might be seen as the result of 
the investment behavior in deregulated electricity markets: the occurrence of capacity 
cycles.  These capacity cycles are generally seen as a major threat to markets’ 
sustainability and society’s welfare [9]. Cycles in generation capacity have been 
discussed during the last two decades [10, 11, 12, 2, 13]. More recently, there has been 
empirical evidence that cyclical behavior does occur in deregulated markets [14].  When 
there is excess capacity, the capacity cycle creates a situation with relatively low prices, 
benefiting the consumers, while generation companies have low or no profit. This in turn 
will lead to limited investment in new generation capacity, as the economic return is not 
sufficient, which will eventually erode the excess capacity and create a shortage, thereby 
reversing the benefit between the consumer and the generation companies. This situation 
might compromise the adequacy of capacity as prices could soar and blackouts might 
occur more frequently. Such cyclical behavior takes a significant amount of time to 
correct because of the interplay of reluctant investors (due to the previous period of low 
return) and the long lags in adding new generation capacity, which typically takes from 
three years for CCGT, and up to a decade for big hydro and nuclear plants. 
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There is a possibility that security of supply will be further compromised in the future; 
see, e.g. [16]. One reason for this is the numerous policy initiatives for introducing 
renewable energy. Some countries, like Germany, have now reached more than 49 
percent of installed capacity and 25 percent of production from renewables [15]. While 
renewable energy has a number of advantages in terms of the environment, less 
dependence on fossil fuels etc., it has the potential to create an issue for security of supply. 
As renewables often get first priority in scheduling (as well as a different pricing 
mechanism), the residual demand for the remaining generation capacity, such as CCGT 
and coal, is significantly lower, i.e. a fraction of the total demand is “reserved” for 
renewables. The immediate consequence of this is that generation companies with 
thermal and nuclear generation capacity produce less and thereby get lower revenue and 
profit. There are examples in, for example Germany, where CCGT plants produce during 
only one out of four days. This has led to closure of thermal plants, e.g. in England, where 
the regulator has expressed concern about the future reserve margin [16]. The reason for 
this is that, in periods when the renewable generation has a relatively small production, 
e.g. due to weather conditions, there is a need for the thermal generation plants to make 
up the missing production. However, because of the low economic return the required 
thermal capacity might have been decommissioned or mothballed. Even if prices 
increase, it is unlikely that utility companies are going to invest in new thermal capacity 
on the basis of market conditions, if they do not believe that they can meet their minimum 
threshold return on the investment.  
We have observed similar behavior in other cases where there has been a large 
dependence on hydro, particularly in South America, where the Pacific weather system 
has created situations of excess water in some periods, followed by a shortage in others. 
This has led to a high volatility in prices and reluctance to invest in thermal capacity to 
offset the variability in water, due to the relatively long period of excess water during 
which the thermal capacity would not produce [17]. 
Regulators and policymakers have become increasingly aware of this issue and have 
started to be concerned that this might eventually lead to higher probability of blackouts 
and a general threat to the security of supply [16]. The response has been to make changes 
in the regulatory frameworks to include options for the regulators to try to solve these 
issues, particularly in the area of ensuring adequate thermal capacity to maintain a reserve 
margin large enough to offset the variability in the production of renewables. Different 
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policies have been proposed and implemented in deregulated electricity markets to 
maintain adequate capacity and prevent the cycles, such as capacity mechanisms [18], 
mothballing [5], and forward markets [19]. 
In this paper, we investigate two of the capacity payment mechanisms suggested in the 
literature. The first is procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting, and the 
second is centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. The first one is an interventionist 
mechanism that introduces a regulator-owned firm into the electricity market. The second 
is a market-oriented mechanism that consists of the implementation of a centralized 
auctioning system, where the market participants bid for capacity contracts [18]. By using 
simulation, we test these two mechanisms under different levels of uncertainty to 
understand which of them is the most efficient in maintaining a desirable level of 
generation capacity and in avoiding capacity cycles.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the capacity mechanisms we 
consider. The third section explains our economic models. The fourth section shows the 
simulation’s results and finally, the fifth section presents the conclusion and discussion 
of our findings.  
2. Capacity mechanisms 
We focus on two capacity mechanisms in order to test their economic impacts on 
investment, in a stylized electricity market. We have selected one interventionist 
mechanism, procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting, and one market-
oriented mechanism, centralized auctioning for capacity. We investigate whether they 
both represent an economic improvement for a market base line, and if so, which of the 
two yields the best results, under different levels of uncertainty. We select these two 
specific mechanisms because they both have a good theoretical foundation in the 
literature, and they represent two theoretically opposed ways of solving the issue of 
maintaining adequate capacity. The first one provides partial market control (influence) 
for the regulator, while the second is an integrated part of the market dynamics.  One 
might argue that both, in their own ways, are interventions that partly set aside the idea 
of a market, i.e. interventions that to some degree suspend the market. While this is not 
necessarily a bad thing, given that regulators have overseen and intervened in the market 
since the beginning of deregulation, one has to consider that market principles must be 
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preserved. It can be argued that such interventions can be necessary in order to maintain 
a well-functioning market.   
Procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting allows a governmental 
institution to use production capacity. This mechanism has typically been implemented 
in the form of an agreement between the TSO and generators [45, 46]. However, different 
authors consider that the regulator can also intervene in the market through a state-owned 
firm [18].  We choose to introduce this mechanism in the form of a regulatory firm that 
makes investments in capacity for reasons of transparency, but it should be noted that the 
effects on the market are similar for the two mechanisms. Countries like France, Sweden, 
and New Zealand have implemented this mechanism. The results in these countries and 
the academic discussion of them have portrayed high efficiency in capacity adequacy as 
its main advantage, and a reduced compatibility with market principles as its main 
disadvantage, as it interferes directly in the market and is not linked to a market-based 
mechanism [20, 21].  
Centralized auctioning for capacity licenses is the second mechanism we investigate, 
where the government or regulator has control over the total market capacity and holds 
auctions for licenses to build new capacity when there is a perceived need. In our model, 
generators do not need to be successful in the auctions for capacity market licenses in 
order to keep a plant open. However, they do need to obtain licenses in the capacity 
market to build new plants. The reason for this is that we assume a constant electricity 
price that is equal to generators’ production costs. Therefore, there is no incentive to build 
a new plant with zero profit-margin; and so, building a new plant is only attractive for 
the generators when such plant is the result of winning licenses in the capacity market. 
In other words, our model focuses on the dynamics of the capacity market while leaving 
the electricity market constant. The generators bid for the right to build capacity, e.g. who 
will require the lowest subsidy for adding a certain amount of capacity [18]. New England 
is one area where this mechanism has been implemented [22]. The literature points out 
capacity-adequacy targeting and market compatibility as its main advantages, and lack of 
control over physical plants as its main disadvantage [22, 23].  
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3. Economic model 
The analysis of the capacity mechanisms discussed above can be done at different levels 
of analysis: from a model calibrated to a particular context, such as a country, to a more 
stylized model, that provides more general insight. We chose the second option, a stylized 
model for a deregulated electricity market, as it helps to understand the main implications 
of the two market interventions. In reality, generators adjust capacity year-on-year by 
closing stations when there is excess capacity and such excess is expected to persist.  This 
adjustment may not be sufficient to eliminate price cycles, but it can dampen them. In 
fact, previous works on capacity mechanisms have found that the possibility of 
mothballing capacity can significantly reduce price cycles [4]. Since we consider a 
stylized market with no interventions as a base case, we decided not to include this 
feature. Furthermore, mothballing has also been criticized in the literature for enabling 
generators to raise prices[5]. 
The model is based on Arango and Moxnes [24]; we extend the model by including the 
possibility of testing the two capacity mechanisms discussed above. 
3.1. Base model   
The base model of the electricity market follows the model developed by Arango and 
Moxnes [24], where investors make investment decisions for capacity in a market-based 
system. The model represents a stylized electricity market with long capacity lifetimes 
and investment delays (i.e. capacity construction time). This market setting also 
resembles other capital-intensive industries, although the lifetime of investment is 
normally shorter in other industries. Assuming that generators are price takers in our 
market, this model follows the closed-loop model formulation, in which they choose a 
capacity to maximize their profits and where the price is the market equilibrium response 
to the generators’ decisions [25]. The model accounts for the main features of electricity 
markets, namely, the non-storability (i.e. no inventory) and the inelasticity of the demand 
(demand always matches supply). For simplicity, we assume that only a single generation 
technology is available. The price of electricity at time t  is determined by 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡, 0)                                                                                 (1)  
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where 𝑃𝑡 is the electricity price, 𝑄𝑡 is the market production, and A and B are price 
function parameters. The generators’ profit at the time t  is given by 
𝜋𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗ 𝑄𝑡                                                                                                (2) 
   
where  C  is  the  marginal  cost (SRMC),  which includes both  operational  and  capital 
cost. Since there have been previous works showing similar results for constant and 
increasing marginal costs [26, 27], we assume the cost (SRMC) to be constant and equal 
to 1 for the entire market, given that we are only considering one technology. Capacity 
utilization is assumed to be 100%, which implies that the market’s production is equal to 
the market’s capacity. In addition, we assume a capacity construction time of V years and 
a capacity lifetime of L years, hence, the market’s installed capacity and production, in 
period t, is given by 
𝜕𝐼𝐶
𝜕𝑡




= 𝑋𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡                                                                                                 (4) 
 
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝑢𝐶𝑡/𝑉                                                                                                        (5) 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝 = 𝐼𝐶𝑡/𝐿                                                                                                         (6) 
 
where 𝐼𝐶 is the installed capacity, 𝐶𝐶 is capacity coming online (capacity emerging from 
the construction queue), 𝐷𝑒𝑝 is capacity depreciation, 𝐶𝑢𝐶 is capacity under 
construction, and 𝑋 represents the investments. Power stations are, in reality, discrete 
units; however, we aggregate the capacity, which allows us to use average (continuous) 
values as a proxy for capacity and the various changes in capacity [49]. We have run a 
series of simulations with discrete time for our economic models and found no significant 
difference in the behavior of the price cycles. 
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In order to model the investments, we use the heuristic proposed by Arango and Moxnes 
[24]. The heuristic is based on adaptive expectations [28], which can cause cycles in 
prices and capacity due to the updating of expectations. Previous works have supported 
Nerlove’s adaptive expectations approach [29, 30]. This approach has also been used for 
capacity construction times to explain endogenous cycles in different industries [31, 24]. 
We are modeling deregulated electricity markets, where adaptive expectations-based 
heuristics are generally seen as being an appropriate assumption for investments [14, 47]. 
The adaptive expectations approach establishes an expected price 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡, which is a 
function of the current price and the current expected price. The current price expectation 
comes from the price at the immediately preceding time-period.  Therefore, 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 is given 
by 
𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝛽1) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽0                                                           (7) 
 
where 𝛽1 and 𝛽0 are parameters for the calculation of the expected price. As we are using 
the same heuristic as [24], we adopt the same values they use for the parameters, such 
that 𝛽1=0.31, and 𝛽0=0.02. Following adaptive expectations, the market investment 
function has two main parts: partial adjustments for capacity and adjustments for 
depreciation, similar to the neoclassical investment function [32]. However, as our base 
case is for an electricity market with cyclical behavior, we assume that the market fails 
to compensate fully for both capacity and depreciation adjustments.  To capture this, we 
use a linearized version of the investment heuristic proposed by Arango and Moxnes [24] 
in order to produce cycles in our base-case market. The market’s investment function is 
thus given by: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝜕 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡+4 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡+4 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔, 0)               (8) 
 
where 𝑋𝑡 is the investment in capacity in period t, and 𝜕, 𝛾, 𝜌, 𝛿 and 𝜔 are the market’s 
decision parameters for depreciation, capacity, expected price, actual price and decision 
adjustment, respectively. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡+4 and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡+4 are depreciation and installed capacity four 
years ahead of period t, 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 is the expected price in period t, and 𝑃𝑡 is the market’s 
actual price of electricity in period t. With these settings, we actually have a stock 
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management problem [33]. The values of the coefficients are taken from Arango and 
Moxnes’ regressions on experimental results [24]. 
 
3.2. Regulator inclusion 
To test the procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting, we introduce a 
regulatory firm in the base simulation model. The regulatory firm can invest in capacity 
year by year, with a maximum of RI units/year. This capacity limit is set to ensure 
competition in the market, i.e. preventing the regulator from acquiring market power and 
thereby maintaining some competition in the market. We do not account for network 
congestion in our model, which implies that generators are not able to exercise local 
market power [34], giving all consumers the same level of access to power. An important 
question regarding this mechanism concerns the use of the reserve capacity: can it 
generate only in shortage conditions, or can it be used under “normal” conditions as well. 
In general, the literature suggests that reserve capacity should only be used in periods 
when the system is under stress [18]. Otherwise, reserve capacity becomes a type of 
mothballing, through which it is possible to quickly use extra capacity when profits are 
expected. Hence, in our model, the regulator invests if the capacity four years ahead is 
going to be less than CE, which is the perfect competition equilibrium (where the 
generators’ marginal revenue is equal to their marginal costs). Thus, the decision rule of 
investment (𝑍𝑡) of the regulatory firm is 
 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑡+4 < 𝐶𝐸 {
     𝐼𝑅                           𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐸 − 𝑄𝑡+4 ≥ 𝐼𝑅
  
  𝐶𝐸 − 𝑄𝑡+4                𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐸 − 𝑄𝑡+4 < 𝐼𝑅
                               (9) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡+4  is the market’s capacity four years ahead, which represents the construction 
time i.e. the regulator knows the amount of capacity that will enter the market in the next 
4 years. With the inclusion of this regulator-controlled firm, we have an additional firm 
that aims to orient the market toward its perfect competitive equilibrium [24], in order to 
maximize social welfare.  
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3.3. Auctioning system 
To include centralized auctioning for capacity licenses, we use an auctioning mechanism 
proposed by Alcaraz [35], where the generators make bids through a bidding curve that 
determines the quantity of licenses desired at each possible license price. The market’s 
capacity is fixed at CE units (perfect competition equilibrium), and the licenses’ price is 
determined through market bidding. Thus, our model focuses on the capacity market 
dynamics while keeping the electricity market constant. Regarding the licenses’ price 
range, we took the values suggested by Alcaraz [35]. The license price ranges from LPL 
to LPH. A negative price indicates subsidized licenses for the generators, and a positive 
price indicates that the generators have to pay for the licenses. Therefore, a negative price 
represents an income and a positive price represents a cost for the generators [35]. The 
generators have an incentive to make a negative bid for the license, as this will increase 
their profit. However, a large number of bids will put an upward pressure on the license 
price, leading to positive values. Conversely, few bids will lead to a lower, i.e. negative, 
price for the license. The number of licenses is distributed according to the market-
bidding curve at the given price. Generators’ profits are then given by 
 
    𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗ 𝑄𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝑡                                                                               (10) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is the number of capacity licenses given in the market at time t and 𝐿𝑃𝑡 is the 
license price at time t. 
We use a heuristic based on the bidding dynamics described by Cramton and Stoft [36], 
to model this second mechanism. The bidding curve generated by the heuristic starts with 
the market’s desired capacity at the maximum subsidized licenses’ price (LPL). Then, the 
curve decreases at a constant rate until it reaches zero capacity desired, at the maximum 
non- subsidized price (LPH), or before. The generators can ask for zero licenses at a price 
that is less than LPH, which means that the market-bidding curve will have zero licenses 
from such a price until LPH).  Since the assumptions and simplifications of our auctioning 
model do not allow us to use empirical data, we use regressions on two previous 
experimental studies (where a similar auction model was used) as a basis for estimating 
the parameters [35, 37].  In such studies, the generators’ profits, capacities and numbers 
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of licenses are found to be the determinants of the generators’ bids. These levels apply 
for all periods of the simulation. The proposed heuristic to determine the desired capacity 
at a price of LPL is 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝−2.1 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑧 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝐺𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝑦 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝, 0), 𝑀𝐿)                          (11) 
 
where 𝐺𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 is the generators’ profit, 𝑀𝐿 is the maximum number of licenses the 
generators can bid for, and 𝐶𝑎𝑝 is the market’s capacity. The letters 𝑧, 𝑥, and 𝑦 represent 
parameters estimated on the basis of pilot experimental results reported by Lara [37] and 
Alcaraz [35]. With these values, we can determine the heuristic for the subsequent point 
in the curve, and then repeat the process for all other points. The heuristics for the 
subsequent points of the bidding curve are given by 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝 =  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑖 + 𝑙 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑝−𝑚, 0)                                                                    (12) 
 
where 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝 is desired capacity at a license price 𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑝−𝑚 is the desired capacity 
at the previous curve point (𝑚 is the separation between the curve points), and 𝑖, 𝑙 are 
coefficients estimated for the particular curve point (𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝) using the results of 
Alcaraz [35] and Lara [37].  
Using the model described above, we introduce different levels of uncertainty, allowing 
us to test the capacity mechanisms’ robustness when markets become uncertain and 
volatile. The inclusion of uncertainty is expected to reduce the optimal investment 
decisions [38, 39]; however, we are interested in understanding how the effectiveness 
(both absolute and relative) of the two capacity mechanisms is affected by the presence 
of uncertainty. The levels of uncertainty represent a number of external factors such as: 
the availability of installed capacity, fuel prices, water availability, weather conditions, 
demand uncertainty etc., representing different types of electricity markets [14]. We use 
the consumer, producer, and economic surplus as performance measures, in order to 
obtain an assessment of the market’s economic results [40].  The consumer surplus for 
the three cases is calculated as 
         




(𝐴 − 𝑃𝑡 ) ∗ 𝑄𝑡
2
                                                                 (13) 
 
where A is the maximum price parameter in the price function, 𝑃𝑡 is the market price at 
time t, and 𝑄𝑡 is the market production at time t. Since the introduction of uncertainty 
creates a separation between capacity and production, we have to differentiate between 
production costs and capacity costs. Thus, the cost function is now  
 
𝐶 =
 ∝∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑄𝑡
𝑄𝑡
                                                                                        (14) 
 
where ∝  and  𝛽 are constants, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡 is the market capacity, and 𝑄𝑡 is the market 
production.  
The producer surplus for the base model is calculated as the generators’ profits, that is 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗  𝑄𝑡                                                            (15) 
 
where C is the individual production cost. The producer surplus for the regulator 
inclusion case is calculated in the same way, with the difference that the regulator’s part 
of the surplus is subtracted. Since strategic reserves are managed by a state-owned firm 
in our model, we subtract this firm’s profits from the producer surplus. By doing so, we 
make sure that the producer surplus only accounts for the actual generators’ profits. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗ (𝑄𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)                                                 (16) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the regulator’s production at time t. For the auctioning system case, we 
calculated the producer surplus as the generators’ profits, that is,   
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗ 𝑄𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝑡                                              (17) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the number of capacity licenses given in the market at time t and 𝐿𝑃𝑡  is the 
license price at time t. The economic surplus is the sum of the consumer and producer 
surplus 
 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 +   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡         (18) 
 
For the auctioning system case, we subtract the cost for the government from the original 
Economic surplus formulation, as follows 
 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 +   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡   (19) 
 
The cost for the government is set as twice the generators’ revenue from licenses, when 
the price is negative. The reason for this is that first, the government has to pay for the 
licenses when the price is negative (subsidies). Second, the money the government uses 
to subsidize the generators could have been available for other governmental needs if 
there were no need to subsidize the generators.  
4. Simulations  
We start with a series of simulations with the three markets: namely, no capacity 
payments, regulator intervention, and capacity auction, all without any uncertainty, to 
establish a benchmark before uncertainty is introduced. For the simulation, we initiate 
the model with the values shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
4.1. Without uncertainty 
We are interested in the price behavior as well as the consumer, producer, and economic 
surplus. The capacity is fixed in the implementation of the auctioning system; therefore, 
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the electricity price remains constant and equal to one. Furthermore, notice that the 
producer profit in the auctioning model might be affected by subsidies from the 
government, i.e. the negative license price, which is why we include the government’s 
cost in our economic surplus calculation.  
Fig. 1a shows the electricity price for the case of no capacity payments, Fig. 1b for long-
term strategic reserves contracting, and finally Fig. 1c shows the license payment price 
in a system with capacity auctions. All simulations in Fig. 1 are without uncertainty. 
Table 1 shows the corresponding comparison of the basic statistics for consumer, 
producer, and economic surplus in each of the three cases. 
 
Figure 1. Simulation results for the three markets’ prices without uncertainty: a) no market  
mechanism (electricity price), b) strategic reserve planning, (electricity price), and c) capacity 
auctions, (license price) 
 
As expected, the base case simulation, i.e. no intervention in the market, shows cyclical 
price behavior. Furthermore, the oscillations increase in amplitude for each cycle, 
creating increasing volatility. In the third cycle, price varies between zero and 2.5. While 
zero might sound unrealistic, we have recently observed negative prices in some markets, 
i.e. consumers are paid for using electricity [41]. Investment in electricity markets is 
characterized by lumpiness in investments [42, 43]. We do not include this feature in our 
stylized model, as it would require detailed assumptions about the investment functions 
of the individual generators. Note that Figure 1c shows negative prices for capacity. The 
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interpretation of this in our model is that a negative price implies that the generators have 
been paid to build new capacity, while a positive price implies that the generators have 
paid to build capacity (see Equation 10). As we stated before, cycles in electricity 
markets have been identified as a detrimental phenomenon for long-term security of 
supply [14] since concentrations of investment in high price periods leads to a future 
overcapacity and low prices, which in turn discourages investment, leading again to high 
prices and so on [9]. Such a detrimental effect is evidenced in Table 1, where one can 
see a negative value for the average producer surplus and a high value for the consumer 
surplus (higher than the optimum and out of the optimum equilibrium). Although the 
value for the consumer surplus is high, the economic surplus is smaller than the optimum 
because of the negative producer surplus.  
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The second scenario in Fig. 1b, reserve contracting, also generates cycles in the electricity 
price; however, they are smaller than in the non-intervention scenario. Despite these 
cycles also expanding, they do it at a much slower rate than what shows in Fig 1a. This 
scenario generates the largest economic surplus of the three experiments, although the 
difference is less than 3 percent, as shown in Table 2. The standard deviation is also 
smaller, as a consequence of the smaller amplitude of the fluctuations. This mechanism, 
as in the previous case, presents poor results for the producers, with an average producer 
surplus of -11.86, which raises questions about the system’s long-term sustainability, i.e. 
it is unlikely that investors will continue to invest in an industry where the average result 
is a significant loss [14]. 
Fig. 1c represents the capacity auctioning alternative intervention where the capacity is 
fixed; therefore, the electricity price is stabilized by default and thus there are no 
electricity price cycles (not shown). However, the instability of the system is represented 
in the license price, which can be seen in Fig. 1c. In this case, without uncertainty, the 
producers’ profits are determined by the license price, which may represent a reduction 
in the economic surplus if there are subsidized (negative) license prices. We observe in 
Fig. 1c that the license price in some periods is positive, i.e. companies pay for being 
allowed to build capacity, while in other periods they are paid by the regulator for adding 
capacity. Table 1 shows that the producer surplus is very close to zero, which indicates 
that the system should be sustainable as companies receive the expected (normal) rent 
from their investments.  
From the above, in the no-uncertainty case, centralized auctioning for capacity is the only 
sustainable option for electricity markets to ensure capacity adequacy and lower the 
chances of blackouts.   
4.2. Including uncertainty 
We now add uncertainty, an important part of real electricity systems as it influences 
companies’ decisions about whether or not to invest. Uncertainty can be generated by 
many different factors: from technology, weather conditions, fuel cost, regulatory 
changes, and others. To include uncertainty, we add noise to the model, following the 
experimental design used by Arango et al. [5]. In their experiment on mothballing, 
capacity utilization was seen as a decision variable for the subjects, i.e. the subjects could 
order capacity as well as decide what percentage of their current capacity they wanted to 
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keep online. However, in this case, we are testing for the effect of uncertainty on 
investment decisions, and we assume that capacity utilization is mainly driven by external 
factors, i.e. the generators do not make decisions about the fraction of capacity they make 
available. We assume that they make available for generation the maximum capacity they 
have, i.e. the capacity utilization decision is imposed on the generators in the form of one 
or more exogenous phenomena e.g. by a hydrological cycle, or by a maintenance cycle. 
We are using a stylized electricity market model with one “generic” generation 
technology. However, we can interpret each of the levels of uncertainty as a different 
composition of the generation technologies matrix, where the highest levels of 
uncertainty correspond to a hydro-dominated market and the lower levels correspond to 
a thermal-intensive market. 
To determine how much of the capacity is going to be available for production, we 
introduced a noise (𝑁) with a normal distribution and adjustable values for the mean and 
standard deviation. In this way, we have the capacity utilization as an external factor, and 
we do not have the market constraint on capacity utilization as in Arango et al. [5].  
Since we have capacity and production as separate issues, we need to separate capital and 
operational costs. Therefore, we used the same cost function proposed by Arango et al. 
[5]  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝐼𝐶                                                     (20) 
          
 
where 𝑄𝑡 is the market’s production, 𝐼𝐶 is the market’s installed capacity and 𝛽, 𝛼  are 
operational and capital unit costs. We use the same values as Arango et al. [5] for the cost 
function coefficients, 𝛽=0.4, and 𝛼=0.6. 
We performed a sensitivity analysis for each case of uncertainty: a low uncertainty 
scenario 𝑁(0.9,0.1), a medium uncertainty scenario 𝑁(0.75,0.25), and a high 
uncertainty scenario 𝑁(0.5,0.5). When going from one uncertainty-scenario to another, 
it is important to notice that we are reducing the mean of the normally-distributed noise 
while increasing the standard deviation (e.g. going from  𝑁(0.9,0.1) to 𝑁(0.75,0.25)). 
Reducing the mean of the noise and increasing the standard deviation could give rise to 
two effects: one from the increase in standard deviation, and a second from the reduction 
of the mean. However, we find that the second effect is negligible; in other words, 
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reducing the mean of the noise while increasing the standard deviation is not significantly 
different from keeping the mean of the noise constant while increasing its standard 
deviation. Table 2 shows a comparison between having a constant mean for the noise 
with an increasing 
standard deviation versus a reduction in the mean of the noise mean with an increasing 
standard deviation. Table 2 shows that the economic surpluses do not change much for 
the cases of low and medium uncertainty, while in the case of high uncertainty they 
change significantly. These changes do not alter our analysis when comparing the three 
cases, i.e. the ranking remains the same regardless of whether we have a constant or 
reduced mean of the noise. However, the average capacity-utilization shows that keeping 
the mean of the noise constant is more likely to yield unrealistic production (capacity 
utilization). As uncertainty increases, one may find periods when the production is higher 
than what is normally produced (capacity utilization is higher than 100%). Take the case 
of medium uncertainty as an example where the simulations with a reduced mean 
𝑁(0.75,0.25), and constant mean 𝑁(1,0.25), both have production above 100%. 
However, having such periods of “overproduction” is more likely in the constant-mean 
case than in the reducing-mean case (132% vs 111%). Since a reduced mean is less likely 
to yield extremely high “overproduction” periods and does not affect the relative 
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Table 2. Comparison between reducing the mean of the noise (mean availability is 
reduced as the standard deviation of cost is increased) and constant mean of the noise 
(constant mean for availability while increasing standard deviation of cost). 
 (Reducing mean 
/Constant mean) 
 












































































 We run 40 simulations with different sequences of random numbers for each of the 
uncertainty scenarios and report the average, and the 10th and 90th percentiles. Beginning 
with low uncertainty 𝑁(0.9,0.1), Figure 2 shows the sensitivity analysis for our three 
cases. Table 3 summarizes the results. 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis (90% C.I.) for each of the three cases under low uncertainty 
𝑁(0.9,0.1) 
 
Fig. 2c shows that there are few cases of negative subsidies (as shown by the 10th 
percentile) and on average, there are high bids by the companies for the right to build 
capacity, which is a reflection of the relatively high electricity price seen in Fig. 2d. 
Overall, the base case presents the highest economic surplus, where before it had the 
lowest, shown in Table 3; in fact, it has changed little from the case without uncertainty. 
The two cases with interventions present lost economic value, the auction-based scenario 
in particular has lost almost 10 percent. The auction-based case has now an important 
surplus for the producers, which might be problematic in relation to the consumers, as 
their surplus is significantly lower in this case than it is in the two other cases. There is 
relatively little volatility in the auction-based system compared to the other two cases, 
however it is a question of whether the consumers will be willing to pay for this certainty. 
We can therefore conclude that for low uncertainty there is no strong reason to include 
any capacity mechanism, or in other words, with low uncertainty, the market would be 
better off left to itself. 
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We now turn to the case of medium uncertainty, 𝑁(0.75,0.25). Fig. 3 shows the 
sensitivity analysis and Table 4, the economic results. The evolution of prices in the three 
scenarios is similar to that of the prices in the low-uncertainty case shown in Fig. 2; that 
is, the prices are higher in the no-intervention and capacity auction and lower in the case 
of strategic reserve contracting.  As in the low-uncertainty case, we can see that the no-
intervention case provides the best economic value, while the auction system provides 
the producers with a large surplus, both in absolute and relative terms. We generally 
observe an increase in both price and volatility in the simulations compared with the 
previous case. Due to the increase in producer surplus, and the consumer surplus 
decrease, the consumers are then better off in the case of reserve planning, while the 
capacity auction is by far the worst case for the consumers. The observed large difference 
in electricity prices in the case of the auction system is explained by the increased 
volatility of the production i.e. the electricity price presents broader bands as the 
production is allowed to have a higher variation in this medium-uncertainty case than in 
the previous low-uncertainty case.  Furthermore, the case of reserve planning is (as it was 
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in the low-uncertainty case) relatively close to the results of the base case. However, it 
does provide slightly lower electricity prices, visible in Fig. 3b. As in the case of low 
uncertainty, we find no incentive to pick either of the two intervention mechanisms, as 
the no-intervention scenario is, on average, more balanced.  
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Finally, we test the high-uncertainty scenarios assuming 𝑁(0.5,0.5), which makes it 
difficult for any market agent to foresee a clear sense of the future. Fig. 4 shows the 
sensitivity analysis in terms of the price evolution over time, and Table 5 presents the 
economic results. The first observation is that it is difficult to learn much from the 
simulation; electricity prices seem to almost cover the whole spectrum from close or zero 
to six, the maximum price allowed in the model. The electricity prices are generally 
higher in all the scenarios. Table 5 shows that there is even less economic surplus than 
was previously the case, with the base case still showing the largest economic surplus. 
In all cases, the producers get a higher surplus than in any of the previous simulations; 
in the case of the capacity auction system the producers get a higher surplus than the 
consumer, which has not been observed in the previous cases. On average, the base case 
presents the most desirable market scenario, although the case of strategic reserve has a 
slightly smaller producer surplus. Given this, we conclude, based on our simulations, 
that in an electricity market with a high stochastic component there is no reason to 
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believe that a strategic reserve or an auctioning system will improve the results by much. 
A broader conclusion might be that given the degree of uncertainty, it is unclear which 
system will perform best – but at least, the average suggests that not much can be gained 
by intervening in the system.  
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In order to improve understanding of the relationship between performance and the level 
of uncertainty, we ran additional simulations to establish how producer, consumer, and 
economic surpluses develop as a function of uncertainty. The results of this analysis are 
shown in Fig. 5.  
All the cases follow a similar trend. The consumer surplus decreases as the uncertainty 
increases, because the greater the uncertainty, the lower the average production and 
investment. Following from the lower electricity production, the price starts to increase, 
which causes a decrease in the consumer surplus. This decreasing consumer surplus is 
more accentuated in the capacity auctioning system than in the other two cases. The 
reason for this is that capacity is fixed in the auctioning system, and therefore it is not 
possible to compensate a lower capacity utilization with an increase in capacity.  
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Figure 5. Consumer, producer, and economic surpluses at different levels of uncertainty 
 
The producer surplus starts from relatively low values, negative or zero. Thereafter, it 
increases as the uncertainty reduces the average production, which in turn increases the 
price and the profit margins. The lower production is more than offset by the increase in 
price in all three cases, increasing the overall surplus for producers. The base case 
scenario shows the steepest increase compared with the other two cases. The first 
mechanism shows a less steep slope due to the introduction of the regulator, which 
provides a fraction of the needed capacity, and thus takes market share away from the 
other generators, which reduces their surplus. The second mechanism restricts the 
increase of the producer surplus by limiting the generators’ profits to the trading of 
licenses, given that licenses have a much lower margin than electricity (maximum 
margin of $5 for electricity vs $2.1 for licenses). The increase of the producer surplus 
continues as the uncertainty increases, implying that an increase in uncertainty will be 
beneficial and should be supported by the producers.  
From inspection of the economic surplus we can make two observations. First, the 
maximum for the economic surplus in the base case and the strategic reserve case is 
almost constant for low levels of uncertainty, i.e. the graphs are almost flat until a value 
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of uncertainty of around 0.2. On the other hand, in the case of the capacity auction the 
economic surplus exhibits a steady decline until an uncertainty level of approximately 
0.5. Second, in two of the three cases, namely, in the base case and capacity auctions, 
the economic surplus shows a minimum followed by a small continued increase. In both 
cases, the minimum is around a level of uncertainty of 0.5. In the case of strategic reserve, 
we observe a continuous decline in the economic surplus as the uncertainty increases. 
Thus, we conclude that consumers and producers will always have opposing interests, 
and the role of the regulator is to balance the interests of these two groups. The producers 
will always have an interest in trying to increase the uncertainty while the consumers 
and, in this case the regulator, try to limit the uncertainty. It is equally important for the 
regulator to ensure that the situation does not end up at the minimum, as that is where 
the whole system “loses”.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We propose a standard economic model for an electricity market in which we test two 
capacity mechanisms, procurement for long-term strategic reserves contracting, and 
centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. We establish a benchmark by means of 
results obtained from the model without any uncertainty, followed by the introduction of 
three levels of uncertainty. The performance of the two capacity mechanisms is then 
compared, each with the other, and in the case of the market without intervention. By 
doing so, we aim to understand, first, how uncertainty influences performance in these 
three cases, and second, whether these two capacity mechanisms improve the market 
performance.   
In the case without uncertainty, we find the centralized auctioning for capacity to be the 
only sustainable option, both in producer surplus and in the market’s stability. The other 
options give rise to significant negative surplus for the producers, which make them 
unlikely to be sustainable. These results are consistent with previous work that has shown 
the advantages of this particular mechanism [20, 21, 18]. When uncertainty is introduced 
into the model, the results change significantly, as the best results were, on average, from 
not including any capacity mechanism in the market. Although including a strategic 
reserve, in some cases improves the results marginally, in reality, it may add 
complications that are likely to consume more than the marginal benefit when it is 
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implemented. We see that in the last part of the analysis, no-intervention seems to be 
doing better as the uncertainty increases. The results suggest that there is no incentive to 
implement either of the two mechanisms we considered when there is significant 
uncertainty in the market.  
Overall, our results show that even though uncertainty leads to worse economic scenarios 
for society as a whole (i.e. decline in economic surplus), it has on average a positive 
effect for generators. The reason for this is that a higher uncertainty limits available 
capacity, which in turn leads to higher prices and higher profit margins. Moreover, such 
uncertainty also negatively affects the willingness to invest in new capacity, creating a 
permanent “semi” shortage of capacity and persistent high prices. These results are 
consistent with [5], who reported higher prices when producers were allowed to mothball 
capacity.  
We return to the old question: what is the best policy for ensuring a sustainable adequacy 
of capacity in an electricity market? The answer implied in this work is that there is no 
best model. Our results suggest that the best policy for one market is not necessarily the 
best for another market. Some production-related uncertainty sources, such as water 
availability and fuel price, are relevant points to take into account when it comes to 
deciding on the most sustainable policy. As our results suggest, centralized auctioning 
for capacity contracts could be a good market policy for stable markets, such as France 
[14] but it might not be a good market policy for markets with highly stochastic behavior, 
such as Colombia [44]. In general, we see that even a relatively small degree of 
uncertainty can make the interventions less effective, making the no-intervention market 
model a more attractive option. However, having a more controlled market, i.e. a market 
with a capacity mechanism, may still be appealing due to the risk-averse behavior of 
both consumers and producers. This behavior might put pressure on politicians to 
introduce a capacity mechanism, even when it implies a cost for society, especially when 
we consider the harmful effects of blackouts and shortages, which might outweigh the 
cost of the regulation.  Considerations about uncertainty are more relevant as renewable 
generation takes a larger share of the market, leaving a decreasing market share for 
thermal generation. Finally, policy implementation in electricity markets is a difficult 
task that involves several stakeholders and although the real effectiveness of a given 
policy is a question than can only be answered in real life, behavioral simulation models 
and experimental economics can give us helpful insights about market policies’ effects. 
         
                        
59
References  
[1] Helm, D. The New Energy Paradigm, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
[2] Larsen, E.R., Bunn, D.W. Deregulation in electricity: understanding strategic and 
regulatory risk. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1999, 50(4), 
System Dynamics for Policy, Strategy and Management Education, 337-344. 
[3] Newbery, D.M. Electricity liberalization in Britain and the evolution of market 
design. In: Sioshansi, F.P., Pfaffenberger, W. (Eds.), Electricity Market Reform 
2006: An International Perspective. Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 109–144. 
[4] Stoft, S. Power System Economics, 2012. Wiley. 
[5] Arango, S., Castañeda, J.A., Larsen, E.R. Mothballing in power markets: an 
experimental study. From regulation to competition. Energy economics, 2013, 36, 
125-134. 
[6] Smedley, T. Goodbye nuclear power: Germany’s renewable energy revolution. The 
Guardian, 2013, Friday May 10th (http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/nuclear-power-germany-renewable-energy). 
[7] Bloomberg. EON files to close unprofitable Irsching gas power plants [WWW 
Document]. Bloomberg.com. URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
03-30/eon-files-to-close-two-unprofitable-irsching-gas-power-plants (accessed 
4.27.15). 
[8] EIA.  Annual Energy Outlook with projections to 2040, 2014. 
[9] IEA. Security of supply in electricity markets: evidence and policy issues. 2002, Paris: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
[10] Bunn, D.W., Larsen, E.R. Sensitivity of reserve margin to factors influencing 
investment behaviour in the electricity market of England and Wales. Energy Policy, 
1992, 20(5), 420-429. 
[11] Ford, A. Cycles in competitive electricity markets. Energy policy, 1999, 27, 637–
658. 
[12] Ford, A. Waiting for the boom: a simulation study of power plant construction in 
California. Energy Policy, 2001, 29(11), 847-869. 
         
                        
60
[13] Olsina, F., Garcés, F., Haubrich, H.J. Modeling long-term dynamics of electricity 
markets. Energy Policy, 2006, 34(12), 1411-1433. 
[14] Arango, S., Larsen, E.R. Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: empirical 
evidence from two decades. Energy policy, 2011, 39 (5), 2457-2466. 
[15] Fraunhofer ISE. Electricity production from solar and wind in Germany in 2014. 
Freiburg, Germany, 20-Oct, 2014. 
[16] OFGEM. Electricity Capacity Assessment, 2013. London.  
[17] Olaya, Y., Arango, S., Larsen, E.R. How capacity mechanisms drive technology 
choice for power generation.  Working paper 2015, University of Lugano. 
[18] Finon, D., Pignon, V. Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: the quest for 
regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market. Utilities Policy, 2008, 16, 
143 – 158. 
[19] Álvarez, K. Efecto de la introducción de mercados de futuros en la estabilización de 
ciclos en los precios de commodities mediante experimentos y simulación. MSc. 
Thesis. Decisions Science Department, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 2013. 
[20] de Vries, L.J., Hakvoort, R.A. The question of generation adequacy in liberalized 
electricity markets. Working paper no. 120. 2004, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 
2004. 
[21] Meunier, G., Finon, D. Market power in electricity markets, 2006, suboptimal 
investment and ISO procurement, Presentation to the 26th USAEE/IAEE Conference. 
[22] Vásquez, C., Battle, C., Rivier, M., Perez-Arriaga, I. Security of supply in the Dutch 
electricity market: the role of reliability options. Report IIT-03-0841C, 2003, 
Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Spain. 
[23] Bidwell, M. Reliability options. A market-oriented approach to long-term adequacy. 
The Electricity Journal, 2005, 18 (5), 11-25. 
[24] Arango, S., Moxnes, E. Commodity cycles, a function of market complexity? 
Extending the cobweb experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
2012, 84 (1), 321-334. 
         
                        
61
[25] Wogrin, S., Centeno, E., Barquin, J. Generation capacity expansion analysis: Open 
loop approximation of closed loop equilibria. Power Systems, 2013, IEEE 
Transactions on 28 (3), 3362–3371. 
[26] Sutan, A.  An experimental investigation of the educative abilities of the agents in 
negative feedback environments, Ph.D.  Dissertation 2005, University Louis Pasteur, 
Strasbourg. 
[27] Huck, S., Normann, H.T., Oechssler, J.  Stability of the Cournot process:  
experimental evidence.  International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, 31 (1), 123–
136. 
[28] Nerlove, M.  Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1958, 72, 227–240. 
[29] Miller, R.M.  Experimental Economics:  How we can build better financial markets, 
2002.  John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey 
[30] Plott and Smith.  Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 2008. North 
Holland. 
[31] Meadows, D.L.  Dynamics of Commodity Production Cycles.  Wright-Allen Press, 
1970, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
[32] Jorgenson, D.  Econometric studies of investment behavior:  a survey.  Journal of 
Economic Literature, 1971, 9 (4), 1111–1147. 
[33] Sterman, J.D.  Modeling managerial behavior:  misperceptions of feedback in a 
dynamic decision making experiment.  Management Science, 1989, 35 (3), 321–339. 
[34] Lesieutre, B., Rogers, K., Overbye, T., Borden, A. A sensitivity approach to 
detection of local market power potential. Power Systems, 2011, IEEE Transactions 
on 26 (4), 1980–1988. 
[35] Alcaraz, S. Free competition vs. auctioning of licenses for electricity production. 
M.Phil. thesis. System Dynamics Group, Department of Geography, University of 
Bergen. 2010. 
         
                        
62
[36] Cramton, P., Stoft, S. The convergence of market designs for adequate generating 
capacity, with special attention to the CAISO’s resource adequacy problem, A White 
Paper for the Electricity Oversight Board, California, April 2006. 
[37] Lara, D. Capacity mechanisms in electricity markets: An experimental study using 
system dynamics modeling. 2014, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 
[38] Heck, N., Smith, C., Hittinger, E. A Monte Carlo approach to integrating uncertainty 
into the levelized cost of electricity. The Electricity Journal, 2016, 29 (3) 21–30 
[39] Santos, M, J., Ferreira, P. A methodology to incorporate risk and uncertainty in 
electricity power planning, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.03.080. 
[40] Baran, P.A., Sweezy, P.M. Some theoretical implications. Monthly Review, 2012, 
64 (3), 24. 
[41] Mayer, J.N., Kreifels, N., Burger, B. Kohleverstromung zu Zeiten niedriger 
Börsenstrompreise — Kurzstudie.” August, 2013. Frauhofer-Insitut. 
[42] Schuler, R. Pricing the use of capital-intensive infrastructure over time and efficient 
capacity expansion: illustrations for electric transmission investment, 2012. 
[43] Nagl, S., Fursch, M., Lindenberger, D. The costs of electricity systems with a high 
share of fluctuating renewables: A stochastic investment and dispatch optimization 
model for Europe. The Energy Journal, 2013, 34 (4). 
[44] Arango, S. Simulation of alternative regulations in the Colombian electricity market. 
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2007, 41(4), 305-319. 
[45] EC. Proposition de directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil concernant des 
mesures visant à garantir la sécurité de l’approvisionnement en électricité et les 
investissements dans les infrastructures. 2003. 
[46] EC. Directive 2005/89. /EC of the European Parliament and the Council concerning 
measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment. 
2005. 
[47] Carlson, J.A. The stability of an experimental market with a supply-response lag. 
Southern Economic Journal, 1967, p. 305-321. 
         
                        
63
[48] Roques, F.A. Market design for generation adequacy: healing causes rather than 
symptoms. Utilities Policy, 2008, 16, 171–183. 
























2.4 Alcaraz (2010) 
Z 
 
10.09 Lara (2014) 
X 
 
1.87 Lara (2014) 
Y 
 






0.6 Arango et al (2013) 
𝛽 
 
0.4 Arango et al (2013) 
𝜕𝑖  
 
-0.02 Arango and Moxnes (2012) 
𝛾𝑖 
 





Arango and Moxnes (2012) 
𝛿𝑖 0.16 
 
Arango and Moxnes (2012) 
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B 0.1 Arango and Moxnes (2012) 
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Table A1. Values used in the simulation experiments. 
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Capacity adequacy has become one of the main concerns in electricity markets over the past 
decade, when a number of capacity mechanisms have been suggested, studied and implemented. 
In this paper, we focus on two of them, i.e., procurement of long-term strategic reserve 
contracting and centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. The first mechanism aims to 
stabilize price behavior by including a regulator who controls generation. The second mechanism 
proposes an auction system for capacity licenses to control the total generation capacity. We test 
and compare the desirability of these two capacity mechanisms with a “free” market using 
laboratory experiments. Our results suggest that the centralized auctioning for capacity contracts 
stabilizes laboratory markets and provides economic welfare comparable to a free market. The 
procurement of long-term strategic reserve contracting, on the other hand, does not seem to 
improve either of the two aspects in comparison to a non-regulated market.  
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1. Introduction 
The electricity sector in many countries has gone through significant changes in the form of 
deregulation and other reforms over the past three decades. Regulators and policy makers have 
had different concerns about processes and outcomes, prioritizing the prevention of market 
power and lower prices over issues such as the environment and renewables (Helm, 2007; 
Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 2006). More recently, there has been renewed concern about 
markets’ ability to deliver enough investments and to ensure electricity’s security of supply (Elia, 
2015), especially since the share of renewables has increased in the national generation portfolio 
in many countries (e.g., OFGEM, 2013). These concerns shape the ongoing discussion of how 
to ensure security of supply, i.e., to ensure the uninterrupted availability of electricity at an 
affordable price (IEA, 2014). Despite three decades of deregulation, security of supply in power 
markets is not yet properly understood (Joskow, 2008). Security of supply can be seen as the 
long-term “economic welfare” of the market, as it aims at balancing the needs of generators and 
consumers (IEA, 2007; Roques, 2008; Arango and Larsen, 2011; Larsen et al. 2016). 
To meet producers’ and consumers’ needs, there is a need for sustainable and reliable markets. 
To ensure this, a number of solutions have been proposed, many of which fall into the category 
known as capacity mechanisms. These capacity mechanisms aim to strengthen systems’ long-
term stability by encouraging a desired investment behavior, i.e., ensuring that enough 
generation capacity is available and avoiding periods of volatile price oscillations and blackouts 
(De Vries, 2007). Capacity mechanisms have been analyzed through actual case studies 
(Cramton and Stoft, 2006; CEER, 2006; Barroso et al., 2006; Cámac et al., 2006; Fignon and 
Pignon, 2008), simulations and experiments (Liu et al. 2010; Van der Veen, et al. 2012; Arango 
et al., 2013), while other studies have used theoretical models (Zou, 2009; Fu and Ren, 2011).  
In this paper, we focus on two mechanisms, i.e., the procurement of long-term strategic reserve 
contracting and centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. We study the effects of these two 
mechanisms on the long-term economic welfare of an electricity market using laboratory 
experiments. The use of laboratory experiments is a recognized methodology for studying 
systems that involve decision-making processes (Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2005) and, in the 
particular case of electricity markets, to test different market settings (Rassenti et al, 2003; 
Arango et al, 2013). 
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We design our experiment based on the experiment presented by Arango and Moxnes (2012), 
using their experiment as our benchmark for the mechanisms’ performance. Arango and Moxnes 
(2012) represent the “no intervention” case because there is no regulatory intervention. 
Thereafter, we create treatments for each capacity mechanism. The rest of this paper is organized 
as follows: The next section explains our two selected mechanisms. The third section describes 
the experimental design and experimental procedure. The fourth section presents our hypotheses 
about market behavior. The fifth section presents the experimental results, and the sixth and final 
section discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
2. Capacity mechanisms 
We investigate two different capacity mechanisms in this paper, i.e., the procurement of long-
term strategic reserve planning and centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. We select these 
specific mechanisms for two reasons. First, the literature indicates that they both perform well. 
Second, they are theoretical opposites; one of them seeks to force the market towards a desired 
state, and the other determines the optimal market state and then uses incentives to reach it. 
With the procurement of long-term strategic reserve contracting, a government institution, i.e., a 
regulator, can intervene in the market with capacity. Capacity can be obtained from either a state-
owned or a privately-owned generator (EC, 2003; EC, 2006). Sweden, Belgium, Germany and 
New Zealand implement variations of this mechanism (Fignon and Pignon, 2008; EC, 2016). 
Both empirical results and the theoretical literature suggest that the mechanism provides 
sufficient capacity adequacy in the market. However, this mechanism has been criticized in the 
literature for its lack of compatibility with market principles; it is seen as a direct market 
intervention that is not in line with a deregulated market (de Vries and Hakvoort, 2004; Meunier 
and Finon, 2006). 
The second mechanism discussed here is the centralized auctioning of capacity licenses. With 
this mechanism, the government has control over—i.e., determines—the total market capacity 
by using auctions for licenses to build the newly required generation capacity to maintain the 
desired reserve margin. Thus, generators bid for licenses to build new generation capacity 
(Fignon and Pignon, 2008, Maurer and Barroso, 2011). The UK, New England and Italy are 
example cases that have implemented this mechanism (Vasquez et al., 2003; EC, 2013; 2016). 
The literature and empirical results suggest that high capacity adequacy and market compatibility 
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are its main advantages and that the difficulty to ensure that licenses become actual capacity is 
its main disadvantage (Vasquez et al., 2003; Bidwell, 2005).  
3. Experimental design 
Experiments have been performed to study different issues in the electricity area. These issues 
include designs (Rassenti et al., 2003), consumers’ willingness to pay for power (Morita and 
Managi, 2015), green electricity (Sundt and Rehdanz, 2015), energy efficiency in the residential 
sector (Ramos et al., 2015), and commercial and industrial demand response to time-of-use 
electricity pricing (Jessoe and Rapson, 2015), among others.  
In the area of security of supply, experiments have been conducted to test different capacity 
mechanisms, such as mothballing (Arango et al., 2013), forward contracts (Brandts et al., 2008) 
and future price calibration and forecasting (Islyaev and Date, 2015). Our experiment contributes 
to this literature by evaluating procurement of long-term reserve contracting and centralized 
auctioning for capacity contracts in terms of security of supply and economic benefits. 
Below, we outline the three treatments used in the experiments discussed in this paper. As 
mentioned above, we use the results of Arango and Moxnes (2012) as the first treatment, 
representing a “free market”. The subsequent two treatments represent capacity mechanisms 
with the same market design. We assume ideal market and institutional conditions for both 
mechanisms aiming to have the cleanest possible experimental design for testing purposes. Each 
of the three treatments consists of six experimental markets, and each market has five players 
who are encouraged to compete to maximize their profits. The three treatments are described as 
follows. 
3.1. Treatment 1 
This treatment is the same as the one used by Arango and Moxnes (2012) in their fourth and 
more complex treatment. This is a symmetrical Cournot market with five players, linear demand 
and constant marginal costs, following Huck’s standard conditions (Huck et al., 2004). In the 
experiment, each player represents a firm in the market. The electricity price is determined by a 
linear inverse demand function with a nonnegative restriction. Each year’s profits and electricity 
price information are made available to all subjects. The capacity utilization is fixed and equal 
to the current capacity with a time step of one year, a four-year investment delay (i.e., from 
investment to the time that the new generation capacity comes online, representing the planning 
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and building lag) and a lifetime of capacity of sixteen years. The subjects decide how much they 
want to invest in new capacity every year. There is a maximum size for each subject (firm) of 20 
units to ensure minimal competition in the market. The experiment has 70 rounds, i.e., 70 years. 
The market price, Pt, in period t is 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 (6 − 0.1 ∗ ∑ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑖=1
, 0)                                                                                                        (1) 
where  𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the nonnegative production of subject i in period t, and 6 and 0.1 are scaling 
constants. The profit function for subject i in period t is 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑝𝑡 − 𝐶) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                           (2) 
where C is the marginal cost, which includes operational and capital cost and is constant at 1 
(monetary units/capacity units). The production of player i in period t is 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
𝑡−4
𝑖=𝑡−19
                                                                                                                                  (3) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the investment decision of subject i in period j=t-19 to j=t-4. Total capacity or 
supply in time t (𝑆𝑡) is 
𝑆𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                                           (4) 
 
3.2. Treatment 2 
This treatment represents the regulators’ procurement of long-term strategic reserve contracting 
(Fignon and Pignon, 2008). The underlying logic is the same as in Treatment 1. The only 
difference is that in addition to the generators, we have a regulator who can invest in new capacity 
in the case that demand is not met; which could also be understood as state-own firm. Since we 
assume ideal market conditions, the regulator has perfect information of the market. The 
regulators’ task is to invest when production is expected to be less than demand. Thus, the 
regulator invests in the market to fill the gap between the capacity required to meet the demand 
and the actual capacity. The regulator cannot have more than 10 units (20% of the market 
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optimum) to ensure that he does not have the power to dominate the market. In this way, we 
preserve the characteristics of a competitive market. 
The conditional function that determines the regulator actions is 
 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑡+4 < 50 {
     10                           𝑖𝑓 50 − 𝑄𝑡+4 ≥ 10
  
  50 − 𝑄𝑡+4                𝑖𝑓 50 − 𝑄𝑡+4 < 10
                                                (5) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡+4 is the capacity in four years. The regulator aims for the market optimum (50 units), 
which is the competitive equilibrium, i.e., the maximum economic welfare. 
3.3. Treatment 3 
The third treatment represents the case of a centralized auction for capacity contracts (Alcaraz, 
2010). The market is as described as in Treatments 1 and 2. In this case, the model calculates the 
amount of capacity to be auctioned, ensuring that the electricity price is equal to the marginal 
cost (perfect competition equilibrium), also known as the optimal total investment (OTI; 
Reichmann, 2007). While in reality both capacity and electricity prices fluctuate, and generators 
bid for capacity based on anticipated revenues from electricity sales, we assume the electricity 
price to be equal to the marginal cost and design a subsidies scheme for capacity. This subsidies 
scheme is designed to reflect different situations in the electricity market without explicitly 
including it. For instance, high subsidies for capacity reflect a shortage of generation relative to 
demand, and low or negative subsidies (costs to build capacity) reflect an excess in generation 
relative to demand. We include this scheme to have more control over our experiment’s input 
and simplify our experimental design for the participants, by providing them one market to deal 
with instead of two. 
Players bid for capacity licenses every year. They make a bid curve in which they write how 
many licenses they want at each possible license price. The bid curves are aggregated and 
matched with the OTI. Then, the equilibrium license price LP is found. Based on the LP licenses 
and the individual bid curves, licenses are given to the individual generators. To ensure that the 
equilibrium can be found, and to avoid logical errors, the model accepts only monotonically 
decreasing curves for desired investments. Players bid every year by drawing investment curves 
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in a desired number of licenses vs the license price chart. Negative license prices denote that 
players require subsidies to make additional investments. With the purpose of having more 
control, we have assumed ideal institutional conditions, and thus all licenses become actual 
capacity after their allocation in the auction i.e. players are obliged to build the capacity they 
have gotten licenses for.  
The cost function of this license or subsidy for subject i in period t is 
𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝑡           (6) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the licenses assigned to subject i in period t, and 𝐿𝑃𝑡 is the license price. The profit 
function in monetary units for subject i in period t is 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                          (7) 
where 𝛼  is the operational cost constant equal to 1 monetary unit per unit of capacity, and 𝐵𝑖,𝑡  
is the license cost or cost function of the mandatory right to build capacity. Since the capacity is 
fixed, the electricity price will remain constant throughout the whole treatment and will be equal 
to the cost; therefore, the profits can only come from the trading of licenses. 
3.4 Economic equilibrium for the three treatments  
Each experimental treatment presents a different scenario for competition and market behavior. 
To be able to benchmark the behavior, we calculate the economic equilibria in the cases of a 
joint maximization, Cournot-Nash and perfect competition (see equilibria calculations in 
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Table 1: Players’ individual investments (ID), market capacity (Cap), price for joint maximization (JM), 




























































































        
*In this treatment, a regulator firm intervenes, so the individual investments of the players do not 
match with the market production. 
As observed in Table 1, the optimal production for maximizing the economic welfare, i.e., the 
competition equilibrium, is 50 units given the calibration we have presented in the equations 
above, and this production amount becomes the one we use in the following.  
 3.5. Experimental procedure 
For treatment 1 (T1), we use the results of Arango and Moxnes (2012). We do not repeat these 
experiments because their main purpose for use is to act as a benchmark for the two other 
treatments. Furthermore, we follow the same format and use the same population, which makes 
their results directly comparable with ours.   
For treatments 2 and 3, we run six experimental markets for each treatment. We follow the 
standard protocol for experimental economics (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Friedman and 
Cassar, 2004). All participants were fourth- and fifth-year students of management and industrial 
engineering at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Medellín, Colombia. The participants 
could earn a payoff between COP $10.000 and COP $40.000 (at the time, equaling between US 
$5 and US $20) in one and a half hours, depending on their performance, which was measured 
as accumulated profits in the experiment. The payoff exceeded the opportunity cost estimated 
for the students for the experiment’s duration time. 
Participants were organized randomly at the workstations used for the experiment so that they 
were not able to identify their competitors in the market. The instructions were then distributed 
among participants (see Appendix B for the experiment instructions). After 15 minutes, we gave 
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participants an additional explanation of the market dynamics and posed general questions to 
make sure they understood their task. We asked participants to make their decisions and write 
them down on a record sheet we gave them as a backup for the experiment. We started the 
experiments under the same initial conditions of Arango and Moxnes (2012), that is, a market 
capacity of 55, which translates into a price of 0.5 and negative profit of -0.5 as the starting point. 
They were told that the software would not allow them to have a capacity over 20 units to ensure 
minimum competition. It was also explained how the interface worked and what information 
they would receive every year. They were informed by the software about their own production 
capacity each year (discriminated in years of remaining lifetime), yearly profits, accumulated 
profits, market capacity and market price. We ran the experiments using a computer network 
with Powersim Constructor 2.51 (see Appendix C for the experiment interface). The software 
ran year by year automatically once all participants made their decision and kept records of all 
variables, including participants’ decisions. The experiment is available from the authors upon 
request. 
4. Dynamic Hypotheses  
We present our hypotheses for Treatments 2 and 3 based on the simulations performed by Lara 
(2014) for treatments 2 and 3. For Treatment 1, we show the simulations reported by Arango and 
Moxnes (2012). 
4.1. Treatment 1 
In this treatment, we use the heuristic and parameters estimated by Arango and Moxnes (2012) 
in their fourth treatment. This heuristic is based on Nerlove’s (1958) adaptive expectations 
approach, which states that players create price expectations based on previous forecasts they 
have made and the current market price. The expected price at time t, 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡, is given by 
𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝛽1) ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 +𝛽0       (8) 
where 𝛽1,is the weight on past expected prices, and 𝛽0 is a scaling constant. We use the values 
estimated by Arango and Moxness (2012), i.e., 𝛽1=0.31 and 𝛽0=0.02.  
 
Given the expected price, we can estimate the total market investment (𝑋𝑡), which is determined 
by 
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𝑋𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝜕 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡+4 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡+4 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜔, 0)          (9) 
where 𝑥𝑡 is the market’s investments in capacity in period t, and 𝜕, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝜇 and 𝜔 are market 
decision parameters for depreciation, capacity, expected price, actual market price and decision 
adjustment, respectively. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡+4 and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡+4, are market depreciation and installed capacity four 
years ahead of period t, 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑡 is the market’s expected price in period t, and 𝑃𝑡 is the market’s 
actual price in period t. The base case simulation, using the estimated parameters from Arango 
and Moxness (2012), is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Simulated prices of the base case (Arango and Moxnes, 2012) 
As Fig. 1 shows, the parameters give rise to cyclical behavior. We use this as the benchmark of 
the comparison with the two intervention mechanisms we have selected because this represents 
a “free market” in the sense that there is no direct regulatory intervention.  
4.2. Treatment 2 
Based on the same parameters used in Treatment 1, Lara (2014) performs a number of 
simulations with the model, including regulator’s investment in long-term strategic capacity. 
Regulator capacity is assumed to be constant the entire time period and equal to 10 units, which 
gives the regulator significant intervention power (20% of the capacity goal) but not enough 
power to completely control the system’s capacity or the price (Meunier and Pignon, 2006). 
Representative results from these simulations are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Simulated price with regulator (Lara, 2014) 
Figure 2 clearly shows that although the regulator does not eliminate cyclical behavior, the 
amplitude of the cycles is significantly lower than in Figure 1. Regulators’ intervention 
contributes to reducing the magnitude of the oscillations. This behavior is, in that respect, more 
preferable than the free market in Treatment 1. We can conclude that it improves the system, 
although the calculation of welfare later will raise some doubts about this.   
4.3. Treatment 3 
In this treatment, we examine the license prices for permissions to build new capacity, given that 
the electricity price is constant. To simulate market bidding for this treatment, we use the 
heuristic proposed by Lara (2014), in which the bidding curve’s initial point is at the lowest 
possible price for the licenses (-2.1) and is determined by the market’s profit and capacity. Thus, 
this initial point is given by 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝−2.1 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑧 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝑦 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝, 0), 20)                                                (10) 
From this initial point, we can estimate the following points on the bidding curve, which are 
given by 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝 =  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑖 + 𝑙 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑝−𝑚, 0)                                                                                           (11) 
where 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝 is the desired capacity at a license price 𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑝−𝑚 is the desired capacity at the 
previous point on the curve (𝑚 is the distance between the points on the curve), and 𝑖 and 𝑙 are 
coefficients estimated for each particular point (𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝). 
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Figure 3: Simulated licenses prices 
With the auctioning system, the market capacity is fixed; therefore, the electricity price is stable. 
However, market instability is present in the license prices, as Figure 3 shows, because the 
producers’ investments and profits are determined by the license prices. If the license price is 
sufficiently negative, i.e., generators are paid to build capacity, there might be a reduction in the 
overall economic surplus. This auction intervention fosters decision making similar to what we 
observed in the previous cases, i.e., the market makes high orders for capacity when the price is 
attractive and low orders for capacity when the price is not attractive. Thus, this decision-making 
approach may lead to oscillations in the license prices (Lara, 2014). However, it is worth noting 
that the uncertainty is less for the generators in this treatment because the future price is known, 
and the cost or subsidy is known before the investment is made, leading to relatively small 
corrections in the license price.  
4.4 Welfare considerations 
To obtain more insight about the advantages and disadvantages of the different treatments, we 
calculate the economic welfare in the three markets. We calculate the consumer, producer and 
economic surpluses for every year; thus, we can see how the economic surplus is affected in 
terms of both expected value and stability. For Treatments 1 and 2, we use the following 
equations: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =
(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝑄𝑡
2
                                                     (12) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑄𝑡                                                          (13) 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠                                                     (14) 
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For Treatment 2, we take the regulator firm results into account, i.e., the profits or losses reported 
by this firm are added to (or subtracted from) the economic surplus. For treatment 3, we include 
the cost for the government. Therefore, the economic surplus for treatment 3 is the sum of the 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus minus the cost for government. The cost for the government 
is calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑣 =   {
2 ∗ 𝐿𝑝 ∗ 𝑋𝑡       𝐼𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 
0                   𝐼𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑
                                                               (15) 
where 𝑋𝑡 is the total assigned licenses in period t, and 𝐿𝑃𝑡 is the license price, as before. When 
there are subsidized prices, the government incurs a double cost, i.e., the direct cost of the 
subsidies and the opportunity cost of the public resources going to subsidies when they could be 
used to meet other public needs. We test economic surplus using the average value and the 
standard deviation to test for both expected value and stability. Table 2 shows the results for the 
simulations discussed previously.  









Base case    
Average 133.59 -12.46 121.13 
Std. Dev. 35.43 
 
37.12 5.09 
Regulator    
Average 136.31 -11.86 124.45 
Std. Dev. 13.33 
 
14.05 0.76 
Auctioning     
Average 125.00 -0.06 123.98 
















              
 
As Table 2 shows, Treatment 1 presents a negative value for the average producer surplus and a 
high value for the consumer surplus (higher than the optimum and out of the optimum 
equilibrium). Despite the high value for consumer surplus, the economic surplus is less than the 
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optimum due to the negative producer surplus. For Treatment 2, the consumer surplus value 
exhibits a value greater than the optimum, along with a negative producer surplus. This 
combination results in an economic surplus that is less than the optimum but greater than the 
base case. Since licenses are the only factor determining market profits in Treatment 3, market 
investors may be prompt to make a decision similar to the ones we observed in the other 
treatments, i.e., investors make high orders for capacity when the price is attractive and low 
orders for capacity when the price is not attractive. In comparison, Treatment 2 presents the best 
average value and the second-lowest standard deviation for the economic surplus of all three 
cases. However, these results raise some questions about the system’s sustainability because this 
treatment shows sustained economic losses (on average) for the producers, which would be 
unbearable for the producers in the long term (Arango and Larsen, 2011). Therefore, we consider 
that Treatment 3 presents the best results in terms of sustainability, average value and standard 
deviation for economic surplus (Lara, 2014). We now show our experimental results to see 
whether they are consistent with these simulations. 
5. Experimental Results 
Figure 4 shows the price develoment over the periods for the different treatments. It illustrates 
our treatments 2 and 3 along with the results of Arango and Moxnes (2012) in T1, which is used 
as our base case. Visual inspections show cyclical tendencies in T1 with different amplitudes 
and frequencies. We can also observe that there seems to be an almost constant adjustment of 
the price in all six markets, as the price tends to regress to its mean. For T2, with the procurement 
of long-term reserves, we observe a change in the dynamics compared to T1, with a higher 
anplitude and lower frequencies on average, i.e., more pronounced cycles as well as periods with 
a stable price in a number of the experimental markets. From T3, we observe a different pattern 
compared to the first two treatments, given that the electricicty price is constant in this treatment, 
and we observe the license price, with relatively short cycles intercepted by periods of no change. 
In most markets, we also observe a significant change over time as the amplitude seems to 
become smaller and in some cases almost dissapear. T2 presents a higher likelihood for prices 
equal to zero. This can be explaind by the presence of the regulator, in the sense that having an 
extra player investing in the market (the regulator) can have the effect of periods with more 
excess capacity and thus a price that drops to zero. 
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Electricity price T1 ($/Unit)                Electricity price T2 ($/Unit)                  Licenses price T3 ($/License)                       
Figure. 4: Observed market prices in different markets for T1 and T2 and license prices in T3 
 
Visual inspection is only the first step in understanding the results. We are interested in how the 
behavior and particularly the oscillations we have observed affect the economic welfare of the 
market. This analysis allows us to understand the cost and benefits of the different types of 
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interventions in the market. We calculate the consumer, producer and economic surplus for all 
markets for each period in the experiment to be able to make these comparisons. We start by 
looking at the aggregated results across treatments and then discuss the disaggregated behavior. 
Table 3 summarizes the aggregated results across the three treatments.  
In Table 3, T3 shows the largest expected value and the second-lowest standard deviation, which 
makes this mechanism the best option for the market. Regarding the economic surplus, i.e., the 
aggregated performance, we observe that there is less than a 5 percent difference between the 
best case (124.44 in T3) and the worst case (118.71 in T2). Moreover, the no-intervention 
scenario (T1) is close to the results of T3, with 123.70. However, the disaggregated results show 
larger differences, where the results of T2 are different from the other two. The consumers do 
better in both intervention cases compared to the market base case; however, they do better in 
T2 than in T3, where the consumer surplus increases by almost fifteen percent, from 125.00 to 
142.76. The opposite is the case for the producer surplus, which is lower in T2 (-23.75) than in 
T3 (-0.67). However, T2 has the largest producer surplus with 3.60.  
One question that we need to solve is whether the treatments’ economic surpluses are 
significantly different from each other. To assess this, we perform a t-test to compare them. Table 
3 shows that all economic surplus values are statistically different from each other in terms of 
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Table 3: Consumer, producer and economic surplus aggregated results of the experiments. j = 












Base case (T1)    
Average 120.10 3.60 123.702,3 
Std. Dev. 
 
13.16 12.96 0.662,3 
Regulator (T2)    
Average 142.76 -23.75 118.711,3 
Std. Dev. 30.02 
 
29.21 13.181,3 
Auctioning (T3)    


















       
 
We observe that there are significant differences in the standard deviation in Table 3. T2 has a 
large standard deviation, which raises questions about the desirability of this option, where the 
variation is significantly higher than in the other two treatments. This implies that there is more 
uncertainty in the prices, which is consistent with our visual inspection of Figure 4. Thus, while 
consumers on average will be better off, there might be periods where the prices will be very 
high. In many cases, this is not desirable, as large price differences might make the market look 
unstable and discourage both new investment in generation (slowly increasing the role of the 
regulator) and general investments in manufacturing if there is uncertainty about the future 
electricity prices. In T3, there is no variation in the price because it is determined by the regulator 
and the market-based solution, although there is uncertainty in this treatment, such uncertainty 
is lower than in T2. 
The economic surplus across treatments is, although different, relatively similar; there is only a 
5% difference between the best and the worst. On the other hand, one could argue that a four- to 
five-percent difference at the national level is a significant amount of money. At a first glance, 
we might argue that the case of procurement of long-term reserves (T2) should be the preferred 
option, given that it creates the most value for consumers, i.e., it is the case where the consumers 
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are best off. However, this is also the scenario where the producers are worst off, and the 
consequence might be that producers’ activity will not be sustainable in the long term, which 
will require the regulator to become increasingly involved. Although the auction-based system 
presents a negative producer surplus, it is very small and should as such not endanger the long-
term survival of the generators.  
We now turn our attention to the disaggregated results in Table 4, and we look more closely at 
the differences between markets within a treatment, i.e., we explore the reasons for the different 
standard variation in Table 3. In Treatment 1, the free market condition, we observe that four out 
of the six markets have a positive producer surplus and in some cases, such as T1-M4, have a 
relatively high surplus, which corresponds to relatively high prices and smaller volatility, as 
observed in Figure 4. We observe little variation (2% difference between best and worst) in the 
economic surplus across the different markets in T1; therefore, the tradeoff is between who 
captures the surplus, the producer or the consumer. The largest economic surplus, although the 
difference is relatively little, is in the first two markets, T1-M1 and T1-M2. These two cases 
represent the two markets where the producer surplus is closest to zero.  
For T2, the procurement of capacity by the regulator, we observe that producers have a negative 
surplus in all markets, and in all cases, it is significantly higher than the greatest loss in any of 
the markets in T1. The variation between the markets is also significantly higher, as shown by 
the standard deviation in Table 3. The reason for the negative surplus can partly be explained by 
the period of low prices in T2 (see Figure 4). This also explains the markets where there is a 
relatively high consumer surplus, e.g., T2-M3 and T2-M6. Looking at the consumer surpluses, 
we can observe that even the smallest, T2-M3, is larger than the largest in T1, T1-M5. The 
economic surplus is very low only in the case of T2-M2.  
T3 shows relatively little variation across the markets compared to the two other treatments. The 
reason for this is that the electricity price is stabilized with the capacity auctions. The producer 
surpluses, though negative, are close to zero in all markets.  
As an overall impression, both mechanisms seem to induce a loss for regulators to bear in order 
to improve the economic surplus of the market. However, the procurement of strategic reserve 
planning puts more stress on the producers’ surplus, arguably because it reduces the generators’ 
ability to increase their profits by reducing their investments to raise the price. This stress on the 
producers’ surplus ultimately leads to both reducing and destabilizing the economic surplus. 
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Table 4 Producer, consumer and economic surplus for the disaggregated markets in the three 
treatments 
\   Producer surplus Consumer surplus Economic surplus 
 
  Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. 
T1 M1 -0.38 20.28 124.47 20.72 124.10 0.96 
 
M2 0.79 18.05 123.51 18.36 124.29 0.84 
 
M3 7.01 19.63 116.91 20.51 123.91 1.40 
 
M4 11.63 17.52 112.33 17.86 123.96 0.76 
 
M5 -2.49 34.85 124.51 35.82 122.02 3.58 
 
M6 5.07 20.54 118.87 21.16 123.94 1.12 
T2 M1 -16.41 39.03 131.54 43.69 117.92 7.81 
 
M2 -43.94 27.09 147.70 27.66 102.70 25.43 
 
M3 -30.26 21.53 154.44 20.26 122.52 2.53 
 
M4 -11.49 19.40 135.77 21.38 123.95 1.15 
 
M5 -9.23 21.19 131.87 23.17 123.81 1.76 
 
M6 -31.21 26.44 154.33 24.99 121.35 4.00 
T3 M1 -0.55 1.44 124.75 0.38 124.20 1.31 
 
M2 -0.15 0.86 124.75 0.31 124.61 0.78 
 
M3 -0.01 0.60 124.71 0.39 124.40 0.85 
 
M4 -0.94 1.54 124.84 0.35 124.50 0.74 
 
M5 -0.71 1.35 124.86 0.28 124.45 0.78 
 
M6 -1.64 2.10 124.83 0.46 124.48 0.76 
 
We focus now on the analysis of potential cycles in the experiment markets, i.e., cyclical 
tendencies in the electricity prices in T1 and T2 and the license price in T3. We perform an 
autospectra and autocorrelogram analysis of the three treatments (see Appendix D). From the 
autospectra, we identify frequency concentrations in all T1 markets. These frequency 
concentrations imply price cycles from approximately 13 to 40 years in this set of markets. The 
autocorrelograms show that for the markets in T1, there are significant autocorrelations for at 
least the first three lags in all groups. With the same analysis for T2, the autospectra show 
significant frequency concentrations in all groups, which suggests cycle lengths ranging from 
approximately 6 to 40 years. For T2, the autocorrelograms show significant correlations for at 
least the first four lags in all groups. For the case of license prices in T3, the autospectra analysis 
shows significant frequency concentrations in groups 4, 5 and 6. The cycle lengths in these 
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groups range from approximately 5 to 20 years, i.e., significantly shorter in the two previous 
treatments. The autocorrelograms for T3 show more variation across the groups than was the 
case in the previous treatments. Here, groups 1 and 6 have no significant autocorrelation, groups 
2 and 3 present significant autocorrelations in only one lag, and groups 4 and 5 show significant 
autocorrelations in 4 and 5 nonconsecutive lags, respectively.  
There are different reasons for and implications of the difference between T1 and T2 versus T3. 
Although the first two treatments present electricity prices (T1 and T2) and the last (T3) presents 
license prices, we expect the same dynamic evolution because it is driven by similar decisions 
around investment in capacity. However, we observe significant differences between the 
outcomes of T1 and T2, which might be useful to discuss in more detail. The bidding mechanism 
in T3 forces players to compete for a fixed capacity; that is, when one player takes a portion of 
the fixed capacity, the maximum capacity the other players can obtain is automatically restricted, 
which is not the case in T1 and T2. To understand how the subjects, make decisions, we assess 
subjects’ decision rules using regressions, with Investment as a dependent variable and capacity, 
depreciation, expected price and price as independent variables. Table 5 shows the results of the 
regressions’ average coefficients per market and per treatment. There is a significant difference 
across treatments in terms of the percentage of significant regressions. The coefficients do not 
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Table 5 Average coefficients of the regressions (different than zero) for T1 (results from Arango 
and Moxnes (2012)) and T2. 𝑎𝑑  is the coefficient for depreciation, 𝑎𝑐  is the coefficient for 










T1 -0.02 -0.04 0.42 0.16 0.54 0.36 87% 
M1 0.27 0.13 -0.24 0.59 -15.99 0.48 100% 
M2 -0.65 -0.63 0.47 -1.00 7.88 0.48 80% 
M3 -0.02 0.21 -0.06 -0.71 1.27 0.09 80% 
M4 -0.43 0.36 0.56 0.26 15.26 0.45 100% 
M5  0.50 0.02 0.93 1.09 -6.11 0.09 80% 
M6 0.19 -0.32 0.89 0.72 0.95 0.54 80% 
T2 0.04 -0.07 0.31 0.05 1.03 0.15 58% 
M1 0.03 0.10 0.48 0.05 0.98 0.13 20% 
M2 -0.09 -0.13 0.30 -0.75 1.44 0.11 60% 
M3 0.18 -0.11 0.28 0.10 1.06 0.22 80% 
M4 -0.19 -0.29 0.22 0.04 0.98 0.11 80% 
M5  -0.03 0.79 0.53 0.18 0.33 0.17 20% 
M6 0.08 -0.18 0.44 0.31 1.37 0.18 40% 
 
 
Expected price and price are reinforcing variables (positive coefficients), meaning that a price 
that is greater than zero will always generate more investment, especially when the investment 
has a positive expected return. This will eventually put pressure on the price and drive it down. 
Capacity shows a negative overall effect on investments, meaning that the more the capacity 
increases, the more reluctant the players will be to invest. Depreciation shows a seemingly 
ambiguous effect. The subjects in T1 have a negative effect on investments, which suggests that 
players in T1 tend to prefer a lower capacity, i.e., they do not necessary replace all retired 
capacity. This leads to an increase in the price as the total capacity decreases. However, subjects 
from T2 seem to have the opposite reaction: They invest more as the depreciation increases to 
either maintain or increase their current capacity. This behavior argues for a higher degree of 
competition in T2 than in T1, leading to lower prices. 
𝑎𝑑  
 
𝑎𝑐  𝑎𝑒  𝑎𝑝 𝑅2 𝑎0 
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There is a reduction in the percentages of significance when T1 is compared to T2. This reduction 
in percentages can be explained by the fact that T2 markets present a higher random component 
in their decisions. This notion makes sense if we conceive T2 as T1 with an added actor, i.e., the 
regulator firm. The introduction of this additional firm (with full foresight) seems to make the 
market less predictable. In terms of the coefficients, there is no distinguishable change from the 
coefficients in T1 to T2 in general. However, it is interesting to note that the price expectations 
in T2 are seemingly less widespread than the expectations in T1. Although it is not conclusive, 
this finding raises the question of whether the introduction of the regulatory firm can somehow 
lead to more predictable price expectations and thus more predictable (at least marginally) 
investments. Therefore, further research is required. 
Based on the average coefficients portrayed in Table 5, we can run simulations using these and 
compare them with our original simulations. Since we use Arango and Moxnes’ (2012) results 
for T1, we will  make such a comparison only for T2 and T3. Fig. 5 shows our original 
simulations from Figure 2 along with the new simulations using the average coefficients 
displayed above for T2. Fig. 5. shows a significant resemblance between our original simulation 
and the new simulation based on the experiment. We observe a similar frequency with the 
maximum for the simulation being the same and the minimum being higher compared to the first 
simulation in Figure 2. The simulation with the new decision rules shows a smoother price 
transition than our original simulation. This can be attributed to the smaller coefficients for 
expected price and price, the more negative coefficient for capacity and the positive coefficient 
for depreciation. The smaller coefficients in expected price and price suggest that players are 
slightly more conservative when observing increases or decreases in price. The more negative 
capacity coefficient accounts for a more constrained investment policy, in which a higher 
capacity implies higher reductions in investments than in the original case. The positive 
depreciation coefficient implies that depreciated capacity is compensated to some extent rather 
than indicating a decreasing tendency (investment going down as depreciation goes up), as in 
the previous case. These three elements suggest a less aggressive investment policy, which 
accounts for the smoother prices we find in Figure 2. 
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Figure 5: Original simulation vs new simulation using the average estimated 
coefficients from Table 4 for T2 
 
To perform the same comparison between the original and new investment functions for T3, we 
run a number of regressions of T3 data following our original investment function (eq. 9) 
formulation, that is, using capacity and accumulated profits as independent variables and 
investment as the dependent variable. Table 6 shows the average coefficients per market and the 
average for the treatment. 
Table 6: Average coefficients of the regressions (different than zero) for T3. MProf is the 



























M1 0.73 2.29 -15.52 0.76 80% 
M2 2.41 2.42 -6.53 0.80 100% 
M3 1.73 1.14 -38.21 0.82 100% 
M4 2.17 0.78 -3.92 0.83 80% 
M5 1.46 1.54 -2.67 0.85 100% 
M6 1.83 1.67 -6.31 0.86 80% 
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It is interesting to note that 90% of the regressions are statistically significant and that the R^2 
value of 0.82 is relatively high. The coefficients are also close to the simulation coefficients, as 
in T2. Market-to-market comparisons show a rather narrow distribution of coefficients for profits 
and capacity. Similar to observations in Table 5 for T2, it also raises the question of whether the 
introduction of capacity mechanisms (auctions, in this case) may lead to more predictable 
investments. Such investments may not be the optimal ones, but they might be more predictable; 
nevertheless, this question is beyond this paper scope, and it may be addressed by future research. 
Based on the coefficients displayed in Table 6, we perform a comparison between the original 
investment function and a new function with these coefficients. As Fig. 6 shows, there is a 
significant resemblance between the original and the new investment functions. 
 
Figure 6: Original simulation vs new simulation using the average estimated 
coefficients from Table 6 
 
There is a significant resemblance between the original and the new investment functions, as 
shown in Fig. 6. These results show consistency between our original simulation and the 
simulations that result from using the experiment-inferred decision rules. Such consistency 
suggests that our results for T2 and T3 are in line with the results that were used to build the 
original simulation parameters i.e., our experiment validates the robustness of the experiments 
on which the original simulations are based. We now turn to the last section, which discusses our 
findings and concludes the paper. 
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6. Conclusion and Discussion 
Capacity mechanisms aim to improve the long-term security of supply or specifically one aspect 
of security of supply, i.e., capacity adequacy. The regulator intervenes in the system by activating 
a mechanism to increase capacity when it is considered necessary (Fignon and Pignon, 2008). In 
this paper, we perform an experimental study to test two different capacity mechanisms, i.e., the 
procurement of long-term strategic reserve contracting and capacity auctions. 
We investigate whether either of the two interventions in the market significantly improves the 
capacity adequacy of the market and thereby not only provides insurance against blackouts but 
also provides affordable prices for consumers, which is another important dimension of security 
of supply. We do this in a number of different ways. We look at the economic welfare of both 
producers and consumers as well as overall economic performance, and we look at the 
autospectra and autocorrelograms to establish the presence of cycles. We estimate the general 
investment function in the market with a simple equation. We also look at the stability of the 
market, as cycles imply that there will be high uncertainty regarding investments, i.e., firms will 
generally be cautious in investing if there is great uncertainty regarding the future return (Arango 
and Larsen, 2011).  
Our experimental results suggest that the procurement of long-term strategic reserve planning 
neither improves the market’s expected benefits nor benefits stability in the market. Moreover, 
the experimental results suggest that generators exhibit substantial losses on average across the 
markets and in each single market. Furthermore, looking at the behavior of the price over time, 
the potential problems for the generators become even more significant if such losses are 
sustained. As observed in Figure 4 and confirmed by the autocorrelograms, there are large and 
long-term fluctuations in the price, including a number of cases with a very low price over long 
periods. We observe larger amplitudes of the fluctuations compared to the base case, T1, which 
increases uncertainty for investments. This is also confirmed by the regressions (see Table 5), 
where it is shown that this type of intervention is unlikely to bring more stability to the market 
and, in most cases, might be worse than leaving the market “alone”.  
The use of centralized auctioning for capacity contracts improves the experimental markets’ 
performance. The overall economic welfare as well as the consumer and producer welfare is 
higher than the second treatment, T2, and only slightly worse for the producers compared to the 
first treatment, T1. In addition, we find that this mechanism presents a more sustainable scenario, 
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given that the expected value and standard deviation for the producers are closer to the normal 
economic profit than in the first mechanism’s case. License price is characterized by random 
patterns with no autocorrelation, which indicates no evidence of cyclical behavior. Furthermore, 
since the regulator sets the electricity price, the uncertainty that the generators experience is 
much less than in the previous cases. This is likely to lead to more timely investments. However, 
as in the other intervention cases, this is far from a “free” market and might to a large extent 
depend on how appropriately the regulator manages the price, ensuring a return for generators 
and an affordable price for consumers.  
To summarize, our experimental results suggest that centralized auctioning for capacity contracts 
can have positive results in electricity markets by improving their economic welfare in terms of 
both stability and expected economic surplus. Conversely, our results also suggest that the 
procurement of long-term strategic reserve planning can actually have detrimental effects in the 
market by reducing the expected economic surplus and increasing the surplus’ instability. These 
results are consistent with the fact that market-oriented mechanisms tend to be more preferable 
than interventionist mechanisms (Meunier and Finon, 2006).  
The selection and implementation of capacity mechanisms in real life are difficult tasks because 
we cannot know for sure what the real outcome is going to be (Larsen and Arango, 2013). 
However, simulation models and laboratory experiments provide insights about what the effects 
of different capacity mechanisms might be in real markets; therefore, they can offer a better basis 
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Consider the main equations in this economic model, i.e., the price equation and the 
players’ profit equation.  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡                      (1a) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗       (2a) 
Since the sum of the players’ individual capacities is total market production Q and we 
assume that all n players are identical, we have    
 𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗               (3a) 
By replacing (3) in (1), we have 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗            
(4a) 
Then, we replace (4) in (2), and we have  
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗           (5a) 
We now derive (5) with respect to 𝑞𝑖,𝑗   and equal it to zero to find the maximum value 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑗
= 𝐴 − 2 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0            (6a) 




                (7a) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 1
2 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 5
= 5 
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Since we now have the value of 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, we can find the values for 𝑄𝑡 and 𝑃 by replacing the 
value of 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 in (3) to obtain the value of 𝑄𝑡 and then replacing this value in (1) to find 𝑃: 
𝑄𝑡 = 5 ∗ 5 = 25 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 25 = 3.5 
 
Cournot-Nash: 
In this equilibrium, we follow the same process we followed in the joint maximization. 
However, we now assume that each player maximizes his or her own benefits, while the 
other players’ benefits remain constant. This implies that the marginal change in the total 
market capacity is equal to the change of the player making the profit maximization. In 
mathematical terms, the previous statements can be described as  
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
 = 1         (8a) 
The starting point is the same as the joint maximization equilibrium with the price and 
profit equations. As in the previous case, we have the following equation: 
           𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗                                              (9a) 
We also know that 
     𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗                (10a) 
We can rewrite (2) as 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗                (11a) 
Since we have the assumption stated in (1), the derivation is 
         
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0            (12a) 
   
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0             (13a) 
By replacing (3) in (6), we have 
         




= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0              (14a) 




               (15a) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =  
6 − 1
0.1 ∗ (5 + 1)
= 8.33 
𝑄𝑡 = 8.33 ∗ 5 = 41.66 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 41.66 = 1.83 
Perfect Competition: 
This equilibrium is achieved when the price is equal to the marginal cost, that is, when 
the profits are theoretically zero. This theoretical zero does not mean that the firms 
actually receive zero profits; rather, it means that the firms receive the normal economic 
profit (no extra gains). 
Margin cost = 1 
Price = Margin cost 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝑄𝑡 =







Now that we know the value for 𝑄𝑡, which makes 𝑃𝑡 = 1, we proceed to find the values 







         




In this treatment, we base our derivations in the basic scheme of Treatment 1, but we now 
have to consider the regulatory firm. Therefore, we start with the same two equations of 
the previous treatment and the regulator contribution (RC = regulator contribution) to the 
total production capacity of the market: 
      𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡                                   
(16a) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗                 (17a) 
𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  + 𝑅𝐶                   (18a) 
Since we know that the RC value depends on 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, we can form 3 intervals for this 
value: 
 
𝐼𝑓 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 40, 𝑅𝐶 = 10 
𝐼𝑓 40 > 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 < 50, 𝑅𝐶 = 50 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 
𝐼𝑓 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 50, 𝑅𝐶 = 0 
By examining these 3 intervals, we can conclude that the third interval does not have the 
joint maximization equilibrium since the players’ profits are 0 or negative in it. We can 
also conclude that since the price ranges from 2 to 0 in the second interval, this one does 
not have the equilibrium value since the maximum unitary profit in it is 1. Therefore, we 
know that the equilibrium lies in the first interval, where RC=10. Thus, we take RC as a 
constant equal to 10. 
We replace (3) in (1): 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗  𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐶              (19a) 
We replace (4) in (2): 
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       𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗            (20a) 
Now, we derive with respect to 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 an equal to zero to find the maximum: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑗




                 (22a) 
Now, we find the values of𝑞𝑖,𝑗, 𝑄𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡: 
 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 10 ∗ 0.1 − 1
2 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 5
= 4 
𝑄𝑡 = 5 ∗ 4 + 10 = 30 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 30 = 3 
Cournot-Nash: 
For this equilibrium, we assume that 𝑄𝑡 changes as a result of a maximization process 
made by one player, while the rest of the variables remain constant. 
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
 = 1               (23a) 
This is the same as saying that for this equilibrium, the derivation with respect to 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is 






= −𝐵               (24a) 









∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗          (25a) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0            (26a) 
We consider price equation (5) and production capacity equation (6):  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡                    (27a) 
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𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  + 𝑅𝐶             (28a) 
We replace (6) in (5) to replace them in (4) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡




              (30a) 
We now find the value for 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, 𝑄𝑡  and 𝑃𝑡 (we also assume RC=10 for this equilibrium 
for the margin intervals we explain in the joint maximization) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 10 ∗ 0.1 − 1
0.1 ∗ (5 + 1)
= 6.66 
𝑄𝑡  = 5 ∗ 6.66 + 10 = 43.33 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 43.33 = 1.67 
Perfect Competition: 
This equilibrium is achieved when the price is equal to the marginal cost, that is, when 
the profits are theoretically zero. This theoretical zero does not mean that the firms 
actually receive zero profits; rather, it means that the firms receive the normal economic 
profit (no extra gains). 
Marginal cost = 1 
Price = Marginal cost 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝑄𝑡 =







Since 𝑄𝑡 = 50, 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑅𝐶 can make infinite combinations that sum 50, we have the 
following ranges, 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑅𝐶, that could add up to 50 units in combination: 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =  [8, 10]   
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𝑅𝐶 =  [10, 0] 
Treatment 3: 
Since the market production capacity is fixed in this treatment, there is only one capacity 
and price scenario that is equivalent to the perfect competition equilibrium; that is 
𝑄𝑡 = 50 
𝑃𝑡 = 1 
In this treatment, the players bid in auctions; in other words, the players compete for a 
share of the total market production capacity (which is fixed). Therefore, 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 behaves 
differently for every individual according to the auction results but always keeping the 
perfect competition equilibrium in the market (𝑄𝑡 = 50  and   𝑃𝑡 = 1). 
 
To summarize the equilibria:  
 T1 T2 T3 
 Cap Price Cap Price Cap Price 
JM 25.0 3.50 30.0* 3.00 NA NA 
CN 41.7 1.83 43.3* 1.67 NA NA 
PC 50.0 1.00 50.0* 1.00 50.0 1.00 
 
Market capacity (Cap) and price for joint maximization (JM), Cournot-Nash (CN) and 
perfect competition (PC) equilibria.  
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Appendix B: Experiment instructions (translated from Spanish) 
T2 
INSTRUCTIONS 
WARNING: Do not touch the computer until you are instructed to do so! 
 
Welcome. In this game, you will play the role of an electricity producer. Every year, you decide 
how much new production capacity (power plants) you want. Your goal is to maximize the 
benefits for all periods of the experiment. 
You are one of five electricity producers in a market and do not know who your competitors are 
and how they operate individually. 
Power plants have a lifespan of 16 years and a construction period of 4 years, from the time you 
order new capacity until this new capacity begins to produce electricity. 
Annual profits are taken for production multiplied by the difference between the price and unit 
costs. Unit costs are constant and equal to 1 unit of experimental money. 
 
Production benefits = (Price - Unit costs) 
 
The production capacity of each player cannot be negative and must be below 20 units. Think of 
this upper limit as a government regulation to maintain a minimum market competition. 
Each year, the capacity and electricity production are given by investments in previous years. 
The capacity utilization is always 100% for all players, i.e., it is assumed that all plants are 
always working at 100% capacity. 
All electricity produced by the market is consumed every year. The larger the total production, 
the lower the price at which electricity is sold. The exact relationship is given by a demand 
curve and is expressed as 
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Price = 6 to 0.1 • Total production ≥ 0 
 
The price cannot be negative, and there is no economic growth influencing demand and 
electricity prices. The relationship between total output (x axis) and electricity prices (Y 
axis) is shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between total production and the price. 
 
Every year, you should make investment decisions in new capacity (you can choose 0 units). 
After 4 years, new investments are added to the existing capacity. This capacity lasts for 
16 years and is automatically reduced as the old plants are discarded. 
In addition to the other participants, you will interact with a market regulator, operated by the 
computer. This regulator has a maximum capacity of 10 units and will invest if it detects 
that the total market capacity will be less than 50 units. 
At the beginning of the experiment, the former managers have invested a constant amount of 
0.6875 units / year. 5 companies are equal players with the same unit costs and the same 
initial capacity. The market starts with an initial capacity of 11 units for a total capacity of 
55 market units. Consequently, the price is equal to 0.5 (experimental money) and the 
initial benefits are equal to -0.5. 
 
TASKS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUSH "accept the decisions" unless you really mean it. 
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After pressing "accept the decisions", this decision for a particular year can no longer be changed. 
1. Look at the information available for the company and the market. 
2. Make your investment decision and type your decision in the box. Please note, you have to 
make an active decision every year. If you do not write anything in the box, the decision 
will be the same as the previous year because the previous investment decision is not 
automatically deleted. The program does not allow you to choose negative investments or 
investments that exceed the maximum capacity. 
3. Type your investment into the assigned paper sheet. 
4. Click "accept the decisions." 
5. Wait until all market participants have made their decisions for the current year, and start at 
point 1 again, when information for decision-making for next year becomes available. 
 
The game will continue until it stops at some unknown future year. 
 
NOTE: This experiment requires that you do not share any information (verbal, written, gestures, 
etc.) with other participants. Please respect these rules because they are important for the 
scientific value of the experiment. 
If it is required, you can direct questions to the personnel in charge of the experiment. 




CAUTION: Do not touch the computer until instructed! 
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In this game, you will play the role of an electricity producer. Every year, you decide how much 
you want to order in new capacity (power plants). Orders are made through bidding at an 
auction for licenses to build new capacity. 
Your objective is to maximize their accumulated benefits. You are one of five electricity 
producers in a market and do not know who your competitors are or how they perform 
individually. Power plants have a useful life of 16 years, and they take 4 years to be built; 
that is, if you decide to build a plant today, you have will it within four years, and it will 
last 16 years from that time. Annual earnings are given by the production multiplied by the 
difference between the price and unit costs, minus the number of new licenses purchased 
multiplied by their price. 
 
Benefits = Prod * (Price-Cost unit) - New licenses * License Pricing 
 
Unit costs are constant and equal to 1 (experimental money / unit). The new licenses reduce 
benefits if the auction generates a positive price for licenses. If the auction generates a 
negative price for the licenses, the benefits increase. Think of the latter as if the government 
were subsidizing licenses. 
The capacity of each player cannot be negative and must be below 20 units. Think of this upper 
limit as a government regulation to maintain a minimum market competition. Each year, 
the ability to produce electricity is given by licenses issued in prior years. The capacity 
utilization is always 100% for all players and all the electricity produced by the five 
producers consumed each year. 
The government determines the total number of new licenses each year. The amount is 
configured such that each year the total number of new licenses is equal to the total capacity 
that has become obsolete. This means that the total capacity in the market remains constant 
over time. Since we assume no growth in demand over time, the price of electricity will 
also be constant and equal to 1 (experimental money / unit). This means that annual 
earnings depend only on the number and price of new licenses. 
Each year, new licenses are auctioned. This is done through a graphical bidding curve where you 
can specify the number of new licenses you would like to receive for different prices. You 
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can manipulate the graph by moving the cursor on the graph by clicking and dragging. The 
license prices range from negative values (subsidies) to positive values. The graph bid must 
be defined in such a way that you order fewer licenses as the price increases, and the bid 
for a price of 2.4 must be zero. If these requirements are not met, the program will ask you 
to edit the graph. 
Each year, the government takes all the graphs of supply and assigns new licenses so that the 
total number of new licenses is equal to the amount of capacity that becomes obsolete. All 
players end up paying (or receiving) the same price (or subsidies) for new licenses. Each 
player receives the number of new licenses he or she has specified by the resulting 
equilibrium price. New licenses automatically lead to orders for new capacity. After four 
years, the new licenses are added to the existing capacity. The capacity lasts for sixteen 
years and is automatically reduced when old plants are discarded. 
The previous business managers have received new licenses and invested a constant amount of 
0.625 units per year, for a long time. 5 companies are the same, with the same unit costs 
and the same initial capacity. The market starts with an initial individual capacity of 10 
units for each company and a market total capacity of 50 units. 
BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUSH "accept the decisions" unless you really mean it. After pressing 
"accept the decisions", your decision for that particular year can no longer be changed. 
1. Look at the information available to the company and the market. 
2. Draw your offer with the graphics cursor. The program does not allow you to ask for more 
licenses when the price increases (logical error) or to request a number higher than zero 
when the price is 2.4 (maximum price). Note that you have to make an active decision 
every year. If you do not make any changes to the chart offer, your decision will be taken 
as equal to the previous year, as the previous offer is not automatically deleted. 
3. Click "accept the decisions." 
4. Wait until all market participants have made their decisions for the current year and receive 
information from the bids next year. Enter your assigned number in the paper reporting 
licenses. 
5. Start at point 1 again. The game will continue until it stops itself at some unknown future year. 
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NOTE 
According to the purpose of the experiment, it is required that you not share any information 
(verbal, written, gestures, etc.). Please respect these rules because they are important for 
the scientific value of the experiment. You can ask clarifying questions. 
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Appendix D: Autospectra and autocorrelogram for all three treatments 
T1: Electricity price in groups 1 to 6 (from top to bottom) 
 
T2: Electricity price in groups 1 to 6 (from top to bottom) 
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Commodity prices are known to fluctuate. Cyclical tendencies are described in terms of 
period lengths, amplitudes, and regularity. Such fluctuations cause problems for 
producers, consumers, labor, and national economies. Here we take a closer look at the 
well-known hog cycle, which has been observed in hog markets since major markets 
were established. The Cobweb theory suggests that the internal working of the market 
causes these fluctuations. However, this theory has been rejected in economic literature 
because cycles can be shown to disappear when assuming a simple behavioral decision 
rules among producers. Furthermore, laboratory experiments have failed to replicate 
lasting cycles. This has opened up for theories that explain price fluctuations as caused 
by random, external shocks. However, there exists a more advanced dynamic model of 
the hog market, which produces lasting cycle, the Meadows model. Here we test this 
theory by a laboratory experiment. Without random shocks, the experiment produces 
price cycles similar to the Meadows theory and to historical observations. Meadows' 
claim that livestock adjustments are driven by current price-cost ratios is not rejected.  
 





         




Commodity cycles and their effects for producers, consumers and national economies 
have been a recurring topic of research (Deaton, 1999; Akiyama et al 2003). Typically, 
economic literature explains price fluctuations as a result of external shocks such as 
weather events, economic and political instabilities (Deaton, 1999). While random 
external shocks certainly affect commodity prices, they do not provide an explanation for 
lasting cyclicality (Deaton and Laroque, 2003). The Cobweb model provides such an 
explanation. However, this model has a weak standing in the economic literature, and it 
is frequently omitted in economic textbooks. Nerlove (1958) showed that the cycle 
disappears if suppliers make use of adaptive price expectations. Moreover, laboratory 
experiments have failed to produce lasting cycles (Carlson, 1967; Miller, 2002; Plott and 
Smith, 2008).  Since many real commodity markets tend to be cyclical, it seems pertinent 
to ask whether the highly-simplified Cobweb model fails to capture essential 
characteristics of commodity markets. In this respect, a study by Arango and Moxnes 
(2012) shows that when complexity and realism in the Cobweb theorem is increased, 
laboratory experiments can produce cycles. 
 
We focus on the hog market, which provides one of the most recognized examples of 
commodity cycles. For this market, Meadows (1970) developed a more complete 
dynamic model than the Cobweb model. Until now, this model has not been tested in the 
laboratory. This is what we do in this paper. Unlike previous experiments to test the 
Cobweb model or Cournot markets (Carlson, 1967; Sonnemans et al 2004; Arango and 
Moxnes, 2012; Arango et al, 2013), Meadows has a more detailed description of such 
market. He captures the livestock of hogs, stocks of growing pigs, and inventories of 
pork. Livestock is important because an increase in livestock requires a reduction in 
slaughtering, thus creating a short-term backward bending supply curve. Pork inventory 
is important since it carries mismatches between supply and demand into the future. Both 
livestock and inventories complicate the model and make it more difficult to form 
rational expectations. Based on data of the U.S hog market between 1956 and 1966, 
Meadows hypothesizes that breeding decisions (or decisions to increase or decrease the 
livestock), are simply based on observations of price-cost ratios. As a result, his model 
produces price cycles similar to those observed. 
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The experiment has N=9 markets, each with five players. We observe similar price cycles 
to those predicted by Meadows' model and as observed in US hog markets. We cannot 
reject Meadows' simple decision rule. First, we present Meadows' model, next our 
hypotheses and the experimental design. Results and conclusions follow. 
 
2.  Meadows' Model 
 
Meadows' hog cycle model seeks to describe and explain the dynamics of hog markets 
in the US in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Hog price cycles had for long been associated with 
random variations in the price of corn, the main forage for hogs (Meadows, 1970). As a 
consequence of this belief, the US government enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938 in order to stabilize corn supplies through the use of corn inventories. However, 
contrary to expectations, amplitudes increased as a result of the policy (Dean and Heady, 
1958). This paradoxical result motivated Meadows to develop a market model to explain 
price cycles when there are no random external shocks. 
 
Meadows' model is a continuous-time simulation model. To adapt the model to our 
experimental design we make several inconsequential modifications, see the comparison 
of the original and the modified model behaviors in Figure 1. The major reason for these 
modifications is to simplify the documentation of the model and the introduction to the 
players. Where Meadows use piecewise linear functions to describe nonlinearities, we 
use linear functions. Units are changed from the Imperial system to the Metric system, 
which is more familiar to our players. We explain other modifications as we go through 
the model equations. Table 1 at the end of this section shows values and units of constants 
and initial values. 
 
At the center of the model is the inventory of pork,  
 
 𝐼 = ∫(𝑆𝑃 − 𝐶𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +  𝐼(0)     (1) 
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which grows or declines with discrepancies between pork supply 𝑆𝑃 and pork 
consumption 𝐶𝑃. I(0) denotes the initial amount of pork in inventory. Pork supply 
measured in terms of weight 
 
 𝑆𝑃 = (𝑆𝑀 + 𝑆𝐿) ∗ 𝑊 ∗ 𝑌   (2) 
 
is given by the number of slaughtered mature hogs 𝑆𝑀 plus the number of slaughtered 





 𝐶𝑃 = (1 − 𝑒
−𝐼 𝐼𝐿⁄ )𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑆   (3a) 
 
is the product of the total US population 𝑃𝑈𝑆 (in the 1960s) and per capita consumption 
of pork 𝑐𝑃. Inventory never goes to zero in Meadows' model simulations. Since we do 
not know what the players will do, we limit consumption if inventory approaches or falls 
below a low limit 𝐼𝐿. [Unfortunately, in the experiment reported in this paper, the 
following erroneous formulation was used 
  
 𝐶𝑃 =  {
𝑐𝑃 ∗ 𝑃𝑈𝑆 
𝐼  
       
,    𝑐𝑃∗𝑃𝑈𝑆≤ 𝐼
,    𝑐𝑃∗𝑃𝑈𝑆> 𝐼
  (3b) 
  
where consumption is limited to what is in the inventory at any point in time. Since the 
inventory is low compared to the monthly throughput, this formulation leads to 
permanent rationing of consumption. In turn, there is no longer need for high prices to 
limit consumption, and consequently, there is less need for hog production.] 
 
Per capita consumption 
 
 𝑐𝑃 = 𝑎𝑐𝑃𝑅 + 𝑏𝑐   (4) 
 
depends on the retail price of pork 𝑃𝑅 and parameters 𝑎𝑐 and 𝑏𝑐. Here we have linearized 
the nonlinear function used by Meadows. The original function has an upper and lower 
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limit for consumption. Simulated price variations tend to be in the nearly linear portion 
of the relationship. A regression on the original function produced values for 𝑎𝑐 and 𝑏𝑐 
(𝑅2 = 0.97). 
 
The retail price 
 
 𝑃𝑅 =  𝑃𝑊/𝑌 + 𝑀   (5) 
 
is given by the wholesale price of hogs 𝑃𝑊 divided by the average hog dressing yield Y 
to get the wholesale price of pork. To this expression is added the sum of margins M for 
all middlemen in the process before the pork is presented in retail stores. The wholesale 
hog price 
 
  𝑃𝑊 = max (𝑎𝑃
1 𝐼𝑅 + 𝑏𝑃




3; 0)  (6) 
 
is a declining and stepwise linear function of the relative inventory coverage 𝐼𝑅. While 
Meadows' nonlinear relationship was close to linear (a linear regression gives 𝑅2 =
0.98), we use a convex relationship with two kinks. This choice implies that it takes a 
higher inventory than in the original model for the price to go as low as zero. Similar 
negative relationships between inventory and price have been documented for 
commodities such as copper (Klein and Marquez, 1989), oil (Fattouh, 2009) and 
agricultural products (UN, 2011). The relationship reflects risks of inventories 
approaching capacity limits and risks of stockouts. The relationship also presumes that 
there is an underlying understanding in the market of what the price should be for some 
learned equilibrium inventory level. 
 
The relative inventory coverage 
 
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝐼𝐶 𝐼𝐷𝐶⁄    (7) 
 
is given by the inventory coverage 𝐼𝐶 divided by the desired inventory coverage 𝐼𝐷𝐶, 
which is assumed to stay constant over time. The inventory coverage 
 
         





⁄    (8) 
 
is given by the inventory I divided by the expected consumption rate 𝐶𝐸, which is set 
constant and equal to the expected average consumption over the long run. 
 
Then we turn to the supply side. Slaughtering of mature hogs is given by 
 
 𝑆𝑀 = 𝑀𝑆/𝑇𝐹   (9) 
 
where 𝑀𝑆 is the stock of mature hogs and 𝑇𝐹 is the optimal length of the feeding period 
for mature hogs. The stock of mature hogs 
 
 𝑀𝑆 = ∫(𝑀𝑅 − 𝑆𝑀 − 𝐴𝐿)𝑑𝑡 +  𝑀𝑆(0)    (10) 
 
increases with the maturation rate 𝑀𝑅, it decreases with slaughtering 𝑆𝑀, and it decreases 
with adjustments to increase the stock of livestock 𝐴𝐿. The maturation rate is given by a 
third-order delay of the breeding rate 𝐵𝑅. In the last step, the maturation rate 𝑀𝑅 follows 
from the oldest stock of piglets 𝑃𝑆
3 
 
 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑃𝑆




2 − 𝑀𝑅)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑃𝑆














1 (𝑇𝑀 3⁄ )⁄  
 
 𝑃𝑆
1 = ∫(𝐵𝑅 − 𝑀𝑅
1)𝑑𝑡 +  𝑃𝑆





3 represent the stocks of piglets in three age classes each with a 
lifetime of 𝑇𝑀 3⁄ , where 𝑇𝑀 is the total time it takes for piglets to mature. 𝑀𝑅
1, 𝑀𝑅
2, and 
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𝑀𝑅 represent maturations out of the respective age classes. By using three short delays, 
the pulse response will be more narrowly distributed than for one long delay and more 
widely distributed than for a discrete lag. The resulting distribution reflects that some 
piglets grow faster and reach the slaughter age earlier than others. 
 
The breeding rate 
 
 𝐵𝑅 = 𝐿𝑆𝑝𝐿𝑙𝑀   (12) 
 
is given by the livestock 𝐿𝑆, the number of piglets per litter 𝑝𝐿, and the number of litters 
per month per livestock 𝑙𝑀. The livestock 
 
 𝐿𝑆 = ∫(𝐴𝐿 − 𝑆𝐿)𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑆(0)     (13) 
 
varies with positive or negative adjustments of the livestock 𝐴𝐿, and decreases with the 
slaughtering of livestock sows 
 
 𝑆𝐿 = 𝐿𝑆 𝑓𝑆 𝑇𝐿⁄    (14) 
 
where 𝑓𝑆 denotes the fraction of sows in the livestock and 𝑇𝐿 is the average productive 
life of sows. Hence, it is only sows that leave the livestock as slaughtered hogs. Boars go 
back to the stock of mature hogs if the livestock is adjusted downwards. The adjustment 
of the livestock 
 
 𝐴𝐿 = (𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿𝑆) 𝑇𝐴⁄    (15) 
 
is given by the difference between the desired livestock 𝐿𝐷 and the actual livestock 𝐿𝑆. 
The adjustment time 𝑇𝐴 reflects that it takes some time to reallocate the necessary 
resources to handling the hogs (man-hours, sheds, feed stores, etc.). The expression 
implies that in the medium-term, farmers can adjust their capacity fairly rapidly, with 
little need for adjustments in facilities. This is consistent with empirical evidence 
(Estabrook, 2015).  
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Different from the continuous decisions (𝐼𝐿𝐷) in the original model, the experiment 
requires that decisions be made at distinct points in time and are held constant between 
these points. Desired livestock is updated according to 
 
 𝐿𝐷 = ∫(𝐼𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿𝐷)𝛿(𝑡, 3,0)𝑑𝑡 +  𝐿𝐷(0)   (16) 
 
where Dirac pulses 𝛿(𝑡, 3,0) ensure that every third month, starting at time zero, the 
desired livestock is updated from the current desired livestock 𝐿𝐷 to the continuously 
updated indicated desired livestock. We linearize Meadows' function for indicated 
desired livestock to   
 
 𝐼𝐿𝐷 =  𝑏𝐷 + 𝑎𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶     (17a) 
 
This is a close approximation to Meadows' function (𝑅2 = 0.98). [Due to the erroneous 
formulation in Equation 3b, we will simulate with a similar equation  
 
 𝐼𝐿𝐷 =  𝑏𝐷
∗ + 𝑎𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶     (17b) 
 
where the intercept 𝑏𝐷
∗  is lowered to compensate for the reduced consumption rate.] 
 
The expected ratio of price to cost 
 
 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶 = ∫{(𝑅𝑃𝐶 − 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶)/𝑇𝑅}𝑑𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶(0)    (18) 
 
is given by a continuous version of the standard adaptive expectation formation. 𝑇𝑅 
denotes the time needed to form expectations and to make decisions about adjusting the 
livestock. The ratio of price to cost 
 
𝑅𝑃𝐶 = 𝑃𝑊 𝐶𝑚⁄    (19) 
 
is given by the ratio between the wholesale price 𝑃𝑊 and the operating cost 𝐶𝑚. 
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Meadows compares hog prices to a constant cost of corn. In order to account for 
increasing marginal costs (manure, hygiene, crowding etc.) associated with increasing 
livestock, we modify and allow for increasing marginal costs 
 
 𝐶𝑚 =  {
𝐶𝑚0                                 ,   𝐿𝑆 ≤  𝐿𝐸





   ,   𝐿𝑆 >  𝐿𝐸  
       (20) 
 
The marginal cost2 is constant and equal to 𝐶𝑚0 for livestock in the range from zero to 
the perfect competition equilibrium livestock 𝐿𝐸. Then marginal costs increase for larger 
livestock. The main reason for introducing increasing marginal costs is to ensure that the 





















                                                 
2  𝐶𝑚0 is estimated based on data found in the Animal Nutrition Handbook (Chiba 2014). 
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Table 1: Parameter values and initial conditions. 
Parameter Value Initial condition Value 
W 109 kg 𝐼(0)* 200x106 Hog 
Y 0.58 dimensionless 𝑀𝑆(0)* 13x10
6 Hog 
𝑎𝑐 -0.05 dimensionless 𝑃𝑆
3(0) 9.76x106 Hog 
𝑏𝑐 7.91    USD/hog 𝑃𝑆
2(0) 9.76x106 Hog 
𝑀 31.55  USD/hog 𝑃𝑆
1(0) 9.76x106 Hog 
𝑎𝑃
1  -42.1   USD/hog 𝐿𝑆(0)* 8.2x10
6 Hog 
𝑏𝑃
1  40       USD/hog 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝐶(0) 23.07 USD/Hog 
 𝑎𝑃
2  -15.55  USD/hog  𝑃𝑈𝑆 200x10
6 People 
𝑏𝑃
2  31.8     USD/hog   
 𝑎𝑃
3  -2.18    USD/hog   
𝑏𝑃
3 7.04     USD/hog   
𝐼𝐷𝐶 0.36     Months   
𝐶𝐸 9.9x10
8Pounds of pork   
𝑇𝐹 2          Months   
𝑇𝑀 10        Months   
𝑝𝐿 7          Hog/litter   
𝑙𝑀 0.17     Litter/month   
𝐹𝑆 0.6       dimensionless   
𝑇𝐿 36        Months   
𝑇𝐴 5          Months   
𝑎𝐷 3.2x10
6   Hog    
𝑏𝐷 5.3x10
6   Hog   
𝑏𝐷
∗  1.06x106 Hog   
𝑇𝑅 6          Months   
𝑎𝑚  2   USD/hog   
𝐶𝑚0 11.84    USD/ hog
2   
𝐿𝐸 38.4x10
6 Hog   
𝐼𝐿 1.74x10
6 Pounds of pork   
*Denotes that stocks are initialized out of equilibrium in Meadows' model. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the behaviors of the original and the modified Meadows models 
simulated with the initial values in Table 1. If it was not for the erroneous rationing of 
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consumption, the two model versions would produce cycles with nearly identical 
amplitudes and with hardly any damping. Hence, the cyclical phenomenon is not 
sensitive to "correct" modifications we made. [With rationing in place, the modified 
version produces dampened cycles. This is the phenomenon we try to replicate in the 
experiment]. Initial conditions are different due to the linearization of the price function. 
The original function produces an initial price of $20.96, whereas the linear function 
produces an initial price of $23.07. 
 




Meadows' model is based on much prior information about the hog market from 
statistical sources and conversations with scholars and hog farmers. The model produces 
lasting cycles similar to those observed in the US hog market. The present experiment 
enables an additional test of Meadows' hypothesis in an environment with no ongoing 
external disturbances. The experiment produces detailed data to examine decision rules, 
decision delays, and prices relative to known equilibria.  
 
The experiment is interesting because it represents a novel approach to see if cycles can 
appear in experimental markets. Except for one treatment in Arango and Moxnes (2012), 
previous experiments have failed to produce lasting cycles (Sonnemans et al, 2004; Huck 
et al, 2002). There are two main reasons why Meadows' model is more likely to produce 
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cycles than Cournot markets and Cobweb markets. First, Meadows introduced an 
inventory, which adds an extra state variable (stock) in the feedback loop on the supply 
side of the market. Second, decisions to increase livestock and meat production have a 
counteracting short-term effect since hogs are added to the livestock instead of being 
slaughtered. Hence a first reaction to a price-induced desire to increase production is 
reduced supply and an upward pressure on price. 
 
Specifically we test Meadows' assumption that adjustments in livestock are determined 
by recent ratios between the hog price and the marginal production cost (originally the 
cost of corn). This corresponds to Nerlove's (1958) hypothesis about adaptive price 
expectations and a linear relationship between price and investment. Meadows' 
hypothesis differs from Nerlove's hypothesis that supply follows investments after a 
simple time lag. As can be seen from the preceding section, Meadows' model gives a far 
more detailed and realistic description of the supply side of the hog market. Observations 
of persistent price fluctuations in hog markets and previous observations of cycles in 
experimental markets (Arango and Moxnes, 2012) motivate the hypothesis. 
 
The experiment also allows for a study of how quickly the experimental markets 
approach equilibria around which they may cycle. We hypothesize a gradual approach 
where adjustments are faster the further away from equilibrium the market is. We 
compare the observed (learned) equilibria to three theoretical equilibria. Equilibrium 
prices (in 1968 prices) are as follows: joint maximization ($21.82/hog), Nash equilibrium 
($14.64/hog), perfect competition ($11.84/hog), see Appendix A for derivations. 
 
4. Experimental design 
 
The design is a Cournot market with increasing marginal costs, under Huck’s standard 
conditions3. The experiment consists of 9 markets each with 6 players. The modified 
                                                 
3 Standard conditions (Huck et al., 2004, p.106): a. Interaction takes place in fixed groups; b. Interaction 
is repeated over a fixed number of periods; c. Products are perfect substitutes; d. Costs are symmetric; 
e. There is no communication between players; f. Participants have complete information about their 
own payoff functions; g. Participants receive feedback about aggregated supply, the resulting price, 
and their own individual profits; h. The experimental instructions use an economic frame (instructions 
use economic terms such as “market”, “price”, “consumption”, etc) 
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version of Meadows' model is used to capture the structure of the experimental market. 
To get a reasonable scale, each player is assumed to make up 1/10,000 of the entire US 
hog market. Initial conditions and parameters that reflect scale are adjusted accordingly. 
The total size of the market is given by the sum over the six players. Appendixes B and 
C show the player interface and the instructions. The experiment is programmed in 
Livecode 7.0.1. 
 
Player i's payoff in NOK 
 
 𝑃𝐹𝑖 = 𝐴𝑃 1586⁄ + 40 ≥ 40   (21) 
 
is a linear function of the accumulated profits AP above a minimum level of NOK 40 
($5). 
 
The interface and instructions give players information about the current hog price, and 
the hog prices one and two months ago. The players get information about own 
production and livestock, marginal costs, and profits. Players do not get information 
about consumption and inventory, however, they could estimate inventory levels from a 
graph showing the exact relationship between inventory and hog price. Players have 
perfect information about the demand curve. [Obviously they did not get information 
about the erroneous effect of the first order control on consumption.] 
 
To reduce the burden of analysis, players have access to a profit calculator. Using their 
own price expectations, they can find their own and other players' optimal production 
and livestock. Players are also informed that an increase in the livestock will not give an 
immediate effect on slaughtering. They get to know that it takes 5 months from a decision 
to increase the livestock is made until new sows start to give birth, and that it takes 12 
months from births to slaughtering. 
 
A few changes were made to simplify the task. Players get to see demand as a function 
of the hog price rather than the proportional pork price; the pork price is not reported. 
                                                 
 
. 
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Another simplification is that in the instructions the livestock is treated as if it consists 
of only sows. This is of no practical concern since the program and the profit calculator 
keep track of the balance between sows and boars. Finally, players get information that 
slaughtering and sales take place automatically, and that they are not involved in setting 
prices, prices are determined by the inventory coverage only. While this is an 
approximation to what happens in real markets, players get precise information that this 
is how the experimental market works. 
 
The perception and decision delay of 6 months (Equation 18) is not included in the 
laboratory experiment. Players use their own procedures for expectation formation, we 
observe and compare to the estimate in Meadows' model.  
 
Experimental procedure: 
We recruited 54 students in total, 22 master students from Economics and 32 master 
students with varied backgrounds at the University of Bergen, Norway. Participants were 
randomly assigned to different computers, and did not know whom they were competing 
with. The participants received written instructions. They were allowed to ask technical 
questions and to play the three first rounds of the experiment to familiarize themselves 
with the game. After the try-out rounds, the experiment was reset and the students were 
reminded that their payoffs depended on their own performance and that the game would 




Figure 2 shows price developments for all nine markets. With the exception of M4, all 
markets show clear signs of cycles with expected period lengths. To estimate period 
lengths we consider the time intervals with the largest number of consecutive and well-
defined peaks and divide by the number of peaks minus one. Table 2 shows the period 
lengths. The average period length is close to the period length of the modified Meadows 
model.  
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Table 2: Estimated period lengths for all markets and time intervals with consecutive 
peaks. 
Market   Time interval 
  for estimation 
   Period length 
M1 3.3-12.8 3.2 
M2 2.8-15.6 3.2 
M3 5.0-14.4 3.1 
M4 n.a. n.a. 
M5 2.8-14.8 3.0 
M6 3.9-14.0 2.5 
M7 1.9-15.8 3.5 
M8 2.9-12.6 3.2 
M9 4.4-14.8 3.4 
Average  3.1 
Meadows modified (Fig.1) 3.2-14.7 4 
 
 
Next, we observe from the price curves that there is an upward trend from the early low 
prices that follow from the initial disequilibrium. It takes time and experience to establish 
equilibria. We assume that learning takes place through a feedback process where 
learning is rapid when prices are far away from desired and slower as equilibrium is 
approached. The result of such a process is captured by the following equation 
 
 𝐸𝑡 = (𝐸∞ − 𝐸0)(1 − 𝑒
−𝑡 𝑇⁄ ) + 𝐸0 ≥ 0  (22) 
 
where 𝐸∞ denotes the ultimate equilibrium value, 𝐸0 the starting value, and T the time 
constant. 
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Table 3: Ultimately learned equilibrium price (𝐸∞), initially perceived equilibrium price  
(𝐸0) and adjustment time for learning (𝑇) for all markets.  
Market 𝐸0 𝐸∞ T 
M1 0.5 10 4.4 
M2 0 9.9 4.0 
M3 0 15 2.7 
M4 0 2490024 124742 
M5 1.3 14.2 8.7 
M6 0.4 13.5 3.4 
M7 0 15.9 4.2 
M8 0 13.9 1.3 
M9 0 16.1 5.7 
Average 0.3 13.6 4.3 
Whenever a regression gives a negative value of 𝐸0, the regression is repeated with no intercept. All 
parameters are significantly different from zero at the 5%-level. 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results. Most markets start out with a learned equilibrium 
price close to zero and far below the ultimate equilibrium price. On average the markets 
tend towards a learned equilibrium price of 13.6 (M4 not included), which is between the 
competitive equilibrium (11.8) and the Nash equilibrium (14.9). The average adjustment 
time T is 4.3 years. 
 
Table 4: Average prices as percentages of the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the Perfect 
competition equilibrium (PCE) for various experiments. 















Percentage of NE 91/64 91 33 99 64 
Percent of PCE 115/81 94 110 n.a 117 
1 
First treatment with players as individual price setters 
2 
Cournot market treatment (basic)  
3 Last treatment (T4) 
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Table 4 shows that the experiment produces equilibrium or average prices, which fall 
within the range of earlier experiments of the Cournot type. All experiments tend to end 
up with prices below the Nash equilibrium and close to or above the Perfect Competitive 
equilibrium. The average price of our experiment is particularly low because of the initial 
disequilibrium condition and the long time needed to learn equilibrium. 
 
Next, we test Meadows' decision rule for desired livestock. Since his rule represents 
market decisions, we test a model for aggregate desired livestock as a function of the 
average ratio of price to costs 𝑅𝑃𝐶. Since we have no observations of the expected price-
cost-ratio 𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑅 we reverse the sequence of Equations 17 and 18. This can be done since 
the decision rule is linear. We use the following linear regression model 
 
 𝐿𝐷,𝑡 =  𝛼0+𝛼1𝐿𝐷,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2?̅?𝑃𝐶,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗
9
𝑗=1,𝑗≠6 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  (23) 
 
Expectation formation is captured by a first order autoregressive model (Koyck lag). The 
average ratio of price to cost over all players in a market is denoted ?̅?𝑃𝐶,𝑡. We pool the 
data for all nine markets, and for that reason we introduce dummies 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 for all markets 
except M6. This is motivated by the different equilibrium values 𝐸∞ reported in Table 3. 
Finally, note that due to the fact that decisions are made only once every third month, 
time t moves in steps of three months. This gives 63 data points for each market when 
the first data point is omitted due to lacking information about 𝐿𝐷,𝑡−1, altogether 567 data 
points for the pooled data. 
 
The coefficient 𝛼1 represents the weight on the previous value for the livestock. The time 
to form expectations can be calculate as 
 
 𝑇𝑅 = −1 ln (⁄ 𝛼1)    (24) 
 
The decision rule for indicated livestock in Equation 17b follows from the regression in 
the following way 
 





𝑗=1 𝐷𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼2?̅?𝑃𝐶,𝑡) (1 − 𝛼1)⁄ = ?̂?𝐷 + ?̂?𝐷?̅?𝑃𝐶,𝑡 (25) 
where 𝑑6 = 0.  
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Table 5 shows estimated parameters for different sets of data. Of greatest interest is the 
slope coefficient ?̂?𝐷. Whether M4 is included or not is of little importance for the slope. 
When the early years are excluded such that prices cycle around a relatively constant 
mean value (learned equilibrium), slopes are steeper and are quite close to the slope in 
the down-scaled Meadows' model. 
 
Table 5: Results of regressions on pooled observations and parameters in the modified 
Meadows model. 
  ?̅? 𝛼0 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝑇𝑅
6 ?̂?𝐷 ?̂?𝐷 
Experiment1 9.5 76** 0.73** 41** 9.5 317 152 
Experiment2 6.5 106** 0.63** 59** 6.5 304 159 
Experiment3 7.6 38 0.68** 94** 7.8 143 294 
Experiment4 3.8 54* 0.45** 167** 3.8 105 304 
Meadows5     6.0 534 329 
Significance levels: ** p<0.0001, * p<0.001 
1 All data, N=567 
2 All data except M4 
3 Last 10.5 years 
4 Last 10.5 years except M4 
5 
Parameters are estimated from the scaled down close to linear function used in Meadows' model. 
6 Time delay is reported in months (not 3-month steps) 
 
 
M4 has a strong effect on the estimate for the expectation delay. We also see that the 
delay time is reduced when the early years are excluded from the data. In this case and 
when M4 is excluded, the estimate of 3.8 months is 2.2 months shorter than the estimate 
in Meadows' model. When the effect of making decisions only every three months is 
taken into account, the experiment produces a delay time that seems consistent with 
Meadows' model. When the individual markets are simulated with estimated parameters 
dampened cycles result. With a minimum of internally or externally generated 
randomness, cycles persist with stable characteristics.  
 
         




We ran nine experimental markets to test Meadows' hog cycle hypothesis. In spite of an 
erroneous formulation of consumption in the experiment, it showed cyclical behavior of 
the same type as produces by Meadows' model and as observed in hog markets. The 
behavior was similar to that produced by Meadows' model when corrupted by the same 
error. We cannot reject Meadows' bounded rationality assumption that decisions to 
change the size of the livestock were influenced by adaptive price expectations. A linear 
regression produces a slope coefficient similar that that estimated by Meadows. 
Adjustments towards an implicit equilibrium indicate learning over time, which is 
consistent with previous studies that have shown significant learning effects in repeated 
Cournot experiments (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). The learned equilibrium price 
relative to the Nash equilibrium ends up similar to previous laboratory experiments. 
 
The results suggest that lasting market instabilities can indeed be generated 
endogenously, with no exogenous influences. Hence, Meadows' model should be 
appropriate for testing stabilization policies. For instance, there may be a potential for 
policies aiming to influence hog farmer decision-making. Further experiments could be 
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Appendix A: Equilibria derivation 
 
𝐵𝑆 is Breeding Stock (Variable) 
 𝐿𝑃𝐻 is Litters per hog (Constant and equal to 0.17) 
𝑃𝑆𝐿 is Piglets save by litter (Constant and equal to 7) 
 𝑊𝑆𝐹 is Weaning survival factor (Constant and equal to 0.7) 
 𝐿𝑊 is the hogs live weight (Constant and equal to 240 pounds or 108.86 in Kg) 
𝐷𝑌 is the hogs dressing yield (Constant and equal to 0.58) 
𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is hogs individual cost (Constant and equal to 11.84) 




By assuming the market is in equilibrium, we can express the following relationships in 












  (2) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 (3) 
 
By replacing 3 in 2, we have: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 2 ∗ 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 (4) 





Since the market is assumed to be in equilibrium, we can also establish the following 
relationships on the demand side: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (6) 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝐻𝑜𝑔𝑠 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌 (7)  
 
By replacing 5 into 7, we have 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌 (7)  
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𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 = ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌  (8)  
 
 
Joint Maximization equilibrium 
 
 Farmers’ profits are determined by the difference between the hog price and the hog 
cost, multiplied by the number of hogs that were slaughtered in the farms. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝐻𝑜𝑔𝑠 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 ∗ (𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (9)  
𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
−15,54 ∗ ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ 31,81 (10) 
 
By replacing 10, 5 and including the value for 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 in 9, we have 
 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗   
−15,54 ∗ ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ 31,81 − 11,84  (11)  
 
 








−15,54 ∗ ( 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
1
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶





−15,54 ∗ ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ 31,81 − 11,84  ) = 0 (12) 
 
By replacing all the constants values in equation 12, we can know the value for BS that 
corresponds to Joint maximization equilibrium 
 
𝐵𝑆 = 1,9305 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑠) 
 
Nash Equilibrium 
For this equilibrium we assume that, by definition, every market actor maximizes his 
own profit assuming that the other players are going to do the same (Best response). 
Therefore, the total market variation is the result of individual maximization. In 
mathematical terms this is represented by 
 
         









Where 𝑏𝑠 is the Breeding stock of one player. Since we are considering 6  in the market 
we have that  
 
𝐵𝑆 = 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 (13) 
 
By replacing 13 in 11, we have 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = ( 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠
36
) ∗  
−15,54 ∗ ( 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ 31,81  − 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (14)  
 
By rearranging 14, we have 
 






(−15,54 ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌)
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ (31,81 − 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠






36𝑏𝑠2 = 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 ∗ 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 = 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑆   (16) 
 
By deriving equations 15 and considering the best response requisite for Nash 










(−15,54 ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌)
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
+ (31,81 − 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 6 ∗ (𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
1
36
) = 0 (17) 
 
By finding the value for 𝑏𝑠 in equation 17, we have that 
 
𝑏𝑠 = 0,5510 
𝐵𝑆 = 6 ∗ 𝑏𝑠 = 3,3096 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑠) 
 
 
Perfect Competition Equilibrium 
For the players to not earn above the normal profit, the following condition must be 
satisfied 
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𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0  (18) 
 
Therefore, by replacing 10 in 18 we have 
 
−15,54 ∗ ( 𝐵𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐻 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐹 +
𝐵𝑆
36
) ∗ 𝐿𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑌
𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐶
− 𝐻𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0 (19) 
 
By finding the value for 𝐵𝑆 in 19, we have that 
 
𝐵𝑆 = 3,8610 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑔𝑠) 
 
 





Number (in millions) 




1.93 5.15 16.59 
Nash 
equilibrium 
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Appendix B: Instructions 4 
 
Welcome! In this experiment you will play the role of a pig farmer. Every third 
month you will make a decision that influences how many pigs you will have 
ready for slaughtering at a later point in time. Your farm is one of six identical 
farms that supply hogs to the slaughtering houses. Your goal as a manager is to 
maximize your farm’s accumulated profits over a 16-year period. Your payoff 
depends on the accumulated profits and can range from NOK 40 to NOK 500. 
 
To help you manage, take a look at the computer screen and note the following 
information. On the left-hand side you find information about your own farm. The 
first item is the number of livestock, which is the number of sows (female pigs) 
that can give birth to piglets (offspring). On average, each litter has 5.8 piglets 
(number of siblings each time a sow gives birth). Each sow gives birth every 10th 
month. The sows’ productive life is 3 years, after which sows are sold to a 
slaughtering house. 
 
The next item is the number of piglets up to the age of 10 months. Below that you 
see the number of mature pigs between 10 and 12 months old. When these pigs 
reach 12 months of age, they are either sold to a slaughterhouse or female pigs 
may become livestock. To simplify, only pigs that survive birth and breeding are 
counted for. 
 
Then you get information about the number of pigs and livestock that are sold in 
the last three-month period. Selling is automatic and happens exactly when pigs 
reach the slaughter age. The marginal cost per pig increases with the number of 
pigs on your farm, the number you see is for the last three-month period. The per 
unit cost increases because your farm has limited room for pigs, and limited 
capacity for feeding and cleaning. The below graph shows how the marginal costs 
vary with the number of sows in the livestock. 
                                                 
4 We changed the term “hog” for “pig” and the term “breeding stock” for “livestock” to make the 
instructions easier to understand, given that most of our participants were not native English speakers. 
 
         




The rectangle with market information shows market prices per pig for the last 
three months. The price varies with the number of slaughtered pigs that the 
slaughter houses have in their inventories. When inventories are nearly full, prices 
are low. This stimulates consumption of pork (pig meat) and help reduce 
inventories. When inventories are low, prices are high and reduce the demand for 
pork. The below graph shows the exact relationship between inventory and price 
in this market. 
 
There is an immediate effect of price on consumption. The figure below shows the 











































         




Price minus marginal unit cost per pig gives the unit profit per pig sold. Total 
profits for a sale is given by the average unit profit times the number of pigs sold. 
The last piece of farm information shows the total profits earned over the last 
three-month period. 
 
Your decision is to set the desired number of livestock. Once you set the desired 
livestock, it will take on average five months before the livestock reaches the 
desired size and the sows begin to produce piglets. It also takes time to reduce the 
livestock because pregnant sows will not be slaughtered before they have given 
birth. You can set a desired livestock from 0 to 200 pigs. 
 
Below the rectangle for decisions you see the accumulated profits for all years. It 
is the accumulated profits in the last year that determines your payoff. Time is 
denoted in years such that three months show up as 0.25 year. 
 
On the right-hand side you see a tool that can help you make decisions about the 
size of the livestock. You enter an assumption about the future price and the tool 
calculates the profit maximizing sales from your farm. This calculation takes 
account of the fact that marginal costs per pig rises with the number of pigs on 
your farm. As a further help, the tool also calculates the needed size of the 
livestock to reach the optimal sales numbers. Once you have entered a new 
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Note that the recommendations you receive reflect your own assumptions about 
what the future price will be, which in turn depends on how many pigs you and 
your competitors sell to the slaughter houses.  
Please use the answers sheet (columns for time period and desired livestock) to 
record your desired livestock every time. 
 
 













                                                 
5 We changed the term “hog” for “pig” and the word “breeding stock” for “livestock” to make the 
experiment    more understandable, since most of our participants were not native English speakers. 
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Making climate conferences more effective? 
 
Erling Moxnes  
David Lara-Arango 





Climate conferences (COPs) over the years have not led to sufficient emission reductions 
to reach generally agreed upon upper limits for climate change. According to mainstream 
game theory and public good and bad experiments, this should not come as a surprise. 
Just like individuals, nations are thought to be selfish. Here these results are challenged 
by a novel design of a public bad experiment. Interestingly, the new design leads to 
relative emission reductions similar to those obtained in Paris and much larger than 
predicted by previous games. This calls for some optimism. The results also point to 
possible improvements in COP procedures and activities. For instance, contrary to most 
earlier studies we find that individual pledges (IP), as used in the recent COP 21 in Paris, 




Keywords: Climate conferences, COP 21, Kyoto protocol, free riding, emission quotas, 
voluntary pledges.  
         




Experience thus far suggests that negotiations (NG) do not work well for the climate 
problem. The Kyoto protocol was a weak agreement among a limited number of nations. 
In follow-up conferences after Kyoto, NGs failed to establish new and stronger protocols. 
Major obstacles have been a bias towards quantity commitments (Cramton et al., 2015; 
Stiglitz, 2015) and consequent disagreements on quotas for different parties and on 
principles for setting such quotas (Depledge, 2000). Poor results are discouraging since 
NGs with conditional cooperation (I will, if you will) are typically seen as necessary to 
ensure socially optimal outcomes in commons problems (Cramton et al., 2015; Hauser 
et al., 2014). 
 
Individual quantity pledges (IP) have been received with marked skepticism (Cooper, 
2010; Cramton et al., 2015; Gollier and Tirole, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015; Weitzman, 2015). 
The main reason for such skepticism is the significant incentive for countries to free ride. 
Support for this position comes from game theory and public bad experiments showing 
that unilateral altruism is not sufficient to solve commons problems, even though 
contributions typically exceed what is predicted by the free rider hypothesis (Inman, 
2009; Marwell and Ames, 1981). In spite of this skepticism, before the Paris COP started, 
"more than 180 countries producing more than 90 percent of global emissions had 
submitted intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), a much broader 
response than many had anticipated" (Solutions, 2015). However, contributions were still 
much lower than needed to prevent average global temperature from exceeding 2oC. 
 
Game theoretical arguments supported by public bad experiments are at the core of 
discussions about COP procedures. In light of the relatively successful use of pledges in 
the Paris COP, it is important to take another look at the underlying theory. With this 
question in mind, we designed and used a novel laboratory experiment representing 
COPs of the NG and IP type. We introduced four major changes from the standard public 
good and public bad games. 
 
1. Payoffs only depend on the agreement reached in the final round of the game, earlier 
rounds represent negotiations or announcements of pledges. 
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2. The social optimum is announced as a common goal, similar to the goal of 2℃. 
Individual players do not have to conceive of and figure out the social equilibrium on 
their own. 
3. The social optimum is an interior solution reflecting the fact that all investments of the 
world are not needed to solve the climate problem. 
4. Players have different payoff functions reflecting that climate and abatement costs 
differ between nations. 
 
The results show much larger relative contributions than comparable public bad and 
public good games. Contrary to what has been claimed, there is no significant difference 
between average contributions for NG and IP. Towards the end, we discuss explanations 
for these findings and point to factors that could lead to even larger contributions towards 
limiting climate change. 
 
2. A novel game 
 
The game builds on the standard public bad game (Andreoni, 1995). Equation 1 shows 
the payoff function for player i 
 
 𝜋𝑖 =∝𝑖 𝐴𝑖 + (5.66 − 3.64𝐵𝑖/60)𝐵𝑖 − 1.16 ∑ 𝐴𝑗
5
𝑗=1   (1) 
 
where Ai is player i's investment in project A. The last term sums up investments in project 
A for all five subjects. This sum determines the public bad, which reduces the payoff for 
all players. Hence, project A reflects economic activities that lead to emissions of GHGs 
and to climate change. Bi denotes investments in project B, which has no public bad effect 
and thus represents emission reductions. 
 
To adapt this game to COP settings, payoffs are determined by the agreement reached in 
the final round rather than by the sum of results obtained over all rounds. To capture 
asymmetries among countries, players have different payoff functions (different 
∝𝑖  coefficients ) and these differences are private information. Still, all players get 
information about the social optimum, as if the goal for emission reductions is announced 
by an agency with knowledge of all payoff functions (e.g. representing the goal of 
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limiting global warming to 2.0 oC). To mimic that the social optimum does not require 
zero emissions and that all of society's investments are not needed for abatement, the 
social optimum is an interior solution with lower total investments than the total player 
endowments. Finally, treatments NG and IP differ in that to get an agreement with NG 
in any year, all players must accept the set of individual proposals. With IP, individual 
pledges in a non-specified final round become the agreement. 
 
The experiment is similar to previous threshold public good experiments of climate 
change negotiations (Brick and Visser, 2015; Tavoni et al., 2011) except for having no 
climate change framing with country names, no predefined strategies to choose from, and 
no face-to-face communication between players.  The NG treatment is also similar to a 
bargaining game (Özyurt, 2015) except for having identical roles (all players are 
investors rather than buyers and sellers) and no face-to-face communication among 
players. 
 
All players have the same endowment of NOK 60. According to Equation 1, per unit 
return on investments in project B decreases with increasing investments in B. When 𝐵𝑖 =
0, the per unit return is NOK 5.66; when 𝐵𝑖 = 60, the per unit return is NOK 2.02. This 
assumption reflects increasing marginal costs of abatement. 
 
The per unit return in project A varies between players and reflects differences across 
nations with respect to costs of climate change as well as of abatement (Gollier and 
Tirole, 2015). Variation is limited and is meant to reflect only real differences that are 
not known to everyone. Differences that are known and acknowledged as acceptable 
reasons for different contributions are not captured under the assumption that such 
differences would be more easily adjusted for in agreements. The ∝𝑖 coefficient is 6.39 
for player 1, 6.52 for player 2, 6.79 for player 3, 7.07 for player 4 and 7.20 for player 5. 
These parameter values imply a social optimum where the sum of player investments in 
project B equals 191.4. The optimal average investment is 38.28 per player, well below 
the endowment of 60. Figure 1 shows how payoffs vary for the median player as a 
function of investments in project B. 
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Figure 1: Payoff as a function of investments in project B (abatement), for subject i with the median payoff 
function. The dashed line shows payoffs if all players invest the same amount in project B. Payoffs are 
maximized when the player with the median value of ∝𝑖 invests NOK 38 in project B (social optimum). 
Solid lines show that individual payoffs are maximized for zero investments in project B (Nash 
equilibrium) no matter what the average investment is of the other four players Bj (38 or 0). Hence, there 
are incentives to free ride as well as to cooperate. 
 
The experiment's two treatments capture two different procedures to reach an agreement, 
Kyoto negotiations (NG) and Paris individual pledges (IP). The Kyoto procedure is 
mimicked in the experiment by having each player propose an investment in project B 
for herself. When all players have made a proposal, all five proposals become common 
knowledge and each player can choose to say yes or no to an agreement based on the 
current proposals. If all say yes, negotiations end and the individual payoffs are 
determined by that agreement. If at least one player says no, the negotiations move on to 
a similar next round. In the 9th and 10th rounds the subjects get warnings that they are 
respectively in the second to last and in the last round. If they fail to reach an agreement 
in the last round, the result is zero investments in project B by all players, i.e. the Nash 
equilibrium. There is no verbal communication. 
 
Different from the Kyoto protocol, players in NG cannot leave the negotiations. 
However, in practice, by proposing zero investments in project B, one player can shift 
the burden of finding an agreement to the remaining four. In the final around, a subject 








0 10 20 30 40 50 60Bi
Payoff subject i
Bj=38 Bj=0 Bj=Bi
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the other four come up with. Hence, even if free riders cannot leave negotiations, they 
cannot prevent agreements among those that choose to contribute. 
 
In the IP procedure, nations are free to state their own national goals for emission 
reductions. In practice, nations made pledges over a several month-long period preceding 
the conference in Paris. In the experimental treatment, subjects are asked to announce 
pledges regarding own investments in project B. After each round, all pledges become 
common knowledge. Different from the NG treatment, players do not vote yes or no to 
the current pledges. Rather, they are invited to revise their own pledges in a new round, 
and so on. At the very beginning they are told that there will be between six and eleven 
rounds and that the experiment will stop without any last round warning. This should 
reduce the temptation to try to fool the others by proposing large investments in project 
B in all rounds except for the last one. 
 
There were 5 subjects in each group, and the groups were formed randomly. With some 
exceptions, players met different subjects in the first and the second treatment. In no case, 
subjects could find out who they were playing against and to what extent group 
memberships had changed. Each player had the same payoff function in both treatments 
with one and the same -value. Group membership stayed the same over all rounds 
within each treatment. Subjects participated twice, once with the NG treatment and once 
with the IP treatment. There were 95 subjects forming 19 groups playing the NG 
treatment and 85 subjects and 17 groups playing the IP treatment. Twenty groups played 
NG first and 16 groups played IP first.  
 
Players read the written instructions (Appendix A), they were given an introduction to 
the experiment interface (Appendix B), and were encouraged to test out a payoff 
calculator before the experiment started. After each round, players could see all 
individual investment proposals or pledges, the total group investment, and their own 
payoffs. Players were privately paid at the end of the experiment. Average subject payoff 
was NOK 213 (USD 25) for two treatments. 
 
The first half of the experiments were run about a month before the Paris COP started. 
The second half was run one and a half year later. The neutral investment wording in the 
experiment should prevent associations to climate conferences. Participants were 
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recruited among Master level students, 50 Norwegian students studying economics and 
40 studying system dynamics; the latter students had varied backgrounds at the Bachelor 




Summary statistics in Table 1 show average last round group contributions of 
respectively 38 and 44 percent of the social optimum for NG and IP treatments. Players 
capture 70 and 72 percent of the payoff for the social optimum in respectively NG and 
IP.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics. Contributions and payoffs refer to last round contributions. 
 NG IP 
Number of groups 19 17 
Groups with final agreement 15 17 
Contribution in Nash equilibrium (NOK) 0 0 
Contribution in social optimum (NOK) 38 38 
Average contributions (NOK) 14.6 16.8 
 - as percentage of social optimum 38% 44% 
 - as percentage of endowment 24% 28% 
Optimal payoff per treatment (NOK) 150 150 
- average payoff relative to optimal 70% 72% 
 
In each of four groups in the NG treatment, one of the players voted no in the last round 
leading to zero contributions (Nash equilibrium). The four players, who voted no, were 
the ones with the highest proposals in their respective groups in the last round. Three of 
those who voted no gained in payoffs, the fourth lost, however, much less than the others 
in the same group. If the four players had voted yes, average last round contributions in 
NG would have increased from 38% to 47%. The frequency of last round individual 
proposals and pledges equal to zero were respectively 12% and 19% in NG and IP. 
 
Figure 2 shows the number of players agreeing to the set of proposals in each round. 
There is a sharp increase in the willingness to agree in the last round. This resembles the 
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Figure 2: Number of players agreeing on set of proposals, average and 95% confidence interval for average. 
Data are only available for the experiments carried out in 2017, N=10. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of multivariate regressions were the contributions in the last 
round is the left-hand side variable, and the right-hand side variables are dummies for 
treatment NG, first treatment, players being economics students, and player numbers 
indicating the effects of different cost parameters ∝𝑖. 
 
Table 2: Coefficients and p-values for linear regressions of investments in project B in final agreements, 
N=180. The degrees of  freedom have been cut in half to account for the fact that each student participated 
in both treatments. 








Coefficient -2.16 0.71 - 1.43 -0.39 18.4 
p-value 0.30 0.73 0.50 0.59 3*10-8 
 
The constant is highly significant, indicating that the overall average contribution is much 
larger than the Nash equilibrium of zero. There is no significant difference between the 
two treatments. A within subject comparison also fails to show a significant difference 
between the treatments (p=0.12). There is no significant effect of  in the order of the 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Round
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contributions tend to be higher in the first than in the ensuing treatments (Moxnes and 
Van der Heijden, 2003). There is no significant difference between contributions by 
economics students and students with mixed backgrounds. The tendency is in the same 
direction as found in many other studies (Frank et al., 1993). 
 
A clustering of errors analysis (N=29) shows that players starting with NG and 
continuing with IP tend to increase their contributions in the second treatment (intra-class 
correlation of 0.025, p=0.48). Conversely, players starting with IP tend to make similar 
decisions in the following NG treatment (intra-class correlation of 0.622, p=0.009).  
 
There is no significant effect of player number, and hence of payoff function parameter 
∝𝑖 on contributions. The social optimum predicts that player 1 should contribute NOK 
40.3 while player 5 should contribute only NOK 35.7. Hence if players behaved 
optimally, we should have obtained a regression coefficient of (35.7 − 40.3)/(5 − 1)  =
 −1.15. While the obtained regression coefficient is considerably higher, -0.39, we note 
that this coefficient is not significantly different from -1.15 (p=0.3). Hence we can neither 
reject that players behave optimally nor that costs have no effect. Interestingly, if we 
consider the IP treatment only, this tendency is strengthened. The coefficient for player 
number is -0.82 (p=0.47), and hence it is less different from -1.15 (p=0.77). The NG 
treatment yields a coefficient for player number of 0.01 (p=0.99). The groups that did not 
reach an agreement cause most of the difference from IP. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the average contributions tend to decrease over rounds in both 
treatments. In NG, the tendency is that contributions drop when it is announced that there 
are only two rounds left. In IP, contributions start to drop after period five, when the 
game may stop in any year. In NG, all agreements were made in the last period and the 
dot shows the average contribution for all groups whether they agreed or not. 
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Figure 3: Average proposals for NG and pledges for IP over rounds. 
 
Given literature on leadership in public bad games (Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2003), 
it is interesting to explore how individual decisions in any round are influenced by what 
the other four players contributed in the preceding round. Pooling data for both treatments 
(N=1440, not including round 10 for NG), we tested a simple regression model for 
individual i's investment in project B in round k. 
 
 𝐵𝑘
𝑖 = 17.9 + 0.50𝐵𝑘−1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 0.39𝑆𝑘−1 − 0.81𝑘 + 𝑒𝑘
𝑖   (2) 
 
All parameters are established with very low p-values (all lower than 1.3 10-7). First note 
that the constant is close to the one reported in Table 2. The second to last term picks up 
the downward trend in contributions over rounds k. Individual investments are positively 
correlated with the average investment for the other four players in the preceding round, 
𝐵𝑘−1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠. Individual investments are negatively correlated with the standard deviation of 
investments in project B over all five players in the preceding round, 𝑆𝑘−1. A large 
standard deviation signals an unfair distribution and pulls individual contributions in the 
direction of free riding. The effect is considerable. By use of simulation6 we find that if 
the standard deviation were reduced from its average of 11.0 to the standard deviation 
for the social optimum, 2.95, the last round average contribution 𝐵9
𝑖  would increase from 
17.5 to 23.7, an increase of 35%. 
                                                 
6  The simulation of Equation 2 starts out with the observed first period average for 𝐵1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 25.1 
and assumes that 𝐵𝑘−1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝐵𝑘−1
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The experimental design with its NG- and IP-treatments differs from more standard 
public good and bad games, except for mostly modest differences with respect to group 
sizes and number of rounds. For a sample of studies that are likely to be quite 
representative, Table 3 shows relative average contributions in the range from Nash 
equilibrium (0%) to social optimum (100%). Considering averages over rounds, NG has 
26 percentage-points higher contributions than the average for public good games and 47 
percentage-points higher contributions than the average for public bad experiments. 
Corresponding numbers for IP are 23 and 44 percentage points. Considering last round 
agreements, NG contributions exceed the average for public good games by 13 
percentage-points and the average for public bad games by 40 percentage-points. 
Corresponding numbers for IP are 19 and 45 percentage-points. 
 
 
Table 3: Group size and number of rounds together with average over rounds and last year relative 
contributions (contribution minus Nash contribution as a percentage of social optimum minus Nash 




















Group size 5 10 5 4 4 5 5 5 
Rounds 10 1 10 15 10 10 10  9 



























1 First treatment and no leader condition. 
2 First treatment with no leader and no pledge condition (Ex-base) 
3 Nonbinding pledge condition 
4 Averages taken over 9 rounds for proposed contributions in NG and pledges in IP. Last round includes 




         




Two main findings come out of this study. First, the novel game leads to larger relative 
contributions than what is typical in public bad and public good games. This is an 
important finding that gives cause for some optimism. Contributions relative to the social 
optimum are not so different from what was achieved in the Paris COP where total 
contributions to emission reductions were about half of what seems needed to reach a 
stated goal of limiting warming to 2oC. 
 
Second, the experiment finds no significant difference between average contributions for 
the two procedures, negotiations (NG) and individual pledges (IP). However, the fact that 
NG may fail to produce a final agreement implies that the risk of zero contribution is 
larger for NG than for IP. This is consistent with unsuccessful COPs after Kyoto. 
 
The two main results are more in line with experience than with standard theory. Hence, 
our novel experiment hints at how theory or models for investigation may be improved. 
First, traditional public bad games do not present a goal of reaching an explicit social 
optimum. The announcement of the goal creates a more noticeable and certain focal point 
(Schelling, 1960) than what players are likely to arrive at using otherwise available 
information and their own reasoning. Importantly, players are also likely to trust that the 
other players take notice of the same focal point. Previously, uncertainty about focal 
points in terms of thresholds has been found to reduce contributions (Barrett and 
Dannenberg, 2012). 
 
Second, when focus shifts towards reaching an agreement, the public bad problem 
becomes more of a public good problem. An agreement is in itself a public good. It is 
know from before that public good framings lead to higher contributions than public bad 
framings (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998). However, this cannot explain why 
our experiment also achieved somewhat better results than previous public good 
experiments. 
 
Third, for games to predict outcomes of COPs better, the social optimum should not 
require contributions to equal to the players' entire endowments. Other experiments show 
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that excess cash can stimulate to larger investments than what is optimal (Caginalp et al., 
2001). Similarly, when all of society's resources are not needed to limit global warming, 
it is easier to move away from the Nash equilibrium and closer to the social optimum. 
The less costly Montreal treaty to limit emissions of CFC gases illustrate this point. 
 
Neither in the experiment nor in the Paris COP did pledges reach the social optimum. 
There is also uncertainty whether real emission reductions will match pledges in coming 
years, in spite of commitments to report emissions and to submit new pledges every five 
years. Future COPs must do better. Detailed experimental results point to potentials for 
further improvements in procedures. 
 
Our experiment did not allow for face-to-face communication. Earlier studies (Hackett 
et al., 1994; Rege and Telle, 2004) show that face-to-face communication leads to 
considerable increases in contributions. Hackett et al. (1994) introduced face-to-face 
communication in an asymmetric public bad experiment with different player 
endowments (private information). Communication increased the average payoff by 33.5 
percentage points (ibid, Table VII). Communication is also an important factor for 
successful management of local common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Hence, if we 
had allowed for verbal face-to-face communication, our experiment would most probably 
have given even better results. In real COPs there is face-to-face communication. 
However, different from public bad experiments and local common-pool resources 
management, COPs operate with layers of people involved from COP negotiators to 
home country politicians and voters. While communicating negotiators seem to be more 
prone to cooperation than most people (Inman, 2009), home country voters and 
politicians may not be sufficiently involved in the communication to establish focal 
points and to build mutual trust. Hence, it is a challenge to establish communication 
between voters and politicians from different countries. 
 
Communication also allows for leading nations to collaborate to establish thresholds by 
announcing large emission reductions conditional on other nations reciprocating. 
Thresholds can create equilibrium situations where self-interest lead to increasing 
contributions over time (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). Similar to announcing a goal in 
terms of a social optimum, there may be need for information and awareness about 
constellations that could produce thresholds and new equilibria. 
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Still regarding communication, a benefit of IP in real COPs is that there is no need to 
agree on principles for how emission reductions should be allocated. This has been an 
obstacle in COPs preceding Paris (Depledge, 2000; Gollier and Tirole, 2015; Stiglitz, 
2015) most likely caused by excessive self-interest (Brick and Visser, 2015). Relying on 
voluntary pledges is likely to reduce the conflict level considerably. In this connection it 
is interesting that we cannot reject the possibility that player contributions to some extent 
reflect private information about payoff functions. Hence, a procedure with pledges (IP) 
could lead to greater efficiency than the proportional reductions often observed in 
negotiated allocations among exploiters of common property resources (Hackett et al., 
1994). The same is the case for negotiations (NG), provided final agreements rely on 
individual proposals and not on a principle of proportional reductions. Further research 
could shed light on how well Paris pledges did reflect public (and possibly revealed 
private) information about individual country "payoff functions". 
 
The experiment shows that what each player contributes in one round is positively 
influenced by what others contributed in the previous round. Previous public bad 
experiments have found that when a leader sets a good example that has a positive effect 
on followers (Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2003). Similar effects are also seen in field 
experiments (Frey and Meier, 2004). Moreover, leading nations not only influence the 
ambitions of other countries, they also have to invent and test out new abatement policies 
and to develop emission-reducing technologies. In turn, successful policies and 
technologies diffuse worldwide over time (Rogers, 1995). Information strategies are 
needed to get as much as possible out of all these leadership effects. 
 
 
In follow-up COPs after Paris, actual emission reductions are likely to become more 
important as signs of leadership than pledges. The literature on diffusion shows that 
people are inspired more by practical experiences than by theory, where "theory" could 
be seen to include uncertain promises and pledges. Uncertainty typically slows down 
diffusion (Rogers, 1995). Already today, those who argue for emission reductions point 
to good practical examples in other countries. Therefore, it is essential for leading as well 
as other nations to deliver what they have pledged. For this reason it is important that 
nations do not underestimate the effort and time needed to reduce emissions of GHGs. 
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Underestimation of the length of delays could slow down implementation of policies 
(Sterman, 1989). So can failure to take account of delays when making decisions 
(Brehmer, 1989). A laboratory experiment where the goal was to meet the Kyoto 
requirements in a cost effective way, found delayed implementations of policies and 
consequent excessive costs (Moxnes and Assuad, 2012). These findings point to the need 
for information policies. 
 
Our experiment shows that large standard deviations of contributions in one round have 
negative effects on contributions in the next round. Fehr and Gächter (2000)  find that 
when free-riders can be punished directly, and not only indirectly by lowering 
contributions towards the common good, average contributions increase over rounds and 
start to approach the social optimum. Regarding the climate problem, groups of co-
operators could punish free-riding nations by using tariffs to reduce imports of products 
with large carbon footprints. The potential for retaliation by punished free-riders must be 
considered (Fehr, 2000; Grechenig, 2010). To avoid unnecessary conflict, punishments 
should be reasonable and graduated (Ostrom, 1990). Some likely free-riders may be 
automatically punished. Provided global emissions of GHGs are reduced, reduced 
demand for fossil energy will force free-riding fossil energy exporting countries to reduce 
production and emissions. 
 
Finally, there is one more deviation between the experiment and reality that needs 
attention. In the experiment, the social optimum is clearly defined. In reality, there is 
uncertainty and confusion about what the socially optimal global emission reductions 
should be. This uncertainty invites politicians and electorates to opt for wait-and-see 
strategies (Guy et al., 2013; Moxnes and Saysel, 2009; Sterman, 2011). This strategy 
plays down the importance of facts and analysis and is likely to lower pledges and actual 
emission reductions. Thus, there is need for media attention to the problem with wait-
and-see strategies. In particular, the general population needs to understand that the 
current emission rate of GHGs is about twice as large as the removal rate and that it takes 
many years to reduce emissions towards or below the removal rate. When climate change 
has reached an unacceptable level, there is little one can do to prevent that it gets even 
worse.  
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You will participate in two experiments each in a group with four other players. The 
instructions on this page are the same for both experiments. You do not know whom you 
are participating with, and you will interact with different groups in the first and second 
experiment. Your decisions will determine how much you will be paid when the 
experiments are finished.  
 
Your task in the experiment is to decide how much to invest in projects A and B. The 
total amount you can invest is 60 NOK. What you do not invest in project B will 
automatically be invested in project A; A = 60 - B. The following formula shows how 
much you will earn in NOK in each experiment. 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = α𝐴 + (5.7 − 3.6𝐵/60)𝐵 − 1.2 ∗ (𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐴) 
 
[The letter  was replaced by the respective numbers 6.39, 6.52, 6.79, 7.07, and 7.20 for 
players 1 to 5.] 
 
Investing all 60 NOK in project A and nothing in B gives the highest direct contribution 
to your payoff. However, your investments in A, and the four other players' investments 
in A, lead to costs for everyone. Hence, if all players invest nothing in B, that will be the 
worst outcome for everyone. Investing in project B has no negative effect for everyone. 
However, the direct return on investment is lower for project B than for A. Also, the more 
you invest in project B, the lower the return on each additional NOK invested in B. To 
be precise, the per unit payoff decreases from 5.5 to 3.5 as your investment in B increases 
from 0 to 60 NOK. 
 
To help you calculate your payoff for different investments in B, you can use the payoff 
calculator that you see on the screen. You enter an investment in B for yourself, and you 
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enter assumptions about investments in B for the four others players. The calculator gives 
slightly different payoffs than the formula because numbers in the formula are rounded. 
 
Note that all players in the group have different returns on investments in project A; 
payoff formulas are different. This means that all players do not necessarily want to 
invest the same amount in project B. You do not know the returns on project A for the 
other players, and they do not know your return. 
 
Using information that is not available to you or any of the four other players, it has been 
found that total payoffs are maximized for a total investment in B of 190 NOK, which is 
an average investment of 38 NOK per players. This maximum requires that investments 
in project B vary among players. 
 
First/Second experiment [if NG-treatment] 
 
In this experiment, you will enter a series of negotiations with the other four players. This 
works as follows: all players announce how much they are willing to reduce their 
investments in project A by proposing investments in project B, thus establishing a 
contract proposal. When all players have made a proposal, the proposals become 
common knowledge, and all players are asked to say yes or no to the current contract. If 
everyone says yes, negotiations stop and you will earn the contract payoff. If at least one 
player says no, the negotiation moves to the next round. Then you will be invited to make 
a new proposal, and the proposal process starts again and continues until you get an 
agreement or you reach the maximum number of rounds (10 rounds). If you do not reach 
an agreement by the tenth round, you get a payoff that corresponds to 0 investments in 
project B by all players. 
During the experiment, only do what you are instructed to do. Do not talk to other players 
during the experiments, do not start any other program on your computer, and do not 
close down the experiment program. In case something should go wrong, for each round, 
write down the investment in project B that you propose in the table below. When 
finished, fold the paper so that nobody can see your proposals. Thanks for following these 
instructions the best you can! 
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Obtained payoff in this experiment: ___________________ NOK 
 
Second/First experiment [if IP-treatment] 
 
In this experiment, you will make a series of pledges (voluntary contributions) to the 
group. This works as follows: all players announce how much they are willing to reduce 
their investments in project A by proposing investments in project B, thus establishing a 
contract proposal. When all players have made a pledge, the pledges become common 
knowledge. Based on the current contract proposal, you are free to revise your pledge to 
the group by announcing another investment in project B. Revisions will go on for at 
least 6 rounds and possibly up to 11 rounds. None of the players know exactly when 
revisions of the contract will stop. Hence, after round 6 any pledge you make could be 
the binding one. You get a payoff that corresponds to the investments in project B by all 
players in the final round. 
During the experiment, only do what you are instructed to do. Do not talk to other players 
during the experiments, do not start any other program on your computer, and do not 
close down the experiment program. In case something should go wrong, for each round, 
write down the investment in project B that you pledge in the table below. When finished, 
fold the paper so that nobody can see your pledges. Thanks for following these 
instructions the best you can! 
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Appendix B:  
 
The experiment was programmed in Livecode, with a program downloaded to each and 
every computer linking to a common server and database. 
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Socially aversive personalities and income distribution: 
Can the dark triad predict behavior in the dictator and 
gangster games?  
 
 
David Lara Arango 





Finding reliable indicators for how humans make decisions is a subject of upmost 
importance. The Dark triad presents itself as a promising indicator of behavior, as it has 
been extensively suggested in the social psychology literature. People who score high in 
the triad components, namely Narcissism, Machiavellianism and Psychopathy, have been 
characterized as being impulsive, selfish and having a generalized lack of empathy. 
Similar to other indicators such as IQ, these personality traits have been able to predict 
behavioral feats in various contexts. However, it is unclear whether the Dark Triad can 
predict people’s decisions in a non-cooperative setting, such as the dictator and gangster 
games. Moreover, it is unclear whether these personality features are sufficient to explain 
individual behavior in controlled environments, or whether they can be considered as a 
form of the fundamental attribution error. This paper proposes an experimental design to 
investigate this issue. The findings suggest that the Dark triad has no significant 
predictive power in the dictator and gangster games, thus supporting the hypothesis of 
the triad being a form of the fundamental attribution error. 
  
 





         




Finding reliable indicators for human decision making processes has been a problem 
many scholars have struggled with.  In this sense, the Dark triad presents itself as yet 
another indicator for such decision making processes. Ever since Paulhus and Williams 
(2002) pointed out that Narcissism, Machiavellianism and Psychopathic traits were a set 
of variables that could explain socially aversive behavior (at a sub-clinical level), the 
literature on what thereafter was known as the Dark Triad has been growing quickly 
(Furnham et al, 2013; Jones and Paulhus, 2011a). Despite the fact that Narcissism, 
Machiavellianism and Psychopathic traits already had vast separate literatures when 
Paulhus and Williams (2002) published their work, the Dark Triad generated a substantial 
response in the academic community (Furnham et al, 2013). The reason behind such a 
response was that the three components of the Dark triad share the same behavioral core, 
namely a tendency towards callous manipulation, which at a sub-clinical level can make 
it difficult to differentiate one of the Triad’s component from the other two. Therefore, 
one of Paulhus and Williams (2002) main contributions was to present a method to better 
triangulate callous personalities by jointly using Narcissism, Machiavellianism and 
Psychopathic traits, rather than having three isolated components.  
 
Having the Dark triad as a method to define callous personalities and socially aversive 
behavior has allowed researchers to find interesting insights about different human 
behavior in occupational, educational and interpersonal settings (Wiggins and Pincus, 
1989; Furnham and Crump, 2005). In occupational settings, the Dark triad has been used 
to study cases of bad leadership, career success and manipulation of coworkers (Paulhus 
and Buckels, 2011). In educational settings, it has been used to predict cheating and 
plagiarism among students (Nathanson et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2010). In 
interpersonal settings, it has been used to study different issues such as prejudices 
formation, social dominance orientation, cynicism, among others (Arvan, 2012; 
Rauthmann, 2012).  
 
As a predictor, the Dark triad presents yet another alternative to anticipate human 
behavior and performance, much like other predictors such as the IQ, which has been 
linked to job performance (Schmidt et al, 1998), academic performance (Frey et al., 
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2004) and income (Murray, 1998).  In this respect, recent studies suggest that the Dark 
triad can predict counterproductive leadership skills (Furnham, 2010), callous 
interpersonal behavior (Rauthmann and Kolar, 2012), antisocial behavior (Baughman et 
al., 2012) and academic entitlement (Turnipseed and Cohen, 2015). Given this predictive 
power, a natural question to ask could be, can the Dark triad also predict other types of 
entitlement, such as income entitlement? If so, then the Dark triad can be an interesting 
set of predictive variables to study how people decide in non-cooperative games that 
involve income distribution. The link between such a set of variables and behavior in 
non-cooperative income distribution games has not been established. This paper explores 
this issue by conducting an experiment consisting of the dictator and the gangster game 
(inverted dictator game) along with the Dirty dozen questionnaire (Maples et al, 2014) to 
capture participants’ Dark triad scores. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief definition 
of the three components of the Dark triad, the third section describes our experimental 
design, the fourth section explains our hypotheses, the fifth section presents our results 
and finally, the last section discusses our findings and concludes. 
 
2. The Dark Triad components 
 
As was previously mentioned, the three components of the Dark triad have been the 
subject of a vast number of separated studies. This section succinctly describes each of 
them. 
 
Narcissism:   
 
Narcissism is often defined as compensatory self-promotion, characterized by 
grandiosity and attention seeking behavior (Morey et al., 2012). In other words, 





         




This psychological trait has been typically defined as having a lack of morality, a cynical 
world view and a tendency to manipulate others (Fehr et al, 1992). A more recent 
definition of Machiavellianism also accounts for the ability to build reputation, form 
alliances and plan ahead; critical factors to clearly distinguish this trait from 




The classical definition of psychopathy is a self-control deficit combined with 
callousness (Cleckley, 1941).  Unlike Machiavellian individuals, psychopaths have a 
tendency to act recklessly. In other words, psychopathy refers to the extent to which one 
can disregard other’s well-being when making impulsive decisions (Hare and Neumann, 
2008). 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
This paper uses the dictator and gangster games. The gangster game is included in order 
to explore whether the gangster game setup could be better predicted by the dark triad 
when compared to the dictator game.  Distinctions between the likely behaviors 
associated with the two games have been pointed out in the literature. Previous research 
has shown a significant change in the dictator’s behavior if he is given the possibility to 
take money instead (or besides) the possibility to give money. Some findings suggest that 
if one gives a wider options range to the dictator, the amount of money he will give to 
the recipient will be significantly smaller than the amount he would give if his only option 
was to give (Cappelen et al, 2012). However, one interesting question still remains; what 
happens when the number of options is not changed but the framing is changed, i.e. what 
happens when people can either give or take money. This question is addressed by 
comparing individuals’ behavior in the traditional dictator game with the behavior 
obtained in a gangster game. This inverted dictator game has also been called the gangster 
game (Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee ,1998). In the gangster game, an endowment is 
given to a player, and a second player is asked how much of such endowment he wants 
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to take from the first player. The dictator and the gangster games are theoretically the 
same, given that a fully rational player will choose to give zero and to take everything, 
which yields the same profit under the assumption that the endowments is both games 
are the same.  
 
Previous studies have shown differences between participants’ behavior in the dictator 
and gangster games. One example is Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998). In this 
study, the authors study how fairness considerations affect the decision making of both 
dictators and gangsters. They found that gangsters ended up leaving less than the dictators 
gave. Another example can be found in Bardsley (2008). The aim of this study is to see 
what the effects of having asymmetric endowments in both games are. Bardsley’s results 
suggests that the proportion of subjects willing to give in the dictator game was higher 
than the proportion of people willing to leave money in the gangster game. According to 
these two studies, people in the gangster game seem to have the tendency to be more 




We developed four computer interfaces for the dictator game and the gangster game 
(Appendix A). One for the dictator in the dictator game, one for the recipient in the 
dictator game, one for the gangster in the gangster game and one for the victim in the 
gangster game. In the instructions (Appendix B) the dictators were told they were given 
an endowment of 60 NOK (6.9 USD approximately), of which they had to decide how 
much to share with a second player, who had 0 NOK. They were also told that the second 
player knew how much their endowment was. The recipients were told they had 0 NOK 
and that there was another player who had received an endowment of 60 NOK and was 
entitled to share a fraction of such money with them. In a separate sheet of instructions, 
the gangsters were told that a second player was given an endowment of 60 NOK and 
they had to decide how much of those 60 NOK they wanted to take for themselves. The 
victims were told they had received an endowment of 60 NOK and that there was another 
player who had received 0 NOK and could decide how much of the 60 NOK he wanted 
for himself. 
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We ran two experimental sessions with 15 groups of two people in one and 13 groups of 
two people in another one. The subjects were System Dynamics and Economics master 
students from the University of Bergen, Norway. All subjects were recruited from 
classes.  In each session, we ran both the dictator and the gangster game, that is, we used 
a within-subject experimental design. Since we used a within-subject variation design, 
14 out of the 28 groups in did the dictator game first and then the gangster game while 
the remaining 14 groups started with the gangster game and then continued with the 
dictator game. Participants were not allowed to take part in more than one session. 
Subjects were told that they would be paid privately the amount of money they had after 
the game was over.  
 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly seated behind computers in cubicles. The 
experiment was designed such that couples (dictator-recipient, gangster-victim) were 
randomly assigned and each participant could not identify her counterpart. The within-
subject design ensured that the ones who were dictators (gangsters) in the first round 
were gangsters (dictators) in the second round. The instructions were distributed among 
the participants and they were told they had 10 minutes to read the instructions and ask 
questions about them. All information was common knowledge.  
 
Participants were playing on linked computers, once the experiment started, the dictators 
had to type the amount of money they wanted to share with the recipient (any amount 
from 0 to 60 NOK in integer numbers, was allowed), and the gangster had to type how 
much of their victims’ endowment they wanted for themselves (any amount from 0 to 60 
in integer numbers, was allowed). Participants were asked to press their respective 
interface buttons (see the interfaces in Appendix B). First, the dictators and gangsters 
typed their decisions and pressed their interfaces’ buttons, thus sending their decisions to 
their respective recipients and victims. Recipients and victims were then asked to press 
the button “Open” to see what their counterparts had given (or left) to them. After having 
filled in the Dirty dozen questionnaire (Appendix C) proposed by Maples et al (2014) 




         




This study’s null hypothesis states that the Dark triad has no significant predictive power 
in control environments, given that it may not be character (or personality) that 
determines participants actions in the dictator and gangster games, but rather participants’ 
circumstances. Previous studies have argued that character is not a good predictor of 
people’s actions. In fact, the majority of people are more influenced by their 
circumstances (or rather the way they perceive their circumstances) than they are by their 
characters (Harman, 1999). Failing to account for people’s circumstances and assuming 
that their actions are only a direct reflection of their character is often referred to as the 
fundamental attribution error in the scientific literature (e.g. Ross, 1977; Flanagan, 1991; 
Nisbett and Ross, 1991). While both games present particular circumstances for 
participants, they are both fairly abstracted from real life situations. In this sense, it is 
mostly participants’ character that would define how they decide in either game.  Being 
a character assessment system, one could expect the Dark triad to be a weak predictor of 
people’s behavior. 
 
The alternative hypothesis states that subjects with the highest score in the Dark Triad 
test will be the ones giving the least in the dictator game and leaving the least in the 
gangster game. This hypothesis is based on previous findings of the Dark triad, 
suggesting that subjects that score high on the Dark triad test are  more aggressive when 
seeking their own interest given their lack of empathy for others (Jonason and Krause, 
2013), In addition, subjects who score high in the Dark triad have also shown higher 
impulsivity (Jonason and Tost, 2010) and a tendency towards risk-taking behavior 
(Adams et al, 2014), which, combined, constitute an ego-satisfying tendency that is 
consistent with higher entitlement and higher selfishness (Campbell et al, 2004; Jones 




Since we used a within-subject experimental design with two different sequencing orders 
for the two games, we performed a dummy regression analysis test to determine whether 
the sequencing of the games has any effect in how participants decided in one game 
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versus the other. Table 1 shows the dummy variables regression analysis. As Table 1 
shows, neither the type of game (dictator/gangster), nor the sequencing of the games had 
a significant effect in the average amount given by the dictators nor the amount left by 
the gangsters. Since there is no such effect, we can group all the dictators’ decisions and 
all the gangsters’ decisions regardless of the sequence in which such decisions were made 
for any given person. 
 
Table 1. Dummy variables regression testing the game type and sequencing simultaneously. 
 Coeff.value Std. error Std.coeff t Sig 
Constant 17.553 3.872   4.534 0.000 
Game 1.037 4.525 0.032 0.229 0.820 
Sequencing 2.005 4.528 0.062 0.443 0.660 
 
Regarding differences between the dictator and gangster games, a t-test comparison 
shows no significant difference between the average amount given by the dictator and 
the average amount left by the gangsters (dictators average=19.6, gangsters average= 
18.5, P-value=0.83). A series of regressions were conducted in order to explore a link 
between participants Dark triad scores and their decisions, using the questionnaire score 
for Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy as explanatory variables for the 
amounts given by the dictators and the amount left by the gangsters. Table 2 shows the 
resulting R-squares and the P-values for each of the three components of the Dark triad. 
As Table 2 shows, only Machiavellianism seems to play a marginally significant role 
(with a 90% confidence level) in determining how much a dictator will give to his 
counterpart. 
 
Table 2. Average scores, scores standard deviations and regression results for each of the Dark triad’s 
elements as explanatory variables of the amount dictators give and gangsters leave to their counterparts.  
 
 
  Dictator game Gangster game 
 
Av.score* Std.dev** R^2  P-Value Slope    R^2 P-Value Slope 
Narcissism   3.76    1.68 0.00 0.88 -0.30    0.00 0.76 -0.58 
Machiavellianism  2.95          1.63 0.09     0.07 -3.10    0.02 0.50 1.15 
Psychopathy   4.29    1.92 0.03 0.21 -2.18     0.01 0.56 0.99 
* Scores for each of the triad’s component range from 1 to 9. Questions 1 to 4 relate to Machiavellianism, 
5 to 8 are related to Psychopaty and 9 to 12 are related to Narcisism 
** Sample standard deviation 
         




To further explore the relationship between the Dark triad components and subjects’ 
behavior, we divided the group in accordance to their recent educational background. 
Tables 3 and 4 shows the results for the Economics and System Dynamics students. As 
these two tables show, there are only two marginally significant relationships in the 
Economics students case for the dictator game (Machiavellianism and Psychopathy are 
significant at a 90% confidence level). There seems to be no significant relationship 
between the Dark triad components and the dictator game for the System dynamics 
students nor for the gangster game in neither of the two groups. 
 
Table 3. Regressions results for the System Dynamics master students 
 
 
Dictator game Gangster game 
 
R-Squared P-Value Slope R-Squared P-Value Slope 
Narcissism  0.01 0.71 -0.88 0.04 0.47 -1.67 
Machiavellianism 0.04 0.51 -1.28 0.01 0.71 0.74 
Psychopathy  0.00 0.93 -0.16 0.01 0.78 0.52 
Table 4. Regressions results for the Economics master students 
 
Dictator game Gangster game 
 
R-Squared P-Value Slope R-Squared P-Value Slope 
Narcissism  0.04 0.52 -3.37 0.03 0.56 2.97 
Machiavellianism 0.19 0.08 -8.08 0.04 0.50 3.16 
Psychopathy  0.22 0.06 -6.64 0.03 0.57 2.10 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
We developed and ran an experiment to study whether it is possible to establish a 
connection between the Dark triad and people decision making on income distribution in 
an experimental setting. Our results suggest that there is not a strong link between the 
Dark triad components of personality and how people decide on income distribution 
problems. However, it is interesting to note that we found smaller P-values for 
Machiavellianism and Psychopathy in the dictator game than in the gangster game. In 
this sense, the Dark triad does seem to be a good indicator for participant behavior in 
some experiments, while it has been a good indicator for behavior in other settings 
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(Arvan, 2012; Rauthmann, 2012) and not in others. This property resembles the research 
on the predictive power of the IQ for different types of performances and 
accomplishments. In a similar way as the IQ, which has been found to be both a powerful 
predictor (Schmidt et al, 1998; Frey et al., 2004; Murray, 1998) and a non-reliable 
predictor of high performance (Kamphaus, 2005; Neisser, et al., 1996) across different 
settings, the Dark triad prediction power may be highly context-dependent and thus hard 
to reproduce in some experiments. In this sense, The Dark triad could indeed be 
considered a form of the fundamental attribution error. Therefore, our results allow us to 
reject our alternative hypothesis and to not reject our null hypothesis. 
 
The reasons why Machiavellianism and Psychopathy may be important predictive 
variables when it comes to making decisions about income distribution can be found in 
the literature. Machiavellians are characterized by being careful strategist who manage 
their own reputation and their relationship with others in such a way that allows them to 
get the maximum benefit for themselves (Kessler et al., 2010). Psychopaths are 
characterized by a marked lack of empathy, which leads them to disregard others 
wellbeing in relation with their own (Hare and Neumann, 2008). An interesting point 
comes from the fact that we are using a one-shot game in our experiment such that 
reputation building is not possible. By not allowing players to build reputation, the 
boundary between Machiavellianism and Psychopathy is difficult to define (Jones and 
Paulhus, 2011a). Future research is needed to explore specific links between the Dark 
triad and people’s behavior in controlled environments.  
 
Contrary to previous studies, this article finds no differences between the dictator and 
gangster games. One possible explanation for this is that previous studies have added 
circumstances. Such is the case of Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998) who 
introduced fairness considerations and Bardsley (2008), who introduced asymmetric 
endowments and scale up transfers in both games. It is also interesting to compare this 
article results with previous studies in the public good and public bad literature such as 
Andreoni’s (1995) work on the motivations behind people’s contribution to a common 
good or a common bad. Andreoni argues that the good feeling of contributing to a 
common cause (the warm glow) is often stronger than the guilt one may feel when one 
contributes to a common bad (cold prickle). While Andreoni’s (1995) paper and the 
present article are based on different games, one may argue that the warm glow and the 
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cold prickle would be present in the dictator and gangster games, that is, the warm glow 
will drive the dictators to give money to their recipients, and the cold prickle will keep 
the gangsters from taking money away from their victims. Consequently, the dictators 
should give more than what gangsters leave to their counterparties if Andreoni’s 
explanation is correct. Our results do not provide evidence to support such explanation. 
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Appendix A: Interfaces 
 
Dictator in the dictator game 
 
Recipient in the dictator game 
 
Gangster in the gangster game 
 
Victim in the gangster game 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
 
Instructions for the dictator in the dictator game: 
 
You are Player 1 in a group of 2 players. You start with 60 NOK, and Player 2 is given 
0 NOK. You have to make a decision about giving money to Player 2. You are free to 
give from 0 to 60 NOK. Player 2 knows that you have started with 60 NOK. You cannot 
identify Player 2, and Player 2 cannot identify you. 
Write the amount you will give to Player 2 in the blank space, and click on the Give 
button. After the game you will be paid the remaining amount of money, and Player 2 
will be paid the amount you gave him or her. 
 
Instructions for the recipient in the dictator game: 
 
You are Player 2 in a group of 2 players. You start with 0 NOK, and Player 1 is given 60 
NOK. Player 1 can give some of this money to you. Player 1 is free to give from 0 to 60 
NOK. Player 1 knows that you have started with 0 NOK. You cannot identify Player 1, 
and Player 1 cannot identify you. 
To be ready to receive information about how much Player 1 decides to give to you, click 
on the Open button. This is the amount you will be paid, and Player 1 will be paid what 
remains of the 60 NOK. 
 
Instructions for the gangster in the gangster game: 
 
You are Player 1 in a group of 2 players. You start with 0 NOK, and Player 2 is given 60 
NOK. You have to make a decision about taking money from Player 2. You are free to 
take from 0 to 60 NOK. Player 2 knows that you have started with 0 NOK. You cannot 
identify Player 2, and Player 2 cannot identify you. 
Write the amount you want to take from Player 2 in the blank space, and click on the 
Take button. After the game, you will be paid the amount of money that you took, and 
Player 2 will be paid what remains. 
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Instructions for the victim in the gangster game: 
 
You are Player 2 in a group of 2 players. You start with 60 NOK, and Player 1 is given 
0 NOK. Player 1 can take money from you. Player 1 is free to take from 0 to 60 NOK. 
Player 1 knows that you have started with 60 NOK. You cannot identify Player 1, and 
Player 1 cannot identify you. 
To be ready to receive information about how much Player 1 has decided to leave for 
you, click on the Open button. This is the amount you will be paid, and Player 1 will be 
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Appendix C: Dirty dozen questionnaire (Maples et al, 2014) 
 
This is a standard questionnaire that has been used in previous studies all over the world. 
Do not write your name anywhere on this sheet of paper. 
 
Please rate your agreement with the items below using numbers ranging from Strongly 
disagree (1) to Strongly agree (9). 
 
1. I tend to manipulate others to get my way. 
 
2. I have used deceit or lied to get my way. 
  
3. I have used flattery to get my way. 
 
4. I tend to exploit others towards my own end. 
 
5. I tend to lack remorse. 
 
6. I tend to be unconcerned with the morality of my actions. 
 
7. I tend to be callous or insensitive. 
 
8. I tend to be cynical. 
 
9. I tend to want others to admire me. 
 
10. I tend to want others to pay attention to me. 
 
11. I tend to seek prestige or status. 
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